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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the implications of technological innovation in the financial
markets to asset prices, market quality, and the delegated portfolio management sector.
Three such developments are considered: index funds (Chapter 1), quantitative mutual
funds (Chapter 2), and exchange traded products (Chapter 3). For index funds, I
study the drivers of the growth in passive investing and its effect on market efficiency.
For quantitative mutual funds and exchange traded products, I explore their impact
on various measures of market quality such as price discovery, market efficiency, and
liquidity.
Chapter 1 investigates the impact of fundamental information acquisition costs on
price informativeness and passive investing. Within a noisy rational expectations equi-
librium (REE) model of multiple risky assets and a redundant market index, I define
passive investing as the optimal decision to: 1) free-ride on the information acquisition
efforts of active traders in the index asset, and 2) forgo all stock picking strategies.
Falling information costs have the dual effect of lowering the cost of market timing, de-
creasing passive share, and lowering the cost of stock picking, increasing passive share.
If the stock picking effect dominates the market timing effect, passive share increases
in tandem with greater price informativeness. I exploit the Security and Exchange
Commission’s eXtensible Business Reporting Language mandate as a negative shock
to information costs to provide suggestive evidence that falling information costs may
be contributing to the rise in passive investing.
ix
Chapter 2, joint with Paolo Pasquariello, studies the effects of quantitative equity
investing, an increasingly popular investment style, on financial market quality. Within
a noisy REE model of strategic speculation with two informed market participants, we
define discretionary investing as fully strategic trading and quantitative investing as
partially or fully myopic via its reliance on a backtested trading strategy. Growth in
quantitative investing is modeled as both the introduction of and the greater backtest
adherence by an informed speculator. The introduction of an additional speculator
generally benefits financial market quality. The effect of greater backtest adherence
depends on whether it leads to more or less aggressive trading than discretion, the
former improving, while the latter worsening market quality. If it is more aggressive,
market quality broadly benefits with greater quantitative investing; if it is less aggres-
sive, market quality deteriorates.
Chapter 3 explores the implications of the growth in exchange traded funds (ETFs)
and the associated arbitrage trading on price discovery and market liquidity. The
introduction of arbitrage trading to segmented markets with otherwise diverging prices
averages noise trading across markets, as the arbitrageur buys (sells) in the market
with excess noise supply (demand). This smoothing results in less informed trading
due to lower camouflage for the speculators, and lower liquidity due to greater adverse
selection concerns for the market makers. The introduction of an ETF that attracts
a threshold level of incremental noise trading leads to unambiguous improvements in
the market quality of the underlying security, as the arbitrageur connects the synthetic
and underlying markets by averaging noise trading across markets. I highlight the
differential effects on market quality of stand-alone arbitrageurs and market makers
jointly serving as arbitrageurs, with the former leading to greater informed trading
intensity for the speculators and greater adverse selection for the market makers, and
the latter having the opposite effect.
x
CHAPTER I
Information, Participation, and Passive Investing
1.1 Introduction
The dramatic growth in the share of passive versus active equity investment man-
agement has sparked a vibrant debate about both its causes and its effects on price
discovery and market efficiency.1,2
A natural and popular explanation for the rise in passive investing, one consistent
with standard models of price formation in the literature, is the relative decline in
the cost of passive versus active asset management. For instance, within Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980, “GS80”), greater relative costs of active investing would lead to
more passive investing in equilibrium. However, in such models this growth would be
accompanied by less informative prices, which is at odds with empirically documented
trends of increasing price informativeness (Bai et al. (2016)) especially for the larger
firms in the economy most affected by indexing strategies (Farboodi et al. (2018)).3
1According to Investment Company Institute (2020), as of 2019, US index and exchange traded
funds (ETFs) accounted for 49% of assets under management by the US open-end equity fund industry,
up from 6% in 1996.
2See, for example, O’Hara (2003) and Boehmer and Kelley (2009) for some evidence on the impor-
tance of asset management in price discovery and Bond et al. (2012) for a review of the literature on
the real effects of financial markets.
3By price informativeness I refer to the extent to which prices reflect fundamentals. In my setting
this will be the inverse of payoff variances conditional on prices. An example of an empirical coun-
1
The observed joint growth in passive share and price informativeness poses a challenge
for simple cost-based explanations.
My first contribution is theoretical: I highlight conditions under which a decline in
active versus passive investment costs leads to both a growing passive share and more in-
formative prices. The result is driven by two realistic extensions to the traditional GS80
framework. First, I incorporate multiple risky assets to separately consider market tim-
ing and stock picking investment strategies for active investing. Second, I differentiate
between participation and information costs for stock picking strategies. Within this
setup, falling fundamental information costs have the dual effect of increasing the frac-
tion of investors pursuing market timing strategies – thereby decreasing passive share
– and decreasing the fraction of investors participating in stock picking strategies –
thereby increasing passive share. To the extent that the stock picking effect on passive
share dominates the market timing effect, falling fundamental information costs lead
to both an endogenously rising passive share and greater price informativeness.
My second contribution is empirical: I provide supportive evidence that the falling
information cost channel is at least partially responsible for the rise in passive investing.
I utilize the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) mandate implemented by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a regulatory shock to information
costs. In the literature (e.g. Dong et al. (2016), Jaskowski and Rettl (2018)), this
event is interpreted as a negative exogenous shock to the cost of acquiring fundamental
information. Exploiting the advantageous phase-in design of the regulation, I find
that lower information costs cause a deterioration in the stock-picking performance
of active strategies, consistent with the main testable implication of my model. This
decline in performance coincides with flows out of active and into passive strategies
with comparable investment objectives. To my knowledge, my study is the first to
terpart would be the slope from a regression of future realized fundamentals on current market prices
(e.g. Bai et al. (2016)).
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attempt to empirically link the rise in passive investing with falling information costs.
To describe the theoretical effect of falling information costs on passive investing, I
first identify what it means to be optimally passive. In this paper, I focus on the purest
and most prominent form of passive investing: the sole allocation to a broad market
aggregate without information acquisition. In this setting, a passive investor partici-
pates in the stock market via an index fund and avoids all active management. Since
active management is a combination of market timing and stock picking strategies, a
passive investor: 1) allocates to a broad market index, 2) forgoes market timing, and 3)
forgoes stock picking. Taken together, the first and second conditions imply that pas-
sive investors optimally free-ride on the information acquisition efforts of active traders
in a market aggregate. The third condition states that passive investors optimally do
not participate in stock selection strategies. These determinants of passive investing
inform the structure of my stylized model for the asset management sector in which
passive investing arises endogenously as an optimal portfolio allocation.
My framework builds on GS80 to allow for both passive investing and the different
types of active management. To distinguish between market timing and stock picking
strategies, I introduce N risky securities and a redundant index asset, whose expected
payoff mimics the aggregate expected payoff to the market. As in GS80, each of the
N + 1 securities has a fundamental payoff, which can be learned for a corresponding
information acquisition cost. I employ an asset rotation inspired by Bond and Garcia
(2020) to decompose the investment set into the index asset and N − 1 orthogonal
long-short portfolios, labeled as stock picking strategies. The stock picking strategies
are costly to participate in, which is meant to resemble the costly nature of active
management over-and-above information acquisition costs (e.g. trading and market
impact costs, excessive fees, overhead, moral hazard, etc.).4 The rotation allows me
4My model generalizes to costly participation for the index asset as well without affecting its main
takeaways. In this case, stock market non-participation will also emerge, which is not the focus of
3
to directly map the investors’ equilibrium portfolio allocations in each of the synthetic
securities to either the passive strategy or various types of active investment strategies.
Within this setup, market timing is defined as investing in the index security with
information acquisition. Stock picking is reflected as participation in at least one of
the stock picking strategies, either with or without information acquisition.5
In equilibrium, the fractions of investors pursuing the passive and various active
strategies are determined by two key forces: 1) strategic substitutability in information
acquisition and 2) strategic substitutability in stock picking participation. The former
is the key outcome of GS80 and directly applies to the index asset: as more investors
acquire information, the value of information acquisition declines, uniquely identifying
the equilibrium fraction of market timers in the economy. The latter, to my knowledge,
is novel and is essential to exploring passive investing. If participating stock pickers op-
timally select their information acquisition strategies, more stock picking participation
results in lower gains to participation for all. Taken together, the two forces ensure
the uniqueness and existence of a linear equilibrium for participation and information
acquisition in stock picking. I then explore the effects of changing information costs
on passive share through their effect on the optimal investment in the index and stock
picking strategies.
The effect of lower information costs for the index asset is standard (i.e. as in
GS80): lower costs lead to a greater fraction of investors acquiring information and
more informative prices. This has the immediate implication of a lower passive share
as more investors pursue a market timing strategy. Thus, as noted earlier, this channel
cannot explain the observed improvement in price informativeness accompanying a
this paper. Therefore, for exposition, I assume that all investors participate in the index asset.
5Uninformed stock picking allows investors to deviate from the passive index without information
acquisition. As originally pointed out by Admati (1985) and more recently emphasized by Biais
et al. (2010) and Garleanu and Pedersen (2020), within models of noisy rational expectations the
unconditional expected market portfolio need not be the optimal portfolio for an uninformed investor
due to the uncertainty associated with the supply of securities.
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greater passive share in the US. The effect of lower information costs on stock picking
is twofold. On the one hand, lower costs incentivize information acquisition, which
motivates a greater fraction of participating investors to become informed. On the other
hand, because a greater fraction of investors are informed, prices become more reflective
of fundamentals, which, in turn, reduces the gains to participation. As expected profits
for stock pickers turn negative, some choose to forgo stock picking altogether, resulting
in a greater passive share. In this scenario, passive share and price informativeness
increase in tandem. The question of which of these forces dominates is ultimately an
empirical one and motivates me to take the prediction to the data.
As a basis for my tests, I propose the following institutional mechanism for the ef-
fect of lower information costs on passive investing. As information costs fall, the first
and most immediate effect is that more active investors acquire information, leading
to more informative prices, and ultimately resulting in deteriorating performance for
active funds. Consequently, investors allocating to active funds internalize the perfor-
mance decline and take money out leading to capital outflows from active investing.
Finally, some of the investors pulling money out of active strategies, reallocate to pas-
sive strategies resulting in capital inflows to passive funds. I attempt to identify each
of the three effects (i.e. lower active performance, active outflow, and passive inflow)
in the data.
Empirically identifying the effect of lower information costs on passive investing
is nontrivial since fundamental information costs are endogenously determined and
typically not easily observable. I address these concerns by exploiting SEC’s “Interac-
tive Data to Improve Financial Reporting” rule as an exogenous and negative shock
to information costs. This regulation, originally introduced in 2009, required firms to
provide their financial statements in an interactive format utilizing XBRL, which made
financial information easier to export into spreadsheets, to machine read with off-the-
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shelf software, and to compare it across firms (via a standard list of tags developed
by XBRL US and reviewed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB]). To
the extent that investors were previously paying third-party data providers for data
manipulation or were spending their own time on it, they can now reduce these costs
by automating the data collection process.6, 7
To establish the effect of information costs on the performance of active manage-
ment, I rely on the staggered phase-in design of the regulation. The first phase applied
to companies with a public equity float of over $5bn: these companies were required
to adopt XBRL reporting for financial statements for fiscal periods ending on or after
June 15, 2009. The second phase applied to companies with public equity float between
$700mm and $5bn: these firms had to utilize XBRL for filings for fiscal periods ending
on or after June 15, 2010. Finally, all remaining filers had to comply for fiscal periods
ending on or after June 15, 2011.
I exploit cross-sectional variation in active mutual funds’ exposure to the informa-
tion cost shock as measured by the fraction of their assets invested in securities exposed
to each phase of the regulation. I argue that greater exposure to the shock will lead
to weaker future fund performance as measured by a fund’s Carhart alpha (Carhart
(1997)). To establish causality, I group funds based on their exposures to either phase
1 or their joint exposure to phases 2 and 3. I take a subset of funds that are either
exposed predominantly to phase 1 (group 1, ≥ 75% of total net assets) or predomi-
nantly to phases 2 and 3 (group 2, ≥ 75% of total net assets) and track their relative
performance through time utilizing an event study approach.
6See e.g. Kim et al. (2012), Blankespoor et al. (2014), Dong et al. (2016), Jaskowski and Rettl
(2018), Bhattacharya et al. (2018) for evidence that the XBRL mandate results in greater information
acquisition by market participants.
7Implicit to my analysis is also the assumption that lower information costs leads to greater price
informativeness in the affected securities. Several theories have been proposed demonstrating that
greater transparency or lower information costs need not imply more informative prices (Banerjee
et al. (2018) and Dugast and Foucault (2018)).
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I find that the performance of the two groups of funds is comparable both during the
pre-treatment period and during phases 1 and 2 of the treatment. However, as phase 3
is implemented, group 1 funds begin to significantly underperform group 2 funds. The
underperformance steadily declines for approximately two years, after which the gap
starts to shrink, ultimately converging in another two years. The trend suggests that
the information cost shock affects fund performance with a lag of approximately two
years, which is consistent with the notion that changes to information costs need time
to be internalized by investors and ultimately be reflected in more informative prices
and declining fund performance.
Both group 1 and group 2 funds exhibit fund outflows, which are especially pro-
nounced in the periods after the respective implementation of phase 1 and phases 2 and
3 of the XBRL mandate. While I’m unable to tease out a causal interpretation for the
active fund outflows, a closer look at the flows to passive funds suggests that perhaps
investors are rotating out of active and into passive funds. More specifically, I apply a
similar grouping based on exposure for passive funds and focus on those passive funds
that are most comparable to the affected active funds as dictated by their investment
objective. I find that group 1 passive funds see significant inflows right around the
time of deteriorating performance for group 1 active funds.
Overall, my paper highlights a novel theoretical link between falling information
costs and the rise in passive investing and provides supportive empirical evidence for
this relationship in US equity markets. Thus, my contribution to the literature is
twofold. On the theoretical side, I contribute to the literature on endogenous informa-
tion acquisition, the aggregation of information and its incorporation into prices, and
the effects of both on portfolio allocation and investor behavior.8 On the empirical side,
I add to the growing literature that explores the effects of developments in information
8E.g. GS80,Verrecchia (1982),Kacperczyk et al. (2016),Garleanu and Pedersen (2017)
7
technology and financial innovation on asset prices and market efficiency.9
I proceed as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 1.3
introduces the model. Section 1.4 explains the solution. Section 1.5 discusses the
comparative statics. Section 1.6 presents the empirical analysis. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Reconciling falling information costs with growth in passive investing is challeng-
ing within canonical noisy rational expectations models since lower costs imply more
information acquisition and therefore more active investing (GS80, Verrecchia (1982)).
Hence, the more recent theories, which explain the rise in passive investing by relying
on the lower relative costs to indexing strategies as the primary driver, yield lower equi-
librium price informativeness (Peress (2005), Bond and Garcia (2020), Garleanu and
Pedersen (2020)).10 Multiple asset models with information choice yield similar im-
plications (Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010),
Veldkamp (2011), Kacperczyk et al. (2016), Abis (2020), Kacperczyk et al. (2018)). In
these studies, lower information costs can be viewed as greater information process-
ing capacity; however, this would have a similar effect of more information acquisition
implying more active management. More broadly my work contributes to the class of
models exploring the aggregation of information in markets with asymmetric informa-
tion (Hellwig (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981)) and investing across multiple
securities (Admati (1985)).
Several papers – including Subrahmanyam (1991), Bhattacharya and O’Hara (2018)
Gorton and Pennacchi (1993), and Cong and Xu (2016) – consider passive investing
9E.g. Dong et al. (2016), Jaskowski and Rettl (2018), Zhu (2019), Katona et al. (2019)
10Bond and Garcia (2020) do find that while price efficiency declines for the index asset, the relative
price efficiency of individual stocks rises. Within my framework, since I am specifically altering
information acquisition costs with endogenous information acquisition, lower information costs lead
to greater aggregate and relative price efficiency.
8
within a Kyle (1985) framework in which sophisticated market participants are strategic
and internalize the impact of their trades. These papers generally point to greater factor
information in prices due to the introduction of an index and the potential mitigation of
adverse selection by uninformed traders. The latter two also emphasize the decreasing
price efficiency in individual security prices as a result of composite security trading.
Unlike these studies, I focus specifically on information costs, and how they may impact
passive share.
Over the last few decades, fundamental data have become more abundant, more
easily accessible, and less expensive, especially thanks to regulatory overhauls. For ex-
ample, the SEC has implemented such mandates as EDGAR and XBRL to make data
more easily accessible and machine readable for investors. These reforms have spurred
much research on the effects of declining information costs on investment management
with some pointing towards greater price informativeness for the affected securities
(Kim et al. (2012), Dong et al. (2016), Jaskowski and Rettl (2018)) while others find
greater information asymmetry (Blankespoor et al. (2014)). Advancements in infor-
mation technology have also yielded alternative fundamental data ranging from retail
parking lot satellite imagery (Zhu (2019)) to cell phone ping data (Froot et al. (2017)).
Recent studies argue that such data may increase the information advantage of the
more sophisticated traders who have access to it (Katona et al. (2019)) leading to
greater income inequality (Mihet (2020)). However, other studies have documented
broad improvements to price informativeness (Bai et al. (2016), Brogaard et al. (2019),
Davila and Parlatore (2019), Martineau (2020)), especially to the larger firms in the
economy most affected by passive investing (Farboodi et al. (2018)). To the extent that
passive investing is at least partially driven by falling information costs, the presented
theoretical framework would imply more informative prices for the affected securities,
consistent with many of the studies mentioned here.
9
A growing literature has focused on the direct effects of passive investing on price
informativeness with mixed results. On the one hand, Glosten et al. (2017) find that
greater ETF ownership leads to more accurate incorporation of accounting information
suggesting that price efficiency is improving with greater passive share. On the other
hand, when investigating Russell index reconstitutions, Coles et al. (2018) find that
weak-form price efficiency deteriorates due to passive investing. Similarly, Israeli et al.
(2017) report that ETF ownership results in decreasing price efficiency, while Cremers
et al. (2016) find that more indexing usually leads to more active investing with greater
alpha. Sammon (2020) further contributes to the debate by demonstrating that prices
are becoming less informative around earnings announcements due to greater passive
ownership. While I do not measure price informativeness explicitly, my model suggests
that the portion of the rise in passive investing that is driven by falling information
costs should be accompanied by greater market efficiency.
More broadly, my paper contributes to the literature on flows and performance
for active mutual funds (e.g. Jensen (1968), Carhart (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998),
French (2008), Fama and French (2010), Berk and van Binsbergen (2015)). Further-
more, various studies have attempted to identify the sources of skill and alpha for active
mutual funds (e.g. Coval and Moskowitz (2001), Kacperczyk et al. (2005), Baker et al.
(2010)). While the literature has provided a variety of explanations for differences
in performance across funds, I focus on a very specific driver of performance, namely
information costs, and provide suggestive evidence to demonstrate that this force is in
effect.
Lastly, my theory sidesteps some realistic aspects of the mutual fund industry and
the effects of changing information costs. In particular, I do not model the asset
management sector in detail and capture all relevant frictions in reduced form (i.e.
through participation costs). Thus, my results on the growth of passive investing due
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to falling information costs likely form a lower-bound relative to a model with a more
realistic asset management sector. In the presence of moral hazard (Brown and Davies
(2017)) or search frictions (Garleanu and Pedersen (2017)), the index asset would
likely become even more attractive leading to even greater passive growth. Similarly,
introducing economies of scale and differential skill for active management (Berk and
Green (2004)) may also lead to greater passive share.
1.3 The Model
The goal of the model is to explore the effect of changes to the relative costs of active
and passive investing and the ensuing implications to the prevalence of indexing strate-
gies and price informativeness. To this end, the model will feature utility-maximizing
traders who allocate between a risk-free asset and a set of risky securities, among which
is an aggregate market index. Two types of costs to active investing will be introduced:
1) the cost of acquiring fundamental information (i.e. receiving a more precise signal
about the future payoff) and 2) any other costs associated with implementing the ac-
tive strategy (i.e. a cost to participate in the strategy). The main purpose of the
exercise is to investigate how changes to information and participation costs affect the
optimal portfolio allocations of traders in the economy, and, in particular, the fraction
of traders pursuing a pure indexing strategy.
1.3.1 Model Setup
The setting is a two-period endowment economy with multiple risky assets and a
continuum of traders indexed by the interval j ∈ [0, 1]. Endowments are assumed to be
W0 of cash for all traders and traders have CARA preferences with risk aversion of 1/τ .
Assets are priced and exchanged in the first period based on the demands of the traders
and the total supply of securities. Liquidation values are realized and consumed in the
11
second period. Markets are assumed to be competitive in that an individual agent’s
demand cannot impact the price. The agents have rational expectations in that the
structure of the model is common knowledge.
1.3.2 Assets
The market contains a risk-free asset with price and gross return normalized to
1 and i = 1, . . . , N risky assets with prices P = [P1, . . . , PN ]
′ and liquidation values
v = [v1, . . . , vN ]
′. Liquidation values are governed by a fundamental payoff θ and noise
payoff u:
v = θ + u
where θ = [θ1, . . . , θN ]
′, and u = [u1, . . . , uN ]
′. Payoffs are independent with funda-
mentals governed by θ ∼ N(µθ,Σθ) with Σθ = diag[σ2θ1 , . . . , σ
2
θN
], noise governed by
u ∼ N(0,Σu) with Σu = diag[σ2u1 , . . . , σ
2
uN
], and σθiuj = 0 for any assets i, j. Expected
supply for each asset is given by the vector X = [X1, X2, . . . , XN ]
′ and noise in the
supply will be introduced for synthetic assets defined below. I assume independent
fundamental and noise payoffs for exposition. Lemma A.2, highlighted in Appendix
A.9, demonstrates that in the case of correlated fundamentals, the payoff space can
be re-spanned with portfolios of underlying securities whose noise and fundamental
payoffs are orthogonal.
In addition to the individual assets, a redundant, value-weighted index, is offered
in the market with payoff governed by:
X ′v = X1θ1 +X2θ2 + · · ·+XNθN +X1u1 +X2u2 + · · ·+XNuN
The security-specific weights of the index asset correspond to the expected supply of
12
each security, which ensures that this is a value-weighted index.11,12
1.3.3 Passive Investing and Information Acquisition
Traders are ex-ante identical and optimally choose to become passive. Passive
traders are defined as those who avoid all active management and restrict their invest-
ment only to the index asset, which is free to trade, without acquiring information on
its fundamental payoff. All other traders are referred to as “active.” Active traders, by
definition, participate in at least one active strategy, which will be introduced below.
For any risky asset i, the fundamental θi can be learned for an information acquisition
cost ci.
13 Without information acquisition, traders attempt to learn the fundamental




= n, and a constant inverse relationship between fundamental uncertainty and




1.3.4 Introducing Synthetic Assets
The index asset is redundant. Since I am after portfolio choice in its presence, it is
useful to construct non-redundant synthetic assets that span the original payoff space
11A value-weighted index will hold a fixed percentage of shares outstanding in all of the securities
within the index. The prices will then ensure that percent of capital allocations are based on market
capitalization. Thus, absent rebalancing considerations, relative share allocations are determined by
shares outstanding for each firm in the index.
12The index is meant to resemble a broad market aggregate resembling the entire economy. The
portfolio weights of the index asset have to be proportional to the expected supply of each security for
the proofs that follow. See Garleanu and Pedersen (2020) for a further discussion on the optimality
of an index based on expected supply, as well as Pedersen (2018) for a discussion on the importance
of the uncertainty in asset supply.
13The structure of the model is slightly different from models based on Admati (1985) in which
traders receive heterogenous signals of the form sji = vi + εji where the signal noise σεji varies by
trader j. In such models individual signals aggregate and are reflected through the realization of the
fundamental vi entering the price function. In my setting, agents choose whether to acquire a fixed
signal of the form θi = vi−ui. See Veldkamp (2011) for more discussion of the difference between the
various types of information acquisition models.
14Taken together, these two assumptions imply that assets with lower payoff uncertainty have greater
expected supply, which is consistent with security issuers catering to the risk aversion of the traders.
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such that the index asset is included. Note that there are infinitely many ways of
constructing such assets; I choose a specific approach that allows me to both include
the index asset and orthogonalize the noise and fundamental payoffs of the synthetic
assets. This greatly simplifies the theoretical results to follow, as I am able to analyze
the assets on an asset-by-asset basis, since their payoffs and prices will not be correlated
by construction. In particular, I follow an approach similar to that of Bond and Garcia
(2020) and introduce synthetic assets with payoffs ṽ1, . . . , ṽN as portfolios of the original










































































Synthetic asset i = 1 is the index asset while synthetic assets i = 2, . . . , N are
long-short portfolios.15 I refer to the long-short portfolios as stock picking strate-
gies, since their payoffs reveal the relative values of securities. Synthetic assets have
prices P̃ = [P̃1, . . . , P̃N ]
′, fundamentals θ̃ = [θ̃1, . . . , θ̃N ], and noise ũ = [ũ1, . . . , ũN ]. For
any synthetic asset i, the fundamentals refer to the linear combination of θi’s in the
payoff and the noise refers to the linear combination of ui’s in the payoff. Note that
fundamental and noise payoffs of the synthetic assets are uncorrelated by construc-
tion due to the assumptions of constant information quality and constant fundamental
uncertainty to supply ratios. I label the distributional assumptions of the synthetic
15I will continue to index the assets by i not ĩ in the subscripts of variable names, however a tilde
above a variable implies that it is synthetic.
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payoffs by θ̃ ∼ N(µθ̃,Σθ̃) and ũ ∼ N(µũ,Σũ). To be able to analyze the synthetic
assets independently, noise supply is assumed to be independent across the synthetic




asset expected supply vector is determined by: X̃ = Z−1X where each column of the
matrix Z corresponds to the portfolio weights of each synthetic asset (e.g. the first
column is the vector [X1, X2, . . . , XN ]
′). The solution for the synthetic asset expected
supply vector is X̃ = [1, 0, 0, . . . , 0]′ (i.e. the index asset has expected supply of 1 while
all other assets have expected supply of 0).
All traders invest in the index asset for free.16 Participation in stock picking strate-
gies is costly over-and-above information acquisition costs, reflected by participation
costs k̃i for synthetic assets i = 1, . . . , N , aggregated into vector k̃ (note that the first
element k̃1 = 0 since the index asset is free to trade).
17. Costly participation refers
to the incremental costs incurred by active funds such as trading commissions, market
impact costs, overhead expenditures, tax filings, etc. The fundamental component of
each synthetic asset i can be learned for cost c̃i for i = 1, . . . , N aggregated into vector




i=1 c̃i. I do not take a stand on
the exact mapping from the original to the synthetic information costs. For my results
to go through, I need falling information costs to the original assets to translate into
falling information costs for the index asset and at least one stock picking strategy.
Passive traders only invest in the index asset without information acquisition, i.e.
they optimally free-ride on the information acquisition efforts of active traders in the
index asset. Active traders pursue at least one active strategy, i.e. they either acquire
information about the index asset (market timing), participate in at least one stock
16This assumption is without loss of generality for the main theoretical conclusions. With costly
participation, aggregate stock market non-participation would emerge, which is not the focus of this
paper. See Peress (2005) for more details on the relationship between information and participation
costs in a market index.
17Subscripts refer to the elements of the specified vector. E.g., Iji refers to the i
th element of vector
Ij
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picking strategy (stock picking) or do both.
1.4 Model Solution
The model is solved in four steps. First, I hold fixed the fraction of traders par-
ticipating and informed by asset (exogenous “participation” and “information”) to
identify the equilibrium price function at which all traders optimize given their type.
Next, I endogenize the information acquisition of active traders (i.e. the “information”
decision), to determine what fraction of traders optimally acquires information. Third,
I endogenize the participation decision (i.e. the “participation” decision), to determine
what fraction of traders optimally participates in the stock picking strategies. Finally,
I map the fractions of traders acquiring information across all assets and participating
in the stock picking strategies to my definition of passive share.
1.4.1 Optimal Portfolio Choice
Trader j forms a portfolio Dj to maximize the expected utility of period two wealth
(W2j) conditional on their fundamental information set Fj and participation set Rj:





The participation set indicates the prices of the synthetic assets in which trader j is
investing. For example, if trader j is active in assets 1,2, and N − 1, the participation
vector would be Rj = [P̃1, P̃2, P̃N−1]. I denote the indices of the securities in which
trader j is investing by rj (in the example, rj = [1, 2, N − 1]). Note that for all traders
P̃1 ∈ Rj since it is free to participate in the trading of the index asset. Even though
the trader observes all prices, due to the orthogonality of assets, the prices of assets in
which the trader does not participate do not inform the investment decision once the
16
participation set has been determined. Therefore the prices of the other assets can be
excluded from the conditioning variables.
The fundamental information set is composed of a subset of the fundamental vector
θ̃ for which information is acquired. The vector Fj indicates the realizations of the
fundamentals the trader will learn after incurring the associated information costs. For
example, if trader j pays c̃2 and c̃N to learn the realizations of θ̃2 and θ̃N respectively,
the information set vector Fj would be [θ̃2, θ̃N ]. Note that for any passive trader,
Fj = ∅, since passive traders, by definition, do not acquire information. I aggregate
the total information of trader j in the information-participation set Ij, where each
element Iji represents the information relevant for security i: for an informed trader
Iji = {P̃i, θ̃i}, for an uninformed trader Iji = {P̃i}, and for a non-participating trader
Iji = {∅}.
To map information and participation decisions to absolute costs, I define 1Rj =
[1{P̃1∈Rj}, . . . ,1{P̃N∈Rj}]
′ and 1Fj = [1{θ̃1∈Fj}, . . . ,1{θ̃N∈Fj}]
′. Conditional on participa-
tion and information decisions, period two wealth for trader j is given by:18





(ṽ − p̃) 1Rj
)
(1.2)
The synthetic assets are orthogonal across all dimensions relevant to prices and pay-
offs: noise supply, fundamental payoffs, and noise payoffs. Therefore, due to fixed
endowments and CARA preferences, optimal portfolio choice can be considered on an
asset-by-asset basis.
For any asset i in trader j’s participation set (i.e. {P̃i} ∈ Iji), optimal demands
18The symbol  signifies element-by-element vector multiplication. In this context it is necessary
to limit investments to assets in the participation set Rj .
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For any asset i not in trader j’s participation set (i.e. {P̃i} /∈ Iji), demands of trader
j are zero:
Dji = 0 (1.6)
All else equal, demands are greater when the conditional expected payoffs are greater
or the conditional payoff variance is lower.
1.4.2 Exogenous Information and Participation
Given the optimal demand functions specified above, I can impose market clearing
for each asset. For each synthetic asset i, I label the fraction of non-participating
traders as γ̃i (aggregated in vector γ) and the fraction of informed traders among
the participating traders as λ̃i (aggregated in vector λ). Note that since all traders
participate in the trading of the index asset, γ̃1 = 0. Given expected supply vectors
for the synthetic assets, noise supplies, and optimal demand functions provided by Eq.
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= X̃i + x̃i (1.7)
It is immediate that an equilibrium does not exist in the full non-participation case
(γ̃i = 1), since there is no demand to clear the supply of the risky asset i. Therefore, I
assume that γ̃i < 1 for all i going forward. I can rewrite the market clearing condition















≡ Si(P̃i) if γ̃i < 1 and λ̃i > 0
(1.8)
and define
Si(P̃i) = x̃i if λ̃i = 0 (1.9)
Si(P̃i) is a sufficient statistic for prices and greatly simplifies the derivation of the
equilibrium price function because E[ṽi|P̃i] = E[ṽi|Si(P̃i)] and Var[ṽi|P̃i] = Var[ṽi|Si(P̃i)].
In Appendix A.1, I derive the following:
Lemma I.1 (Equilibrium: Exogenous Information and Participation Strategy). For
any synthetic asset i, fixed λ̃i and fixed γ̃i < 1 there exists a price function of the form
P̃i(γ̃i, λ̃i, θ̃i, x̃i) = q1(γ̃i, λ̃i)+q2(γ̃i, λ̃i)θ̃i+q3(γ̃i, λ̃i)x̃i, where q1, q2 and q3 are constants,
such that for all realizations of θ̃i and x̃i, Eq. (1.7) is satisfied.
Si(P̃i) demonstrates that prices provide a noisy signal for the fundamental θ̃i. As
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in GS80, it is useful to think of Si(P̃i) as a mean preserving spread of θ̃i:







if λ̃i > 0 (1.11)
Greater volatility of the noise payoff, lower fraction of informed traders, higher risk-
aversion, higher volatility of noise trader supply, all lead to a less precise price system.
In addition, lower participation (i.e., greater γ̃i) also leads to lower precision under the
assumption of exogenous information and participation.
I have demonstrated that an equilibrium exists in which traders are exogenously
assigned information and participation decisions. Next, I allow traders to optimally
choose whether to become informed about asset fundamentals.
1.4.3 Endogenous Information, Exogenous Participation
I now consider endogenous information acquisition, i.e. traders optimally make
information acquisition decisions, with preassigned participation across multiple assets.
When making the information acquisition decision, traders do not know the specific
realization of the fundamental θ̃i or the specific realization of price P̃i. Therefore, in
making the decision of whether to acquire information, traders need to evaluate the
unconditional expected utility of acquiring information (i.e. for all potential realizations
of θ̃i and P̃i) relative to the unconditional expected utility of inferring the information
from prices (i.e. for all potential realizations of P̃i).
For the results that follow, I will rely on an identity derived in Admati and Pfleiderer
(1987), which allows me to evaluate the unconditional expected utility of a trader with
20
a specific information set. In particular, the unconditional expected utility (EU) of





























where µṽ−P̃ ,Rj is the unconditional expected return of the assets in trader j’s participa-
tion set, Σṽ−P̃ ,Rj is the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of returns of the assets
in trader j’s participation set, and Σṽ−P̃ |Ij = Σṽ|Ij is the conditional variance-covariance
matrix of returns of the assets in trader j’s participation set. The unconditional ex-
pected utility is composed of the expected utility of investing without conditioning
on prices or fundamentals (the term in the exponent) and the uncertainty reduction
associated with conditioning on any information acquired by the trader (the ratio of de-
terminants). Recall that utilities are negative; therefore a reduction in variance implies
a greater expected utility.

































An immediate consequence of Eq. (1.13) is that for a given participation set Rj, the
ratio of the unconditional expected utility of becoming informed in asset i (information-
















The lower uncertainty associated with the acquisition of fundamental information
(σũi/σṽi|P̃i) is offset by the utility lost due to the cost spent on information (exp (c̃i/τ)).
Assuming optimal demands by traders given information and participation sets and
market clearing, I can derive a closed form solution for the ratio of expected utilities
provided by Eq. (1.14). This result is summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma I.2 (Utility Change due to Information Acquisition). Given the equilibrium
price function and conditions specified in Lemma I.1, for trader j participating in
synthetic asset i (i ∈ rj), the ratio of the expected utility of being informed about i
(I∗ji = {P̃i, θ̃i}) to being uninformed (Iji = {P̃i}) is monotone and increasing in λ̃i for
a fixed γ̃i.
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The result immediately follows from properties of conditional normal distributions (see
Eq. (A.2)) and is consistent with GS80.19 The orthogonality of assets allows me to
consider the utility ratio on an asset-by-asset basis, which implies that Eq. (1.15) holds
for all synthetic assets i.
Lemma I.2 highlights the strategic substitutability in information acquisition. The
more traders acquire information in a particular asset, the lower are the relative gains
to information acquisition. I can therefore classify the equilibrium in information ac-
19Although, as noted by Veldkamp (2011), GS80 do not explicitly derive the closed form solution
for the ratio of utilities.
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quisition. If there are no informed traders, when gains to information are greatest, and
it is still not beneficial to acquire information, no one becomes informed. If everyone is
informed, and it is still worthwhile to acquire information, everyone remains informed.
Finally, if information acquisition is attractive but not for all participating traders, then
the fraction of informed traders grows exactly to the point at which the expected utility
to becoming informed is equal to the expected utility of remaining uninformed. I call
an equilibrium with endogenous information acquisition an information equilibrium.
The information equilibrium will be characterized by the fraction of traders optimally
acquiring information in every asset, the exogenously determined participants in every
asset, and a price function that clears the market at traders’ optimal demands.
Proposition I.1 (Equilibrium: Endogenous Information, Exogenous Strategy). For
a fixed level of participation given by vector γ, there exists an information equilibrium
in synthetic assets in which traders optimally make information acquisition decisions
across all assets in which they participate and all conditions of Lemma I.1 are satisfied.
The equilibrium is unique due to the monotonicity of fi(γ̃i, λ̃i) in λ̃i.
The equilibrium highlighted in Proposition I.1 will be characterized by the following
conditions. For each synthetic asset i, the following pairs (γ̃i, λ̃i) and price functions
P̃i define the information equilibrium:
If fi(γ̃i, 0) ≥ 1 then P̃i(γ̃i, 0, θ̃i, x̃i) and (γ̃i, 0) is an information equilibrium
If fi(γ̃i, λ̃
∗
i ) = 1 then P̃i(γ̃i, λ̃
∗
i , θ̃i, x̃i) and (γ̃i, λ̃
∗
i ) is an information equilibrium
If fi(γ̃i, 1) ≤ 1 then P̃i(γ̃i, 1, θ̃i, x̃i) and (γ̃i, 1) is an information equilibrium
I refer to the first equilibrium as “fully-uninformed”, the second as the “interior,” and
the third as the “fully-informed” information equilibrium. Proposition I.1 directly fol-
lows from Lemma I.2. To understand the forces present in the information equilibrium,
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It is simple to demonstrate that the squared correlation between the function of price







Therefore, price informativeness is inversely related to m̃i. Specifically, holding all
model parameters fixed, the total number of informed traders in asset i given by (1−
γ̃i)λ̃i determines the informativeness of the price system. Furthermore, ñi determines
































Eq. (1.20) and (1.21) highlight the properties of the interior information equilibrium.
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Falling information acquisition costs, higher information quality, and lower risk aver-
sion (higher τ) all lead to a more informative price system. Any change in parameters
while keeping information acquisition cost, risk aversion, and information quality con-
stant does not change the price informativeness of the price system. In an information
equilibrium, for a fixed level of participation 1− γ̃i, changes in these parameters would
lead to a change in fraction informed λ̃i to exactly offset their effect on price informa-
tiveness.
Proposition I.1 also allows me to determine the relationship between levels of par-
ticipation and information acquisition by the participating traders. For each synthetic
asset i, given an exogenous participation level 1 − γ̃i, the following conditions specify
the amount of information acquisition that takes place among the participating traders:












ñi) < c̃i <
τ
2





















For sufficiently high information acquisition costs (relative to levels of risk aversion
and information quality) no trader is incentivized to acquire information regardless of
participation levels, resulting in a fully-uninformed equilibrium. In this equilibrium
price informativeness does not change in response to changing participation levels. For
a sufficiently low level of participation 1− γ̃i, even with all participating traders acquir-
ing information, it is still worthwhile to do so, resulting in a fully-informed equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, by Eq. (1.18), greater levels of participation result in more infor-
mative prices (lower mi). Finally, with a sufficiently high level of participation and
sufficiently low information costs, the expected utility of being informed is exactly
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equal to the expected utility of being uninformed, resulting in an interior equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, greater participation levels lead to less information acquisition by
participating traders, leading to a fixed number of informed traders and a constant
price informativeness.
1.4.4 Endogenous Information and Participation
By Proposition I.1, for every level of participation there is an information equilib-
rium. We now have to solve for the optimal participation decision, which in tandem
with an information equilibrium will be referred to as the “overall equilibrium.” A
trader’s decision to participate in a particular asset is driven by the tradeoff between
the expected utility gains to adding another risky asset i to their portfolio and the util-
ity losses associated with the participation cost. Since the asset is in an information
equilibrium, a trader will also take into consideration optimal information acquisition:
to the extent that it is beneficial to acquire information (i.e. in a fully-informed equi-
librium), the trader will do so. I utilize Eq. (1.13) to evaluate the ratio of the uncondi-
tional expected utility of a trader participating in asset i (information-participation set
I∗j , fundamental information set F
∗
j ) to the expected utility of a trader not participating





















Since all traders participate in the index asset for free, the participation decision
only affects the stock picking strategies (i > 1). Optimal information acquisition is
provided by conditions specified in Eq. (1.22). Furthermore, because the stock picking
strategies are in zero expected supply, the unconditional risk-premium for each stock
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picking strategy is zero (see Appendix A.2). Taken together, I can rewrite the ratio of
expected utilities of participating and not-participating in stock picking strategy i > 1
as:
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I summarize Eq. (1.24) in the following Lemma.
Lemma I.3 (Utility Change Due to Participation). Suppose participation 1 − γ̃i is
fixed for each synthetic asset i and consider the resulting information equilibrium as
specified by Proposition I.1. In this equilibrium the ratio of the unconditional expected
utility of a trader j participating in asset i (information-participation set I∗j ) to not
participating in asset i (information-participation set Ij) is as follows:






























The utility lost due to participation and, potentially, information costs (exponential
term) is offset by the diversification benefits of adding another asset to the portfolio
27
(ratio of conditional and unconditional standard deviations). I can now formulate the
equilibrium in information and participation.
Proposition I.2 (Equilibrium: Endogenous Information and Participation). There
exists an overall equilibrium in synthetic assets in which for every asset i traders opti-
mally make information and participation decisions resulting in 1−γ̃∗i traders optimally
participating and, conditional on levels of participation, λ̃∗i of the participating traders
optimally acquiring information as specified by the conditions of Eq. (1.22). The ratio
of the utility change due to participation is monotone and decreasing in γ̃i ensuring the
uniqueness of an overall equilibrium within the class of linear price functions.
Proposition I.2 highlights the strategic substitutability in participation. In an infor-
mation equilibrium, the value of participating in stock picking decreases with partici-
pation. The more traders choose to participate in the stock picking strategies, the less
valuable it is to participate. Conversely, the fewer traders invest in the stock picking
strategies, the more valuable it is to be active in them. If even with all traders par-
ticipating in synthetic asset i the gains to participation outweigh the costs, all traders
will participate in equilibrium: γ̃∗i = 0. These results stems from the intuition that
optimally informed and uninformed traders benefit at the expense of noise traders. The
amount of trading by the noise traders is exogenous and results in a fixed profit pool
for the participating active traders. To the extent that there are more informed and
uninformed traders in a particular asset, the profit pool on a per-trader basis shrinks
resulting in the diminishing attractiveness of participating in the asset to begin with.
An immediate consequence of the proof of Proposition I.2, are closed-form solutions
for equilibrium participation levels as outlined in Corollary I.3.
Corollary I.3 (Closed-Form Solutions for Equilibrium Participation Levels). The
closed-form solution for the equilibrium participation level in any synthetic asset i > 1,
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in which all conditions of Proposition I.2 are satisfied, is as follows:

If 1exp (2c̃i/τ)−1 ≤
1
ñi
























ñi + 1− exp(2c̃i/τ)
)}
If 1exp (2c̃i/τ)−1 −
1
exp (2(k̃i+c̃i)/τ)−1








For a fixed level of risk aversion and information quality, participation levels are
determined by the relative magnitude of information and participation costs for the
stock picking strategies. All else equal, falling information acquisition costs move the
information equilibrium from fully-uninformed (first case), to an interior (second case),
to a fully-informed (third case) equilibrium. Similarly, a rising participation cost moves
the equilibrium from interior to a fully-informed equilibrium. When the equilibrium




















Since, ρSi(P̃i),θ̃i and σṽi|P̃i both determine price informativeness, in an interior equi-
librium participation is jointly determined with price informativeness, risk aversion,
participation costs, and noise trading variability. All else equal, in an interior equilib-
rium, higher price informativeness correlates with lower participation and vice-versa.
Note that in the case of no informed traders, ρ2
Si(P̃i),θ̃i
= 0, σ2ṽi = σ
2
ṽi|P̃i
, and Eq. (1.26)
simplifies to the solution for the fully-uninformed equilibrium.
The emergence of uninformed stock picking in the uninformed and interior infor-
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mation equilibria with endogenous participation occurs due to the mean-variance in-
efficiency of the index asset for an uninformed investor. In models of noisy rational
expectations, the expected market portfolio may not be the optimal portfolio for an
uninformed investor due to the noise in security-level supply (e.g. Admati (1985), Bi-
ais et al. (2010), Garleanu and Pedersen (2020)). There is value in deviating from the
passive index as such deviation gives investors access to the noise trading demands
in the underlying securities, even if the deviation is based only on market prices.20
Uninformed stock pickers are able to more accurately infer the supply of individual
securities and benefit from providing liquidity to the security-level noise traders.
1.4.5 Participation Levels and Passive Share
In defining passive share, I take the view that passive investors:
1. Optimally free-ride on the information acquisition efforts of active investors in
the market index, i.e. invest in the index asset without information acquisition.
2. Forgo stock picking, i.e. do not participate in the stock picking strategies.
The conditions above map naturally to the framework at hand. Within my model
there are up to 2×3N−1 possible participation and information strategies corresponding
to information acquisition in the index asset (2 possibilities total) and participation
and information acquisition in the stock picking strategies (3 possibilities per asset
across N − 1 assets). Portfolio allocations are defined probabilistically and map to
the fractions (equivalently, numbers) of traders allocating to each portfolio. Since the
allocations across synthetic assets are independent by construction, the fraction of
traders pursuing both conditions 1 and 2 is the fraction of traders pursuing condition 1
20Pedersen (2018) provides various examples for why a passive fund may be at a disadvantage
relative to an active fund when maintaining a value-weighted index. Examples include share buybacks,
secondary offerings, index additions and deletions during which passive investors will trade at less
favorable prices than active investors.
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times the fraction of traders pursuing condition 2. Passive share Γ within the structure
of the model equals to the number of traders uninformed in the market index and not









γ̃i(k̃i, c̃i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fraction not participating in stock picking strategies
(1.27)
The former term specifies the fraction (i.e. number) of uninformed traders in the
market index (in which all traders participate) and is defined by Eq. (1.22), which can
be rewritten as:
If c̃1 ≥ τ2 log(1 + n1) then λ̃1 = 0













n1) then λ̃1 = 1
(1.28)
The latter term specifies the fraction (i.e. number) of traders not participating in the
stock picking strategies as provided by Eq. (1.25):

If 1exp (2c̃i/τ)−1 ≤
1
ñi
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)}
If 1exp (2c̃i/τ)−1 −
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exp (2(k̃i+c̃i)/τ)−1








I can now identify the effects of information and participation costs on passive share.
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1.5 Comparative Statics
I investigate the effects of information acquisition costs and participation costs on
the equilibrium level of passive investing as given by Eq. (1.27), (1.28), and (1.29) and
price informativeness. Price informativeness is defined as the inverse payoff variance
































1.5.1 Information Acquisition Costs and Passive Share
The primary goal of this paper is to identify the relationship between the costs of
acquiring fundamental information and passive investing. According to my definition,
a passive trader must: 1) free-ride on the information acquisition of others in the index
asset and 2) not participate in stock picking. The traditional setting of GS80, sheds
light on the first requirement. To the extent that passive investors are information
free-riders in the index, greater information acquisition costs lead to more uninformed
traders, which leads to a greater passive share and lower price informativeness.
However, GS80 are silent on the effects of information costs on participation in the
trading of a risky asset. What differentiates my work from GS80 is the incorporation
of a participation cost into the costly information framework.21 In GS80 participation
is free, therefore all traders invest in the asset. However, in reality, participating in
21Peress (2005) also does this, however, his model contains a single risky asset and is designed to
explore aggregate stock market participation. As in GS80, within his framework, greater information
costs would also lead to more passive investing due to the single-asset nature of the model.
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stock picking is a costly endeavor relative to indexing. Stock-picking funds usually
have higher turnover, incur greater trading commissions, and participate in stocks
which may have a greater market impact relative to an index asset. Therefore, it
seems reasonable to assume that in addition to potentially incurring a cost to acquire
fundamental information, traders must incur non-zero participation costs to invest in
the stock picking strategies.
I apply this reasoning to the stock picking strategies and assume that stock picking
requires some trading cost over-and-above a simple indexing strategy. In this setting,
falling information costs for stock picking affect the attractiveness of participating in
stock picking unconditionally due to two forces. On one hand, as information becomes
cheaper, more participating traders become informed and prices become more informa-
tive. On the other hand, precisely due to the fact that more participating traders be-
come informed and prices are more informative, participating in stock picking becomes
less attractive for all participating traders. Lemma I.4, demonstrated in Appendix A.5,
highlights the relationship between gains to participation and information costs under
the assumption of fixed participation.
Lemma I.4 (Effect of Information Costs on Unconditional Expected Utility). For any
stock picking strategy i (i > 1) and a fixed level of non-participation γ̃i < 1, changes
to information cost c̃i have the following effect on the unconditional expected utility of


















As information costs fall, some previously uninformed active traders become in-
formed (as in GS80), while others optimally choose to not participate in the trading of
the asset. The net effect of these two forces is to equate the expected utility gains to
participation in stock picking and the utility losses to participation costs. Price infor-
mativeness continues to improve since the total number of informed traders continues
to grow with lower information costs.
Below a certain level of information acquisition costs for the stock picking strategies,
all participating traders become informed as specified by the final condition of Eq.
(1.25). Beyond this point, a further decline in information costs accrues directly to
the participating traders without affecting price informativeness, since the number
of informed traders remains the same. At this point, participating in stock picking
becomes attractive yet again, and some of the traders on the sidelines rotate back
into the stock picking strategy by paying both the participation and the information
acquisition cost. The number of investors switching back is exactly such that the
expected utility gain to participation is offset by the utility losses due to the costs spent.
Price informativeness continues to improve with lower costs until full participation in
the stock picking strategy is achieved.
The discussion above assumes an interior or fully-informed equilibrium in which
information costs affect trading decisions. In the corner solutions, with full partici-
pation, falling information costs have no impact on price informativeness because the
total number of informed traders does not change in these regions. Proposition I.4 sum-
marizes the effects of information acquisition costs on passive share and the resulting
price informativeness.
Proposition I.4 (Effect of Information Costs on Passive Share and Price Informa-
tiveness). Equilibrium passive share Γ(c̃, k̃) defined by Eq. (1.27) has the following
relationship with information costs across the three information equilibria for the index
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The results of Proposition I.4 with regards to passive share follow directly from the
definition of passive share (Eq. (1.27)), the closed form solution for the uninformed
fraction in the index asset (Eq. (1.28)), and the closed form solution for the stock
picking participation levels (Eq. (1.29)). The results relating to price informativeness
follow from the equilibrium passive share and Eq. (1.30).
1.5.2 Participation Costs and Passive Share
Participation costs for stock picking have no effect on the market index, which is
free to trade. Therefore, their effect on passive share only comes through participation
levels in the stock picking strategies. The higher the cost to participate in stock
picking (equivalently the lower the cost to index), the fewer traders participate in
the stock picking strategies. This, in turn, increases passive share as more traders
optimally forgo participation in the stock picking strategies. Price informativeness is
only impacted for sufficiently high participation costs, as dictated by the third condition
of Eq. (1.27), for which the stock picking strategy is in a fully-informed equilibrium.
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Beyond this cost level, greater participation costs lead to lower participation and fewer
informed traders, resulting in deteriorating price informativeness by Eq. (1.30). I
summarize the relationship between participation costs and passive investing in the
following Proposition.
Proposition I.5 (Effect of Participation Costs on Passive Share and Price Infor-
mativeness). Equilibrium passive share Γ(c̃, k̃) defined by Eq. (1.27) has the following
relationship with participation costs across the three information equilibria for the stock


























Proposition I.5 follows directly from Eq. (1.27), (1.29), and (1.30).
1.5.3 Asset Pricing Implications of Information and Participation Costs
So far I have discussed the effect that information and participation costs have on
equilibrium portfolio allocations and price informativeness. I now explore the effects
of changes to these costs on observable return characteristics: market risk and risk
premium and individual security expected returns, variances, and covariances.
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1.5.3.1 Asset Pricing Implications to the Synthetic Assets
As demonstrated in Appendix A.2, the unconditional expected returns for the syn-
thetic assets are given by










Expected returns are determined by the aggregate expected supply of the risky asset
(X̃i) and the inverse of the weighted average precision of the informed and uninformed
participating traders. An immediate consequence is that all stock picking strategies
have a risk premium of zero since they are in net zero expected supply. For the market
index, index information acquisition costs will affect the risk premium as follows:
Lemma I.5 (Effect of Information Costs on Expected Returns). Changes to infor-
mation costs across the three information equilibria for the index and stock picking
















Lemma I.5 is demonstrated in Appendix A.6. In an interior equilibrium, greater
information costs lead to a noisier price system resulting in higher expected returns.
Lemma I.6, demonstrates the effect of information and participation costs on uncondi-
tional return variances:
Lemma I.6 (Effect of Information and Participation Costs on Return Variances).
Changes to information costs and participation costs across the three information equi-
libria for the index and stock picking strategies (i > 1) respectively have the following























Lemma I.6 is demonstrated in Appendix A.6. Greater information and participa-
tion costs generally lead to a noisier price system, resulting in greater unconditional
variances of returns. Armed with the properties of the expected returns and variances
of the synthetic assets, I can analyze the asset pricing implications to the broad market
and the underlying securities.
1.5.3.2 Asset Pricing Implications to the Original Assets
It is important to explore the implications of changing information and participation
costs on the return properties of the original assets. I reconstruct the original assets
using portfolios of the synthetic assets and derive the comparative statics in Appendix
A.8.
1.5.4 An Illustration
I now illustrate the equilibrium properties of my model through a simple numerical
example. There are two risky assets in the market, resulting in two synthetic assets:
the market index and a stock picking strategy. There are up to two possible investment
strategies in the index (participating informed or participating uninformed) and three
possible investment strategies in the stock picking strategy (not participating, partic-
ipating informed, participating uninformed), resulting in a maximum of 2 × 31 = 6
potential information and participation strategies, one of which is purely passive and
the others are active. The five active strategies can be categorized based on their
participation and information acquisition in stock picking. Figure 2.1 demonstrates
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the equilibrium fraction of traders pursuing the various investment strategies and the
implications to price informativeness for changing information and participation costs,
while Figure 1.2 highlights the implications to cross-sectional and aggregate returns.
Passive share is in blue and is defined as the fraction of traders optimally allocating to
the index portfolio without acquiring information and optimally not participating in
the stock picking strategy.
Figure 2.1a demonstrates the effect of a falling stock picking information acquisition
cost on equilibrium strategy participation. For sufficiently high information costs, no
information acquisition takes place. However, because the benefit of participation in
stock picking outweighs its cost, all traders participate in stock picking resulting in no
passive share and active portfolios that include uninformed stock picking, highlighted
by the orange. As mentioned earlier, this is due to the benefits to deviating from the
passive index, even if the deviation is based solely on market prices: there are gains
to providing liquidity to the noise traders in the stock-picking assets. As information
costs continue to fall they reach a certain threshold at which information acquisition
begins to take place for some stock picking participants: at first we see the emergence
of active portfolios that contain informed stock picking in yellow. In the initial stage
the participation constraint is slack; therefore all traders continue to participate in
stock picking, some informed, some not. At a certain level of information costs (just
below 2.5 on the graph), prices have gotten so informative that it no longer makes
sense for all traders to participate, leading some to exit stock picking just to the point
where the participation constraint binds for the rest. This leads to the emergence of
both a pure market timing portfolio (in purple) and a passive portfolio (in blue). As
information costs fall further, the share of both continues to grow. At a certain point,
information costs have fallen so low, that the entire stock picking sector is informed.
At this point further decreases to information costs directly accrue to the participating
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traders since they no longer alter the informativeness of the price system. Here, some
traders are once again incentivized to switch back from both pure market timing and
passive to stock picking leading to the inverted U-shaped curve for passive share.
Figure 2.1b demonstrates the price informativeness of the stock picking strategy
with falling information costs. Initially, price informativeness stays constant since
there is no information acquisition in the asset. Once information acquisition begins,
price informativeness begins to grow. As the peak passive share is reached and all
stock pickers are informed, price informativeness grows at a lower pace because the
non-participating traders are the ones switching to participation and acquiring in-
formation. Since they have to overcome both the participation cost hurdle and the
information acquisition cost hurdle, they do not switch to information acquisition as
quickly as originally participating uninformed traders. Price informativeness for the
original assets follows a similar path.
As shown in Figure 1.2a, the index risk and return dynamics are not affected by
stock picking information costs. However, greater stock picking information costs lead
to a noisier price system in the relative values of securities, which results in increasing
variances for the returns of the underlying assets and more negative covariances, as
demonstrated in Figure 1.2b.
Figures 2.1c and 2.1d show the equilibrium strategy participation and price informa-
tiveness in the presence of rising information costs for the index asset. As information
costs increase, more and more traders switch from acquiring information to free-riding
on the acquisition efforts of others resulting in deteriorating price informativeness and
a growing passive share. For sufficiently high levels of index information costs, no one
is informed about the market aggregate and changes to costs have no further impact
on passive share and price informativeness.
Lower information acquisition in the market index leads to a noisier price system,
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which directly impacts the market risk premium and variance, shown in Figure 1.2c.
This, in turn, directly affects the underlying assets, which are all implicitly long the
overall market, resulting in both greater expected returns, greater volatility, and greater
covariance.
Figures 2.1e and 2.1f show the equilibrium strategy participation in the presence
of a rising stock picking participation cost. For sufficiently low participation costs, the
relative benefit of participation outweighs its cost resulting in no passive share since ev-
eryone participates in stock picking. In this region price informativeness for neither the
stock picking strategy nor the index asset is affected. Beyond a certain participation
cost threshold, some traders begin to optimally forgo participation in stock picking,
leading to fewer participating traders, resulting in greater benefits to information ac-
quisition for those who remain. As some uninformed participants acquire information,
price informativeness remains constant despite the growing share of passive capital.
Beyond a certain point, all participants become informed, and further increases to par-
ticipation costs lead to deteriorating price informativeness as the aggregate share of
informed capital starts to shrink.
Participation constraints only affect the stock picking strategy, and thereby have no
impact on market risk and return dynamics as demonstrated in Figure 1.2e. Decreasing
participation increases the noise in the price system for the stock picking strategy,
thereby increasing its return variance. This, in turn, has the effect of (in this example,
very slightly) increasing the return variance of both underlying securities and lowering
their covariance, shown in Figure 1.2f.
1.6 Empirical Analysis
The primary insight from the theory presented is that falling fundamental infor-
mation costs have a dual effect on passive share. On one hand, they increase the
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prevalence of market timing strategies, which reduces passive share. On the other
hand, they decrease stock picking participation, which increases passive share. If the
stock picking force dominates the market timing force, passive share increases and price
informativeness rises due to falling information costs. I provide suggestive evidence for
the existence of this channel in the data.
Although the model is static in nature and does not explicitly incorporate the ac-
tive vs. passive investment management sectors, its underlying logic would suggest the
following institutional mechanism. As information costs fall for individual firms, more
active investors acquire information about their fundamentals. This greater informa-
tion acquisition results in prices that are more reflective of future fundamentals, which
in turn leads to lower gains to being an active investor. As investors internalize the
lower expected performance, some choose to take money out of active funds, result-
ing in capital outflows from active investment strategies. Finally, some investors will
choose to reallocate their funds to passive investment strategies.
Guided by this logic, I identify a quasi-exogenous negative information cost shock
and conduct the following tests. First, I explore the performance of active funds around
the time of the shock, and exploit its staggered design for causal inference of the effect
of information costs on active performance. Second, I analyze the flows out of active
funds around the time of the regulation. Third, I examine the flows into passive funds
around the same time frame.
1.6.1 The Setting and Test Design
One of the primary goals of the SEC is to “promote efficient and transparent capital
markets” while embracing technological advancement (SEC (2009)). Historically, the
Commission has pursued this through various regulations, most notably through the
implementation of EDGAR in 1993, which required public firms to submit their public
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filings electronically. The focus of this paper is a more recent regulation aimed at
making financial information more useful to investors.
In January of 2009 the SEC announced the adoption of Rule S7-11-08: “Interactive
Data to Improve Financial Reporting.” The mandate requires firms to supplement
their regular financial filings made through EDGAR with financial statements provided
in an interactive format utilizing the eXtensible Business Reporting Language. The
benefits of this regulation are twofold. First, investors can now directly download
financial information into spreadsheets or analyze it with a variety of commercial off-
the-shelf software. Second, XBRL relies on a standard taxonomy (i.e. a set of tags
for different financial items) developed in accordance with U.S. generally accepted
accounting principles (US GAAP) and reviewed by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) and the Commission. This facilitates the interpretation of financial
information, makes it more comparable across firms, and simplifies the automation of
financial analysis. To the extent that investors were previously paying third-party data
providers for the services of information extraction and aggregation or were devoting
meaningful amounts of time to performing these tasks themselves, the regulation at
least partially alleviates these burdens. Therefore, I interpret the XBRL mandate as a
negative shock to information costs.
To identify the causal effect of lower information costs on passive investing, I rely
on the phase-in design of the XBRL mandate. Companies had to comply with the
regulation according to the following timeline:
• Phase 1: Filers with public equity float > $5bn: for 10-Q/K with financial state-
ments for fiscal periods ending on or after June 15, 2009
• Phase 2: Filers with public equity float between $700mm and $5bn: for 10-Q/K
with financial statements for fiscal periods ending on or after June 15, 2010
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• Phase 3: All remaining filers: for 10-Q/K with financial statements for fiscal
periods ending on or after June 15, 2011
In my primary tests, I exploit cross-sectional heterogeneity in passive and active fund-
level exposure to the XBRL mandate. Specifically, I take the universe of active and
passive domestic equity funds and estimate the fraction of their total net assets allo-
cated to companies affected by phase 1, 2, and 3 of the regulation as of the second
calendar quarter of 2009. I limit my analysis to funds that were either predominantly
invested in phase 1 securities (group 1) or those that were primarily invested in phase
2 and 3 securities (group 2). To test the active fund performance effect of lower in-
formation costs, I conduct an event study in which I track the relative performance of
group 1 and group 2 active funds. Similarly, I perform event studies on the flows out
of group 1 and group 2 active funds, and flows into group 1 and group 2 passive funds.
1.6.2 Data
I rely on EDGAR index files to come up with a sample of XBRL adopters through
time. In particular, I utilize the “full index” data, which contain the list of all companies
submitting XBRL filings by quarter, including company CIK, filing type, and filing
date.22 This allows me to track companies’ adoption of XBRL through time and I
classify adopting companies into phase 1, phase 2, or phase 3 based on the dates
of their initial XBRL filings and the number of XBRL filings made subsequently. I
exclude companies that participated in the voluntary program prior to the ruling. My
final sample contains 448 phase 1 firms, 996 phase 2 firms, and 3,353 phase 3 firms
with the public equity data required for the analysis presented here.23,24
22See https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/accessing-edgar-data.htm for more informa-
tion.
23The SEC estimated approximately 500 filers to fall into the phase 1 group, however, this number
also includes foreign issuers and voluntary adopters.
24I thank Ekaterina Volkova (University of Melbourne) for sharing her CIK-CUSIP mapping based
on 13D and 13G filings. The mapping served as a helpful complement to the CIK-CUSIP mapping
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I utilize the Center for Research in Security Prices Mutual Fund Database (CRSP
MFDB) to construct my active and passive mutual fund samples.25 I limit the analysis
to broad market domestic equity funds and include both index and exchange traded
funds as passive funds in the main specifications.26 I only include those active and
passive funds whose data fully overlaps with the three year phase-in of the XBRL
mandate. I include summary statistics for both the fund-level and fund share-class
level samples for active funds (Tables 1.1-1.4 and 1.5-1.7 respectively) and the fund
share-class level sample for passive funds (Tables 1.8-1.9).
I utilize the CRSP MFDB fund-level holdings data to estimate XBRL exposure.27
Specifically, I use a fund’s holdings data closest to the beginning of phase 1 in June of
2009, which is typically the holdings disclosure for calendar 2Q2009. I then estimate
the exposure of fund i to phase j of XBRL as
exposurei,j =
∑N
k=1 1{security k ∈ phase j} × $holdingsi,≈6/2009,k
TNAi,≈6/2009
(1.32)
where j = 1, 2, 3 specifies the phase of XBRL to which a security k may potentially
belong, security k = 1, . . . , N indexes the securities in which fund i is invested and
TNAi,≈6/2009 are the total net assets for fund i in the month closest to June of 2009. I
classify funds into groups (specified by the variable “TRT”) based on their estimated
exposures to the various phases of XBRL:
provided by Compustat through WRDS.
25I gratefully acknowledge Doshi et al. (2015) for making their code publicly available, which was
extremely helpful in getting up to speed on using the CRSP MFDB and TR S12 databases.
26I include active funds with the following CRSP objective codes: EDCL, EDCM, EDCS, EDCI,
EDYG, EDYB, EDYI. Passive funds are those with the same objective codes that were also identified
as index funds (INDEX FUND FLAG = D) or exchange traded funds (ET FLAG = F ). I go
through the passive funds by hand and take out misclassified active funds.
27I also run the analysis using the Thomson Reuters (TR) s12 database with similar results, however
I rely on CRSP as my main source since, as pointed out by Zhu (2020), between 2008-2015 58% of
new US equity mutual fund classes from CRSP cannot be matched to the TR s12 database and index
funds are more likely to be missing in TR.
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- Group 1 (TRTi = 1): exposurei,1 ≥ 0.75
- Group 2 (TRTi = 0): exposurei,2 + exposurei,3 ≥ 0.75
- Group 3 (TRTi = 2): all other funds with exposurei,1+exposurei,2+exposurei,3 ≥
0.75
Group 1 (or phase 1) funds are those with oversized exposure to phase 1 of the XBRL
mandate. Group 2 (or phase 2-3) funds have oversized exposure to phases 2 and 3
of XBRL. Finally, group 3 (or phase 1-2-3) funds have exposure spread out over the
three phases. By construction, I limit the analysis to funds with at least 75% of
TNA allocated to XBRL-exposed securities. Tables 1.3,1.7, and 1.10 demonstrate the
exposure of active funds on a share-level and fund-level, and passive funds on a share-
level to the three phases of the XBRL mandate by group. As can be seen, group 1
and group 2 funds have minimal overlap by phase exposure, with approximately 5-8%
TNA exposure overlap between the two groups. By relying on a categorical grouping
as opposed to variation in phase exposure through time, I avoid well-documented issues
associated with security-level holdings data.
I further rely on CRSP MFDB to extract data on fund total net assets, returns,
and expenses. Fund flow for fund i in month t is estimated as common in the literature
(e.g. Sirri and Tufano (1998), Lou (2012)):
flowi,t =
TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1(1 + ri,t)−MRGi,t
TNAi,t−1
(1.33)
where TNAi,t are the total net assets of fund i in month t, ri,t are the returns of fund
i in month t, and MRGi,t are the total net assets of any funds acquired by fund i
in month t. Following Lou (2012), I use a smoothing procedure to identify merger
dates. Consistent with prior studies, fund-month level observations are required to be
a minimum of $15mm TNA, both current month and past month data must exist for
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flows to be imputable, and flows are winsorized at the 1% level from both tails. Flows
analysis is conducted on a fund share-class level basis since flows to and from different
share classes (e.g. institutional vs. retail) may vary.
Fund performance is evaluated on a 36-month rolling basis utilizing fund-level re-
turns against the Carhart (1997) four-factor model:
















t + εi,t (1.34)
where rei,t is the net return of fund i in month t in excess of the one-month Treasury






t are the market, value, size, and momentum factors
respectively.28 I require 36 months of historical data to evaluate the alphas for any given
month. Performance analysis is conducted on a fund-level basis to avoid duplicated
performance measures for different share classes.
1.6.3 Results
Guided by the proposed mechanism, I ask three questions through the lens of the
mutual fund data. First, do lower information costs lead to lower alphas for active
funds? Two, if so, are funds flowing out of the affected active strategies? Three,
are passive strategies seeing inflows as a result? As such, I conduct tests along three
dimensions: 1) active mutual fund performance, 2) active mutual fund flows, and 3)
passive fund flows. As a starting point, I examine the viability of the following event
study specification to track the difference in these measures through time by month,
before, during, and after the XBRL mandate:
yi,t = γ0 +
T∑
t=2
βt(1t × TRTi) + γ1xi,t−1 + ηt + νi (1.35)
28The data are obtained from the Fama-French Monthly Research Factors dataset available through
WRDS and sourced from Ken French’s website.
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where yi,t ∈ {αi,t, f lowi,t} is defined in Eq. (1.33) and (1.34), xi,t−1 ≡ log(TNAi,t−1)
is a measure of fund size, 1t is an indicator function for each month t, and ηt and νi
are month and fund fixed effects. The performance specification would be conducted
just for active funds, while the flow specification would be conducted for active and
passive funds separately. In all specifications I would track the difference, measured
by βt, in the outcome variable between funds primarily affected by the first phase of
the XBRL mandate (TRTi = 1) to those primarily exposed to the second and third
phases of the regulation (TRTi = 0). First, I highlight the econometric complications
that would arise within the specification above. Second, I propose a solution to these
complications.
Fund performance and fund flows may be explained by various factors such as
portfolio manager skill, fund size, fund objective, and market conditions. To isolate
the effect of information costs on performance and flows, one needs to control for these
various observable and unobservable fund-level and time characteristics. The latter
is resolved via time fixed effects ηt. One may be inclined to resolve the former via
fund fixed effects νi and lagged fund size xi,t−1. However, as pointed out by Pástor
et al. (2015), this results in a finite sample bias due to a contemporaneous correlation
between innovations in αi,t or flowi,t and innovations in assets under management.
Intuitively, greater performance or greater flows also imply growth in total net assets,
which in turn leads to a negative bias in the coefficient capturing the effect of fund size
on performance or flows.
To address the finite sample bias I apply a recursive demeaning procedure based
on Moon and Phillips (2000), applied to the fund performance vs. size relationship by
Pástor et al. (2015), and further updated by Zhu (2018). Borrowing notation from Zhu
(2018), I first construct forward-demeaned variables for performance, flows, and fund
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size:
ȳi,t = yi,t −
1




x̄i,t−1 = xi,t−1 −
1




where t spans 1 to Ti − 1 with Ti being the month of the final observation for fund
i. The forward demeaning procedure absorbs fund fixed effects, however introduces a
correlation between the lagged forward-demeaned size and the demeaned innovation in
flows or performance. To resolve the latter, I conduct a two-stage least squares analysis
whereby in the first stage I regress the forward-demeaned measure of fund size on its
current realization
x̄i,t−1 = ψ + ρxi,t−1 (1.36)
and in the second stage I conduct the event study initially introduced in Eq. (1.35)




βt(1t × TRTi) + γx̄∗i,t−1 + ηt (1.37)
where x̄∗i,t−1 is the fitted value from the first stage regression. As pointed out by Pástor
et al. (2015), the relevance and exclusion conditions of the instrument are likely met as
xi,t−1 is embedded in the dependent variable in the first stage and xi,t−1 is unlikely to
be correlated with innovations to the forward-demeaned performance and flows. The
month fixed effects will span t = 2, . . . , T thereby imposing the zero-intercept condition
of the specification above, which is appropriate given the forward-demeaned nature
of the variables. The interaction coefficients βt will capture the monthly differential
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performance and flows to group 1 versus group 2 funds after accounting for observable
and unobservable fund-specific characteristics and aggregate time trends.
The results are highlighted in Figures 1.3-1.5. Figures 1.3a and 1.3b document the
time trends and event study results for the performance of active mutual funds. In
the pre-treatment period and during phases 1 and 2, the two groups of active funds
exhibit broadly similar performance as can be seen both through the time series plot
as well as the event study analysis. However, starting in the second half of 2011, the
performance of the two groups diverges dramatically with the funds initially affected
by XBRL seeing deteriorating performance relative to funds affected in the later stages
of the regulation. The result would suggest that lower information costs for phase 1
firms have propagated through the market, leading to greater information acquisition,
greater price informativeness, and, ultimately, declining performance by group 1 funds.
The process took about two years after the initial implementation of the regulation.
In another two years, group 1 performance begins to rebound relative to group 2
performance, suggesting that the lower information costs are now affecting group 2
firms. Finally, as the lower information costs work through the system for group 2
funds, the relative performance of groups 1 and 2 converges.
To ensure that the identified trend in performance is not an artifact of omitted
variables or fund-level aggregation issues, I focus on a closely matched sample of group
1 and group 2 funds, paired both by total net assets (group 1 funds’ TNA has to
be within 10% of group 2 funds’ TNA) and CRSP investment objective code. This
set of funds is much smaller, as highlighted in table 1.4, however the sample is tightly
matched with roughly the same fund characteristics for group 1 and group 2 funds. The
inclusion of time fixed effects and the recursive demeaning procedure introduced above
further addresses concerns regarding the causal inference. Figure 1.6 demonstrates the
results of the analysis. The trends in performance are consistent with the patterns for
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the full sample and are even more convincing. Taken together, the two sets of results
provide suggestive evidence for the negative effects of lower information costs on active
fund performance.
The next step in the mechanism are flows out of active funds due to their perfor-
mance decline. Figures 1.4a and 1.4b display both the cumulative flows out of active
funds and the results of the event study as applied to monthly flows. Although the
event study does not highlight a clear pattern in differential flows between group 1 and
group 2 funds, a visual inspection of the cumulative flows suggests that there is a lead-
lag relationship comparable to the patterns in the relative performance of the funds.
Outflows are initially greater for group 1 funds, suggestive of investors allocating out
of these funds due to their weaker performance. This is followed by greater outflows
from group 2 funds, once again in-line with their performance decline.
The final step in the mechanism would suggest that investors allocating out of active
funds would shift their freely-available capital to passive funds. Without individual-
level transaction data this step is difficult to test since capital flows cannot be traced to
individual investors. However, operating under the assumption that investors allocating
out of active and into passive would prefer a passive fund with similar characteristics
to the active fund (e.g. similar investment objective), the analysis demonstrated in
figures 1.5a and 1.5b provides some supportive evidence. Specifically, passive funds in
group 1 see greater inflows around the time of under-performance by group 1 active
funds. Furthermore, this trend is reversed as group 2 active funds under-perform group
1 active funds. Although this evidence is at most suggestive, it aligns well with the
mechanism described.
In summary, the empirical results presented provide causal evidence on the effect
of information costs on active performance. When coupled with an investigation of
flows out of active and into passive funds a picture emerges that is consistent with the
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proposed effect of falling information costs on passive investing.
1.7 Conclusion
Many critics of passive investing view capital flows to index products as uninformed
capital and worry about the implications to price efficiency and the functionality of
financial markets. To assuage these concerns, I document a novel theoretical link be-
tween two strong trends in the data, not easily reconcilable within standard models:
1) increasing passive share and 2) decreasing information costs and greater price infor-
mativeness.
In my model, traders optimize across two dimensions: information acquisition and
stock picking participation. The dual forces of strategic substitutability in information
acquisition and participation dictate the equilibrium levels of information acquisition
and passive investing. An equilibrium outcome of my framework is that for interior
information equilibria, falling fundamental information costs have the joint effect of
decreasing passive share via a greater prevalence of market timing strategies and in-
creasing passive share via greater non-participation in stock picking strategies. If the
stock picking channel dominates the market timing channel, passive share rises endoge-
nously in tandem with more informative prices. I provide suggestive empirical evidence
on the existence of this channel, utilizing the XBRL mandate as a negative shock to
information costs.
Alternative drivers for a rising passive share include falling costs to indexing and
greater costs to market timing strategies, both of which lead to decreasing price infor-
mativeness. Given the differential outcomes to market efficiency, further empirically
detangling the drivers of passive investing presents an exciting avenue for future re-
search.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Active, Fund Level: TNA by Phase Exposure ($mm)
Phase Exposure count mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Phase 1 782 1,814 20 78 287 1,091 6,622
Phase 1-2-3 574 1,058 18 57 172 607 4,060
Phase 2-3 470 564 18 56 184 555 2,056
Total 1826 1,255 18 63 215 789 4,586
Analysis performed for active funds on the fund-level basis. Funds are grouped based on
XBRL Phase exposure estimated using available holdings data closest to June 30, 2009.
Table 1.2: Active, Fund Level: Objective by Phase (count)
CRSP Objective Codes Ph. 1 Ph. 2-3 Ph. 1-2-3 Total
Domestic Equity Growth 468 25 211 704
Domestic Equity Growth Income 236 11 72 319
Domestic Equity Income 69 2 25 96
Domestic Equity Micro Cap 0 17 3 20
Domestic Equity Mid Cap 8 34 239 281
Domestic Equity Small Cap 1 381 24 406
Total 782 470 574 1826
Analysis performed for active funds on the fund-level basis. Funds are grouped based on
XBRL Phase exposure estimated using available holdings data closest to June 30, 2009.
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Table 1.3: Active, Fund Level: Exposure by Phase (%)
Phase Exposure Ph. 1 Ph. 2 Ph. 3 Ph. 2-3 Ph. 1-2-3
Phase 1 85.5 7.3 0.3 7.6 93.1
Phase 1-2-3 51.5 36.8 4.3 41.1 92.6
Phase 2-3 4.8 60.3 27.3 87.5 92.3
Total 54.2 30.1 8.5 38.6 92.8
Analysis performed for active funds on the fund-level basis for the paired sample. Funds are
grouped based on XBRL Phase exposure estimated using available holdings data closest to
June 30, 2009.
Table 1.4: Active, Fund Level, Paired: TNA by Phase Exposure ($mm)
Phase Exposure count mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Phase 1 21 713 57 106 240 865 2,943
Phase 2-3 21 696 58 106 244 902 2,744
Total 42 704 57 106 242 902 2,943
Analysis performed for active funds on the fund-level basis for the paired sample. Funds are
grouped based on XBRL Phase exposure estimated using available holdings data closest to
June 30, 2009.
Table 1.5: Active, Class Level: TNA by Phase Exposure ($mm)
Phase Exposure count mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Phase 1 1616 912 17 40 137 549 3,157
Phase 1-2-3 1099 578 17 30 88 302 2,167
Phase 2-3 843 313 16 28 94 303 1,105
Total 3558 667 17 34 109 381 2,329
Analysis performed for active funds on the share class-level basis. Funds are grouped based
on XBRL Phase exposure estimated using available holdings data closest to June 30, 2009.
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Table 1.6: Active, Class Level: Objective by Phase (count)
CRSP Objective Codes Ph. 1 Ph. 2-3 Ph. 1-2-3 Total
Domestic Equity Growth 905 40 397 1342
Domestic Equity Growth Income 530 20 126 676
Domestic Equity Income 164 3 49 216
Domestic Equity Micro Cap 0 25 3 28
Domestic Equity Mid Cap 16 65 477 558
Domestic Equity Small Cap 1 690 47 738
Total 1616 843 1099 3558
Analysis performed for active funds on the share class-level basis. Funds are grouped based
on XBRL Phase exposure estimated using available holdings data closest to June 30, 2009.
Table 1.7: Active, Class Level: Exposure by Phase (%)
Phase Exposure Ph. 1 Ph. 2 Ph. 3 Ph. 2-3 Ph. 1-2-3
Phase 1 85.3 7.2 0.3 7.5 92.8
Phase 1-2-3 52.3 36.4 3.9 40.3 92.6
Phase 2-3 5.0 61.4 25.6 87.0 92.0
Total 56.1 29.0 7.4 36.4 92.5
Analysis performed for active funds on the share class-level basis. Funds are grouped based
on XBRL Phase exposure estimated using available holdings data closest to June 30, 2009.
Table 1.8: Passive, Class Level: TNA by Phase Exposure ($mm)
Phase Exposure count mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95
Phase 1 282 1,739 18 47 176 655 5,277
Phase 1-2-3 46 618 16 29 67 498 2,304
Phase 2-3 154 571 16 26 98 330 3,018
Total 482 1,258 17 37 127 587 4,154
Analysis performed for passive funds on the share class-level basis. Funds are grouped based
on XBRL Phase exposure estimated using available holdings data closest to June 30, 2009.
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Table 1.9: Passive, Class Level: Objective by Phase (count)
CRSP Objective Codes Ph. 1 Ph. 2-3 Ph. 1-2-3 Total
Domestic Equity Growth 101 4 14 119
Domestic Equity Growth Income 18 0 1 19
Domestic Equity Income 10 0 4 14
Domestic Equity Large Cap 153 0 0 153
Domestic Equity Micro Cap 0 3 0 3
Domestic Equity Mid Cap 0 59 27 86
Domestic Equity Small Cap 0 88 0 88
Total 282 154 46 482
Analysis performed for passive funds on the share class-level basis. Funds are grouped based
on XBRL Phase exposure estimated using available holdings data closest to June 30, 2009.
Table 1.10: Passive, Class Level: Exposure by Phase (%)
Phase Exposure Ph. 1 Ph. 2 Ph. 3 Ph. 2-3 Ph. 1-2-3
Phase 1 88.8 7.2 0.4 7.6 96.5
Phase 1-2-3 47.9 43.5 5.0 48.5 96.4
Phase 2-3 5.3 63.6 25.9 89.5 94.8
Total 58.2 28.7 9.0 37.7 95.9
Analysis performed for passive funds on the share class-level basis. Funds are grouped based
on XBRL Phase exposure estimated using available holdings data closest to June 30, 2009.
56
(a) Stock Picking Info. Cost: Participation by Strategy (b) Rising Stock Picking Info. Cost: Price Inf.
(c) Index Information Cost: Participation by Strategy (d) Rising Index Info. Cost: Price Inf.
(e) Participation Cost: Participation by Strategy (f) Rising Part. Cost: Price Inf.
Figure 1.1: Effect of Information and Participation Costs on Equilibrium Strategy
Participation and Price Informativeness.
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(a) Stock Picking Info. Cost: Market Return Effects (b) Rising Stock Picking Info. Cost: Returns
(c) Index Info. Cost: Market Return Effects (d) Rising Index Info. Cost: Returns
(e) Participation Cost: Market Return Effects (f) Rising Part. Cost: Returns
Figure 1.2: Effect of Information and Participation Costs on the Market Risk Premium
and the Cross-Section of Asset Returns.
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(a) Active fund alpha time series by group
(b) Relative performance of group 1 and 2 funds
Figure 1.3: Effect of the XBRL Mandate on Active Fund Performance.
The dotted lines signify the dates of the initial implementation of each phase of XBRL in
sequential order from left to right. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered
by month × investment objective.
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(a) Cumulative flows to active funds by group
(b) Monthly difference between group 1 and 2 fund flows
Figure 1.4: Effect of the XBRL Mandate on Active Fund Flows.
The dotted lines signify the dates of the initial implementation of each phase of XBRL in
sequential order from left to right. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered
by month × investment objective.
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(a) Cumulative flows to passive funds by group
(b) Monthly difference between group 1 and 2 fund flows
Figure 1.5: Effect of the XBRL Mandate on Passive Fund Flows.
The dotted lines signify the dates of the initial implementation of each phase of XBRL in
sequential order from left to right. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered
by month × investment objective.
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(a) Active fund alpha time series for paired sample
(b) Relative perf. of group 1 and 2 funds, paired sample
Figure 1.6: Active Fund Performance for a Closely-Matched Set of Funds.
The dotted lines signify the dates of the initial implementation of each phase of XBRL in
sequential order from left to right. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered
by month × investment objective.
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CHAPTER II
Quants, Strategic Speculation, and Financial
Market Quality
2.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, quantitative investing has become increasingly popular
in the financial markets. More generally, quantitative investing takes many forms,
from high frequency algorithmic market-making to fundamentally-oriented quantitative
strategies. Of particular note is the rapid growth in the fundamental equity quantitative
investing trading sector. While such strategies were previously available primarily
through hedge funds to select clients, they are now gaining a wider prominence and
are being offered through traditional mutual funds and ETFs to ordinary investors
(see Abis (2020) and Beggs et al. (2019) for further evidence). Quantitative strategies
are generally based on quantitatively-disciplined trading rules, which results in both
benefits, via greater trading discipline, and pitfalls, via strategy-crowding and myopia.1
The goal of this study is to develop a theoretical framework for exploring the strategic
interaction between humans and machines in the financial markets and the implications
of greater fund automation for their quality.
1For an example of myopia, see Jason Zweig, “The Stock Got Crushed. Then the ETFs Had to
Sell.” The Wall Street Journal, 31 Jan. 2020.
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Many fundamentally-oriented quantitative investment strategies are based on back-
tests. A defining characteristic of backtested strategies is their reliance on historical
data to identify a signal which is predictive of future risk-adjusted returns. The in-
vestor then relies on the estimation to translate a real-time signal into a trading rule.
An attractive aspect of this approach is its inherent discipline: the trading rule is not
as susceptible to human emotion due to its automated nature. However, this greater
discipline comes at a cost. Precisely because the trading strategy relies on historical
data, it cannot take into account the effect that the implementation of the strategy
will have on other market participants. For example, if other fundamental investors
know that the machines will be receiving an inaccurate signal, they may trade against
them to take advantage of the expected mispricing. It is this inherent myopia of back-
tested strategies that we focus on as the primary differentiator between quantitative
and discretionary investing.
In principle, the effects of quantitative investing on financial market quality are
twofold. On the one hand, incremental informed speculators are entering the market.
On the other hand, those speculators adhere to quantitative strategies, which may be
myopic in nature. We build on the canonical strategic speculator framework of Kyle
(1985) to incorporate the two dimensions. First, we use Kyle’s economy with a single
imperfectly informed speculator, as the benchmark, i.e. before quantitative investing
(Economy 1). In this baseline setting, we label the single speculator as the discretionary
investor (“DI”), as his fully-strategic trading strategy is meant to resemble the trading
strategies of the more traditional fundamental equity investment funds. Economy 1 also
serves as the backtesting environment for the quantitative investor (“QI”). She uses
the data generating process from Economy 1 to build a profit-maximizing strategy,
“the backtest,” under the assumption that the other market participants are not aware
of her existence. This is the key assumption of the model, as it captures the notion
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of myopia inherent in quantitative strategies: by definition, the backtest ignores the
strategic response of the discretionary investor and the market maker to the trading
strategy of the quant.
Next, we introduce a second differentially informed speculator, the QI, to the mar-
ket. If QI is assumed to be fully strategic (as DI), the resulting economy (Economy 2)
captures the effects of incremental informed speculation on the market akin to Foster
and Viswanathan (1996). Finally, we introduce quantitative investing by allowing the
QI to trade based on either a convex combination of the profit-maximizing strategy of
a fully strategic quant in Economy 2 and the backtest (Economy 3) or full automation
(i.e. exclusively the backtest; Economy 4). The effect of incremental informed specula-
tion on market quality is identified as the change from Economy 1 to Economy 2, while
the implications of quantitative investing are identified via changes from Economy 2
to Economy 3 or Economy 4.
Our primary finding is that the direction of the effect of greater automation by
the quantitative investor on financial market quality is determined by the sign of the
wedge between the trading intensity of a fully-automated quant (Economy 4) and a
fully-discretionary quant (Economy 2). The sign of the wedge acts as a sufficient
statistic for the net effect of the three primary parameters in the model: information
precision of the DI, information precision of the QI, and the correlation of their signals.
A positive wedge, i.e. when the automated quant trades more than the discretionary
quant, generally results in positive effects on market quality. Greater automation leads
to greater expected trading volume by the quant, generally acts as a deterrent from
more trading by the discretionary investor (as he becomes concerned about excess in-
formation slippage), and results in a net increase in the expected trading volume for the
speculative sector as a whole. Since this net increase is driven by the trading behavior
of a QI who adheres less and less to a profit-maximizing strategy, profits for the specu-
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lator sector decrease, price informativeness and price volatility rise, market depth rises,
and return volatility falls. However, a negative wedge between the trading intensity
of a fully-automated and a fully-discretionary quant implies that the quant trades less
aggressively with greater automation. Less aggressive trading creates opportunity for
the discretionary investor to trade more aggressively at the expense of the quant. As
such, the DI trades more with greater automation by the QI, makes greater profits,
which more than offsets the declining profits for the quant, and ultimately results in a
lower trading volume and greater profits for the speculative sector as a whole. Market
quality suffers as market depth, price informativeness, and price volatility fall, while
return volatility rises.
We are able to theoretically characterize the determinants of the sign of the wedge,
which in turn directly maps to market quality outcomes. Greater (lower) relative signal
precision for the quant (DI) and a lower signal correlation generally result in a positive
wedge. However, the relationship ultimately depends on the initial level of signal
precision for the discretionary investor. If discretionary investors have relatively low
signal precision, e.g. as for fundamentally-oriented proprietary quant funds, greater
information quality for the quant or lower signal correlation will generally lead to
improvements in market quality. If instead the DI has a sufficiently precise signal, e.g.
as for smart-beta ETFs, improvements in the quant’s signal may lead to a deterioration
in market quality.
We further find that the introduction of the quant, whether fully-discretionary or
fully-automated, generally benefits market quality as price informativeness and price
volatility rise while return volatility falls. However, the effect on market depth and
the trading volume and profits of the speculative sector are more nuanced and are
again driven by the wedge with discretionary trading. As expected, the DI is almost
always worse off due to the introduction of the QI. However, with a positive wedge,
66
the speculative sector as a whole trades more and makes greater profits, resulting in
a decline in market depth. With a negative wedge, the speculator sector trades more
and makes lower profits, resulting in increasing market depth.
These results contribute to an important theoretical literature on price formation
in the financial markets. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) show how aggressive
competition among perfectly informed speculators may lead to speedy incorporation of
information into prices (the “rat race”). Foster and Viswanathan (1996) demonstrate
that under imperfect information and signals with sufficiently low correlation, the “rat
race” may occur only initially, while less aggressive trading, i.e. a “waiting game,”
may emerge in later rounds of trading. While our framework is static in nature, we
capture both the “waiting game” and the “rat race” outcomes via the single-period
trading intensity of the speculators in our game. Importantly, we allow for differential
information quality, which interacts with signal correlation to dictate market quality
outcomes.
Most literature on quantitative investing has focused on the effects of high fre-
quency trading on market liquidity and price discovery. As pointed out by Kirilenko
and Lo (2013) a key trade-off exists in greater automation. On the one hand, algo-
rithmic trading lacks human emotion, potentially leading to greater market stability.
On the other hand, quantitative investing may be more highly correlated between
funds, resulting in greater market instability. To our knowledge, only Abis (2020)
develops a theoretical framework for exploring the trading behavior of quantitative
versus discretionary funds. The author builds on the mutual fund attention allocation
model of Kacperczyk et al. (2016) and introduces quantitative investors as those who
have unlimited learning capacity only in idiosyncratic shocks. However, investors are
competitive (rather than strategic) in their model. We complement this approach by
allowing for strategic trading, a realistic feature of most financial markets, while ab-
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stracting from idiosyncratic learning capacity. Several studies, including Khandani and
Lo (2007), Khandani and Lo (2011), and Beggs et al. (2019), have documented the fact
that quantitative funds, whether hedge funds or mutual funds, tend to not consider
the behavior of others, consistent with our model’s predictions, resulting in violent
reversals in periods of unwinding. Many have shown that algorithmic trading, in par-
ticular high frequency trading, leads to improving price efficiency and liquidity (e.g.
Hendershott et al. (2011), Hendershott and Riordan (2013), Brogaard et al. (2014),
Zhang (2017), and Chakrabarty et al. (2019)), although acquisition of new information
may deteriorate (Weller (2018)).
2.2 Model
We model a three-date financial market with a single risky asset. Participants
include informed speculators, noise traders, and a market maker. At time t = 0,
informed speculators observe their signals with regards to the payoff of the risky asset.
At time t = 1, speculators and noise traders submit their demands for the risky asset
and market markers set prices according to the aggregate order flow. At time t = 2, the
risky asset payoff is realized. Agents have rational expectations in that the informed
speculators and the market maker are aware of the model parameters and each others’




There will be four market environments, or economies, indexed by j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
which will differ based on the presence and trading strategy of the quantitative investor.
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The economies will be introduced in greater detail below.
Risky asset
The risky asset has an endogenously determined price Pj set by the market maker
in the first period and an exogenous payoff v distributed according to v ∼ N(P0, σ2v),
realized in the second period.2 The equilibrium price function is indexed by Economy j
as it will depend on the presence and the trading strategy of the quantitative investor.
The payoff distribution remains the same across all four economies.
Informed speculators
There are two informed speculators indexed by i ∈ {d, q} with different trading
behavior: a discretionary investor (i = d, “DI”) and a quantitative investor (i = q,
“QI”). Each informed speculator i receives a signal about the final payoff of the risky
asset given by:
si = v + ei, (2.1)





is a measure of
information quality.
Discretionary investor The discretionary investor is risk-neutral and behaves akin
to the Kyle (1985) insider, choosing a share amount xdj to maximize period two ex-
pected profit:
xdj = arg max
x̃dj
E[x̃dj(v − Pj)|sd]. (2.2)
2Henceforth σ2x = τ
−1
x refers to the variance of x, τx refers to the precision of x, andσxy refers to
the covariance between x and y.
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The investor is strategic in that he accounts for the expected effect of his order on the
price set by the market maker as well as the information revealed by his signal about
the expected trading behavior of the quantitative investor. Within our framework,
discretionary behavior is modeled via an investor’s ability to take into account the
expected behavior of others in the market when developing a trading strategy. A
quant, in contrast, either fully or partially lacks this ability.
Quantitative investor The quantitative investor develops a profit-maximizing trad-
ing rule under the assumption that the discretionary investor and market maker are
not aware of her existence. This strategy originates from the notion that many quanti-
tative strategies are based on backtested signals, which by definition take as given the
behavior of market participants. In other words, when developing trading strategies
based on historical market data, quant traders are not able to incorporate the effect
that their presence may have had on the strategic trading behavior of other market
participants present at the time.3 The backtested strategy, labeled xb and introduced
in greater detail below, is derived from a world in which only the discretionary investor
is present.
We model the potentially myopic behavior of the quantitative investor in a reduced
form manner. Specifically, we assume that the quant’s optimal asset demand xqj is
given by the solution to the following optimization:
xqj = arg max
x̃qj
E[−γ(x̃qj − xb)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
backtest
+ (1− γ)x̃qj(v − Pj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
strategic speculation
|sq], (2.3)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
Eq. (2.3) is based on the observation that a quant’s welfare is at least partially de-
3This concept is known within the macroeconomics literature as the “Lucas Critique” (Lucas
(1976))
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termined by her adherence to a backtested, potentially well-known, trading approach
(xb). The degree of adherence, or “automation,” is parametrized by γ. Such behavior
may be explained by marketing reasons, and the related greater investing discipline and
transparency. For example, quantitative fund strategies are less-likely to be affected by
human emotion, and the associated discipline may appeal to investors thereby generat-
ing greater fund flows. Furthermore, the adherence to a particular well-known strategy
may reduce the moral hazard issues associated with delegated portfolio management.
It is important to note that human judgement continues to play an important role
in quantitative strategies. From the choice of investment strategy to its real-world
implementation, human decisions are at the core of launching and maintaining the
operations of quant funds. Quants may very well be strategic in their trading via,
e.g., “feeler orders” to test market liquidity, scaling and turning strategies on and
off depending on market conditions, and attending industry conferences to interact
with other quant fund managers to understand the behavior of others. We model this
“discretionary” aspect of quantitative investing in a reduced form via the loading 1−γ
of the strategy on the traditional profit maximization objective of the Kyle insider.
An immediate consequence of Eq. (2.3) is that for γ > 0 the quant is not maximiz-
ing her profits. Implicit in this assumption are certain un-modeled gains that may arise
due to the pursuit of a quantitative versus a discretionary strategy. For example, the
lower reliance on human judgement may lower the risk of moral hazard, thereby reduc-
ing agency frictions. Furthermore, adherence to a very specific strategy may cater to a
particular set of investors, thereby attracting greater fund flows. In addition, quanti-
tative strategies may have a greater breadth due to their reliance on computing power,
thereby potentially allocating to a much higher number of securities. The resulting
benefits to diversification, although absent from the model, may also be captured by
the backtested trading strategy.
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Noise traders
Noise traders provide an exogenously given aggregate demand of the risky asset
of z ∼ N(0, σ2z) such that σzed = σzeq = σzv = 0. Some examples of noise demand
include uninformed retail investors buying or selling shares for liquidity needs, informed
asset managers buying or selling securities purely for hedging purposes, or corporations
unexpectedly issuing or buying back stock. We will rely on η = σ2z/σ
2
v as a normalized
measure of noise trading in the market.
Market makers
Following Kyle (1985), market makers (“MM”) are assumed to have risk-neutral
preferences and operate in a competitive environment. Therefore, given aggregate
order flow ωj = xdj + xqj + z, the market maker sets a price such that he breaks even
in expectation:
Pj(ωj) = E[v|ωj], (2.4)
i.e. such that the equilibrium asset price is semi-strong from efficient. An underlying
assumption in this framework is that the market maker has sufficient inventory (if
selling) or liquidity (if buying) to satisfy the net demands of the traders. The market
maker attempts to discern between the informed and uninformed order flow and to set
prices accordingly.
2.2.2 Model Solution
Our objective is to identify the effect of growth in quantitative investing on financial
market quality. Intuitively, this growth may be driven by new quant funds entering
the market, incumbent discretionary funds switching to quantitative strategies, or both
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new entrants and incumbent strategy transitions. We focus primarily on the effects of
new quant funds in the financial markets as we believe this to be the primary driver
of the growth in quantitative investing. However, our framework can also speak to the
effects of automation by incumbent discretionary funds and can be extended to jointly
consider new quant funds and incumbent strategy transitions.
Growth in quantitative investing that is driven by new entrants in the financial
market has a dual effect on market quality. First, market quality changes due to the
incremental informed participants in the financial markets. Second, market quality is
impacted by the quantitative investing approach of the new entrants. To speak directly
to the effects of quantitative strategies we must untangle the two forces. We do so by
considering market quality across four economies:
- Economy 1: DI
- Economy 2: DI + QI (γ = 0)
- Economy 3: DI + QI (0 < γ < 1)
- Economy 4: DI + QI (γ = 1)
Economy 1 resembles a world before quantitative investing was introduced. This is
also the quant’s backtesting environment, which allows her to back out the DI’s trad-
ing rule and the MM’s pricing function. The backtest will be a regression of prices on
fundamentals, which coupled with observable order flow provides the quant with suf-
ficient information to form her profit-maximizing strategy. The quant will then build
her strategy such that profits are maximized under the assumption that the MM and
the DI are not aware of her existence.
Economies 2-4 introduce the quantitative investor, but do so in phases in order to
distinguish between the effects of an additional informed speculator and the speculator’s
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backtested trading rule. First, Economy 2 isolates the effect of introducing a second
informed speculator to the economy. Applying γ = 0 to Eq. (2.3), demonstrates that
the QI’s and DI’s objective functions are identical. Therefore, Economy 2 is simply an
extension of Kyle (1985) with two informed speculators, a static version of Foster and
Viswanathan (1996) but with differential signal precision. Second, Economy 3 “turns
on” the quant’s strategy. Increasing γ leads to greater adherence to the backtested
strategy implying greater “automation” by the quant. Finally, Economy 4 reflects a
full-automated quant. In our baseline theoretical results we only consider Economies
1,2, and 4, however we also conduct a simulation exercise for intermediate values of γ
in Economy 3.
We now proceed to sequentially solve for the DI’s and QI’s trading strategies and
the MM’s pricing rule in Economies 1-4. For each economy j we conjecture that the
optimal trading strategy of investor i is linear in his / her signal and is given by
xij(si) = αij + βijsi, (2.5)
and the optimal pricing rule of the market maker is linear in the aggregate order flow
such that
Pj(ωj) = µj + λjωj. (2.6)
We then derive the coefficients that satisfy the investors’ and market makers’ opti-
mization functions given by Eq. (2.2), (2.3), and (3.4). We refer to βij as the “trading
intensity” of speculator i as it reflects how aggressively the speculator reacts to an
incremental unit of signal. We identify 1/λj as “market depth,” our primary measure




Economy 1 is a world with a single informed speculator (DI) who trades strategically
to minimize information slippage and maximize profits. This is the traditional Kyle
(1985) framework with the sole difference that the informed speculator observes a noisy
signal sd = v + ed instead of perfect information v about the risky asset payoff. The
DI solves Eq. (2.2) while the MM solves Eq. (3.4) with ω1 = xd1 + z. Lemma II.1
demonstrates the existence and uniqueness of a linear strategy equilibrium.
Lemma II.1 (Equilibrium in Economy 1). Within the class of linear equilibria, there
exists a unique linear trading rule for the DI and a unique linear pricing function for
the MM specified by Eq. (2.5) and (2.6) respectively such that Eq. (2.2) and (3.4) are
satisfied for all realizations of v, ed, and z.
Specifically, as derived in Appendix B.1, the equilibrium trading rule of the DI is
xd1(sd) =
√
φdη(sd − P0), (2.7)
and the pricing rule of the MM is







The DI is more aggressive in trading on his signal with more noise trading, a more
precise signal, and a greater expected payoff. The MM sets prices such that the ex-
pected profits from providing liquidity to the noise traders exactly offset the expected





φd, is decreasing in signal quality and is increasing in the relative amount
of noise trading. Both are driven by the market maker’s reaction to adverse selection:
the more precise the DI’s information or the greater the likelihood of informed trading,
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the more sensitive will the price be to order flow.
2.2.2.2 Quant’s Backtest
A defining characteristic of backtested strategies is their reliance on historical data
to identify a signal, which is predictive of future risk-adjusted returns. The quant relies
on the strategy to map a real-time signal to a trading rule, which is implemented in
the financial markets. By relying on historical data to generate a signal, the quant
cannot know how other market participants would have reacted to her presence in the
market. Even if similar strategies already exist in the market during the backtest, the
quant’s strategy will likely be incremental, implying that the backtest does not fully
capture the strategic behavior of other market participants. It is this lack of strategic
consideration that we focus on as the primary friction associated with quantitative
strategies.
We model this inherent myopia of backtested strategies, by endowing the quant
with a signal, but assuming that she builds the strategy under the assumption that the
other market participants are not aware of her existence. In other words, the quant
assumes that the behavior of other market participants does not change in response
to her presence. Prior to launching her strategy, the quant uses historical data from
Economy 1 to generate her optimal trading rule. One can think of this as years of
trading data that is based on the data generating process of Economy 1, used as the
backtest into the quant’s trading approach. She gathers an extended time series of this
data, and backs out the trading rule of the DI and the pricing strategy of the MM.
The DI’s trading strategy, Eq. (2.7), and a simple manipulation of the MM’s pricing
rule, Eq. (2.8), demonstrate that:
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Let’s assume that Economy 1 plays out over many periods, e.g days, t = 1, . . . , T and
in each day t the following data is recorded: {P1t, ω1t, vt}. In other words, the QI is
able to observe historical prices, trading volume, and fundamentals. The quant can
then take this data and run the following ordinary least squares regressions:
P1t = a+ bω1t + et
P1t = c+ dvt + εt






z ⊥ v implying that the QI will be






and d = φd
2
. Assuming the QI
has a sufficiently long data sample, she will deduce both the DI’s signal precision φd and
the normalized amount of noise trading η from the data. Together, these parameters
allow her to identify the MM’s pricing rule and the DI’s trading strategy: we assume
that the data sample is sufficiently long such that she obtains highly accurate estimates.
This, in turn, allows her to construct an optimal, profit-maximizing strategy under the
assumption that the DI and MM are not aware of her existence:

























derived in Appendix B.2. The notion of myopia is incorporated by the QI’s reliance
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on the MM’s pricing function P1(ω1) and the DI’s demand xd1(sd) from Economy 1.
In other words, the QI assumes that the MM will treat her order flow as noise trading
and the DI will not internalize the QI’s presence.
Similar to the DI’s Economy 1 trading strategy, the QI’s backtest trades more
aggressively with more noise trading and a greater expected payoff. For negative and
sufficiently low positive signal correlation, the quant will always buy more shares with
greater expected payoff as she’s less concerned about moving the price in the same
direction as the DI. However, with high signal correlation, the QI may trade against
the DI since she becomes concerned about excess information slippage. Ultimately, the
backtested strategy will depend not only on the quant’s signal precision and level of
noise trading, but also on the DI’s signal precision and the signal correlation.
2.2.2.3 Economies 2-4
Armed with the backtested strategy of the quantitative investor, we proceed to
derive the equilibrium trading and price setting behavior in Economies 2-4. Economy
2 will be the classic extension of Kyle (1985) to include two informed speculators with
potentially correlated signals (e.g. Foster and Viswanathan (1996)) and potentially
differential information quality. Economy 3 will incorporate the notion of quantitative
investing as the QI will at least partially rely on the backtested strategy (γ > 0), while
Economy 4 will include a full-automated quant (γ = 1). The trading behavior of the
DI and the QI are determined by the solutions to Eq. (2.2) and (2.3) respectively, while
the MM continues to set prices to break-even in expectation as specified in Eq. (3.4).
Lemma II.2 demonstrates the existence and uniqueness of a linear strategy equilibrium.
Lemma II.2 (Equilibrium in Economies 2-4). Within the class of linear equilibria,
there exist unique linear trading rules for the DI and QI and a unique linear pricing
function for the MM specified by Eq. (2.5) and (2.6) respectively such that Eq. (2.2),
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(2.3), and (3.4) are satisfied for all realizations of v, ed, eq, and z.
As demonstrated in Appendix B.3 multiple equilibria exist in this problem. In part
this is due to the two equilibria within the Kyle (1985) framework whereby a speculator
can buy less on a stronger signal, which in equilibrium leads to a downward sloping
supply curve for the MM. Within our framework, this interacts with the QI’s objective
function resulting in up to four equilibria. We focus on economically meaningful equi-
libria, which appear to be unique. Specifically, we restrict λj to be greater than zero:
supply curves are upward sloping.
To gain intuition behind the equilibrium it is helpful to analyze the functional forms
of the trading rules for the informed speculators and the pricing function of the market
maker. For the DI, demand is given by:
xdj =





Single strategic speculator demand
− E[xqj|sd]
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Adjustment for second speculator
,
(2.10)
as derived in Eq. (B.10) and (B.11). The DI’s demand is the sum of his demand
function as if he were acting alone (conditional on the market maker’s pricing rule)
and an adjustment for the expected trading behavior of the QI conditional on his
information. The adjustment is equal to the expected price impact of the QI’s expected
trading activity (λjE[xqj|sd]) scaled by 2λj, which maps ex-ante expected profits to
share demand. The adjustment term is still dependent on λj because the expected share
demand of the QI is also (inversely) dependent on λj. Furthermore, the adjustment
will depend on the QI’s level of automation γ, known by both the MM and the DI,
since it will factor into both the equilibrium pricing function of the MM via λj and the
expectation of the demand of the QI via E[xqj|sd]. Decomposing the numerator of the
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adjustment even further yields:
E[xqj |sd] = αqj + βqjP0︸ ︷︷ ︸













such that the DI’s optimal trading strategy depends on both what he expects v to be
and what he expects the QI to know about v and use in her trading strategy. The
expected trading strategy of the quant based on the DI’s information is the sum of the
unconditional expectation of her trading strategy and an information adjustment based
on the DI’s signal. The signal inference will be jointly determined by the DI’s signal,
QI’s trading intensity, the absolute and relative precision of QI’s and DI’s signal, and
the signal correlation.
We can apply a similar decomposition, derived in Eq. (B.56), to understand the
trading behavior of the quantitative investor:
xqj =
γ
γ + (1− γ)λj
xb +
(1− γ)λj
γ + (1− γ)λj
E[v|sq]− µj − λjE[xdj|sq]
2λj
. (2.12)
The exogenously assigned automation parameter γ will determine whether the model
represents Economy 2 (γ = 0), Economy 3 (γ > 0), or Economy 4 (γ = 1).
2.2.2.4 Economy 2: γ = 0
With no automation the QI becomes a fully-strategic speculator akin to the dis-
cretionary investor. The forces driving the behavior of the DI specified above will be
symmetric for the QI. Of particular note is the relationship between the trading inten-
sity of the DI and the QI as derived in Eq. (B.21) since the aggregate trading intensity
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will determine various market quality measures introduced in the next section:
βd2 =
2φd − φdφq − ρ
√
φdφq(1− φd)(1− φq)






It is immediate that ∂k/∂ρ > (<)0 ⇔ φd > (<)φq, which implies that greater signal
correlation will cause the investor with an information advantage to trade more ag-
gressively. The importance of signal correlation to trading behavior is consistent with
the findings of Foster and Viswanathan (1996).
2.2.2.5 Economy 3: 0 < γ < 1
For a partially automated quant, i.e. intermediate values of γ, the trading rule
is an endogenously determined weighted average of the backtested strategy and the
fully-strategic trading approach. As evident from Eq. (2.12), the relative weights are
determined by λj, which, in turn, identifies the depth of the market. For a fixed level
of liquidity λj by the market maker, greater automation (higher γ) results in a greater
weight being placed on the back-tested strategy versus the strategic rule. For relatively
liquid markets (λj < 1), greater γ leads to a more than a one-to-one weight increase on
the backtested strategy (e.g. a 1% increase in γ leads to a more than 1% of incremental
weight being placed on the back-tested rule). For relatively illiquid markets (λj > 1),
greater γ leads to a less than one-to-one increase in the weight placed on the backtested
strategy. Finally, for λj = 1, a greater γ results in exactly a one-to-one increase in the
weight placed on xb. The quant is more aggressive in implementing her backtest in
more liquid environments.
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2.2.2.6 Economy 4: γ = 1
A fully-automated quant adheres solely to the back-tested strategy xb, which is
developed under the assumption that the DI and the MM are not aware of her existence.
However, both the DI and MM internalize the QI’s expected behavior thereby rendering
QI’s strategy suboptimal from the perspective of profit-maximizing behavior.
2.2.2.7 Economy 2-4: Market Maker
For the market maker’s pricing rule, first note that the aggregate order flow ωj
provides a noisy signal for v:
ωj = αdj + αqj + (βdj + βqj)v︸ ︷︷ ︸
Signal
+ βdjed + βqjeq + z︸ ︷︷ ︸
Noise
, (2.14)
where the informativeness of the order flow can be expressed as:




eq + 2βdjβqjσedeq + σ
2
z . (2.15)
A lower conditional variance implies a more informative order flow. Lower trading
intensity by either informed speculator, greater signal precision for either informed
speculator, lower noise trading variance, and a lower signal covariance all lead to a
more informative order flow. This in-turn translates into the following effects on market




= βdj + βqj +
Var(ωj|v)
(βdj + βqj)σ2v






Var(ωj|βdjed + βqjeq + z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Noisiness of order flow
) (2.16)
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Holding aggregate trading intensity of the speculators constant, a noisier order flow
results in a more liquid price system. Market makers are less concerned about adverse
selection and are therefore less sensitive to greater order flow. Less precise signals,
greater signal covariance, and more noise trading all lead to a noisier system. Changes
to trading intensity for either speculator may either increase or decrease the liquidity
provision both through the noise-to-signal ratio and through the aggregate trading
intensity measure.
2.3 Comparative Statics
We explore the effects of the introduction of and the greater automation by the
quantitative investor on market quality. As customary in the literature (e.g. Vives
(2008)), we focus on the following measures of market quality as well as certain impor-
tant asset pricing measures for each Economy j:
1. Market depth: 1/λj
2. Price informativeness: Var(v|Pj)−1
3. Price volatility: Var(Pj)
4. Return volatility: Var(v − Pj)
5. Expected trading volume for each informed speculator: E[|xij|]
6. Expected trading volume for the speculator sector: E[|xdj + xqj|]
7. Expected profits for each informed speculator: E[πij] = E[xij(v − Pj)]
8. Expected profits for the speculator sector: E[πj] = E[πdj] + E[πqj]
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The closed-form solutions for each of the measures above utilizing the informed specu-
lators’ trading rules and the market maker’s pricing function as derived in Appendices
B.1 and B.3 are provided in Appendix B.4. Unfortunately, the theoretical framework
does not allow for analytically tractable solutions for the trading rules and pricing
functions. Therefore, we split the comparative statics analysis into two sections. The
first is a special case of the generalized model, which assumes that the DI has perfect
information, and only considers changes to market quality when the QI switches from
full discretion (γ = 0) to full automation (γ = 1), thereby only exploring changes to
market quality for Economies 1,2, and 4. Within this framework, we are able to theo-
retically demonstrate the effects of the introduction of and automation by the quant on
market quality. The second section conducts a quantitative exercise for the generalized
model, documenting changes in market quality due to the addition of and all levels of
automation by the QI (Economies 1-4) across a large number of parameter draws. We
first discuss the theoretical benchmark and conclude with the market quality outcomes
of the generalized model.
2.3.1 Theoretical Benchmark
The benchmark case assumes the DI has perfect information (φd = 1) and the
unconditional expected payoff is zero. The latter assumption is without loss of gen-
erality, but the former needs further justification. Inherent in this assumption is the
notion that traditional fundamental investors may have superior access to fundamental
information via corporate management meetings, industry and market expertise, and
deep-dive fundamental analysis. Quants, on the other hand, may look at rough proxies
for fundamental value, such as historical multiples or price trends, and hope that on
average, across a large sample of securities, such proxies will be indicative of future
payoffs. Examples of such quant funds would be smart beta exchange traded funds
84
and statistical arbitrage strategies nested within hedge funds. However, this category
does not include fundamental investors who rely on big data as an input into their
investment process, since such fundamental investors may actually have superior in-
formation. Examples of the latter would be fundamental funds relying on credit card
transaction data to accurately estimate retailers’ revenues or utilizing airfare pricing
datasets to forecast airline revenues.
The introduction of quantitative investing has a dual effect on the financial markets.
First, an incremental informed speculator is introduced to the economy. Second, the
incremental speculator chooses to pursue an automated strategy. We attempt to dis-
tinguish between these two effects by first exploring the implication of adding a second
informed strategic speculator to the market (Economy 1 to Economy 2), and, second,
analyzing the impact of automation by the incremental strategic speculator (Economy
2 to Economy 4). Under the assumption that growth in quantitative investing is driven
by new entrants in the market, the net effect of quantitative investing will be inter-
preted as the change in market quality between Economy 1 and Economy 4. However,
if the growth is driven by strategy transitions of incumbent funds from discretionary
to quantitive, the effects could be viewed through the changes from Economy 2 to
Economy 4.
Proposition II.1 derived in Appendix B.6 highlights our main theoretical findings
regarding the effects of quantitative investing on financial market quality. Figure 2.1
demonstrates the comparative statics graphically.
Proposition II.1 (Quantitative investing and financial market quality). Market qual-
ity improves due to the introduction of the quantitative investor, but the improvement is
dampened by the quant’s pursuit of the backtested trading rule. The shift from Economy
1 to Economy 2 results in greater trading volume by the speculator sector, more infor-
mative prices, greater market depth, and lower profits for the speculator sector. The
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transition from Economy 2 to Economy 4 leads to less aggressive trading and lower
profits by the QI, more aggressive trading and greater profits by the DI, less informa-
tive prices, lower market depth, and greater profits for the speculator sector as a whole.
Overall, market quality improves from Economy 1 to Economy 4.
The introduction of a second strategic speculator to the economy, i.e. the transition
from Economy 1 to Economy 2, unequivocally improves financial market quality. The
result is consistent with the findings of Foster and Viswanathan (1996) for the case of
uncorrelated information for multiple informed speculators. As can be seen from Fig.
2.1a, the introduction of a fully-discretionary quant is internalized by the DI, causing
him to trade less aggressively relative to a market in which he’s the only informed
speculator due to concerns regarding incremental information slippage. However, the
decline in the DI’s trading, is more than offset by incremental trading by the QI,
resulting in a net growth in expected trading volume by the speculator sector. This
net growth is increasing in the QI’s signal precision, as she trades more aggressively on
her information. Fig. 2.1d highlights that the greater trading by the speculator sector
leads to more informative prices relative to a benchmark world of a single informed
speculator, which, in turn is translated into lower profits for the discretionary investor
and the speculator sector as a whole (Fig. 2.1b). In equilibrium, the greater trading
volume and more informative prices correspond to greater market depth (Fig. 2.1c),
greater price volatility (Fig. 2.1e), and lower return volatility (Fig. 2.1f). The latter
two outcomes are directly driven by prices that more accurately track fundamental
values.
The primary contribution of the present framework is an analysis of the effects of
automation by the QI on the behavior of the DI and the net effects to financial market
quality. The quant’s backtested rule is less aggressive (i.e. has lower trading intensity)
than her trading strategy with full discretion. In part this is due to the foundation
86
of the backtest, which assumes that the DI and the MM are not aware of the QI’s
existence: they treat the incremental order flow as originating from the noise traders.
Once the presence of the quant is internalized by other market participants, the DI
trades more cautiously, allowing a discretionary quant to trade more aggressively in
response. On the other hand, an automated quant is, by definition, pursuing a strategy
that is not profit maximizing. This opens the door for the discretionary investor to
trade more aggressively on his information, but the net effect is less expected trading
volume by the speculator sector as a whole relative to Economy 2. The decline in
trading volume leads to less informative prices and greater profits for the DI and the
speculator sector as a whole. The QI earns less in expectation in Economy 4 due to
the sub-optimality of her strategy from a profit maximization perspective. Concurrent
with the lower price informativeness, liquidity dries up in the form of lower market
depth, price volatility declines, and return volatility increases. Overall, Economy 4
market quality decreases relative to Economy 2.
Despite the potentially detrimental effects of automation by the quant, as the shift
from Economy 2 to Economy 4 would suggest, we emphasize the overall improvement
to market quality from Economy 1 to Economy 4. The beneficial effects from the intro-
duction of an incremental informed speculator to the economy dominate the potential
inefficiency induced by the trading strategy they pursue. To the extent that quan-
titative investing growth is driven by new entrants in the market, our model would
suggest overall improvements in market quality. However, if existing funds are transi-
tioning from discretionary to quantitative strategies, market quality may be negatively
impacted.
The presented framework makes strong assumptions in exchange for theoretical
tractability. Next, we conduct a numerical exercise to describe the properties of a
more general version of the model.
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2.3.2 Generalized Model
In the generalized model, we do not restrict the DI to perfect information, allow
for signal correlation between the informed speculators, and allow for partial automa-
tion (i.e. intermediate values of γ). As such, we are able to not only consider the
relationships between the levels of market quality in Economies 1,2, and 4, but also to
explore the effects of intermediate automation through Economy 3. After all, quantita-
tive funds are ultimately deployed by humans, and inherent in this is a certain level of
discretion. Humans may choose to strategically scale, turn off, and alter their invest-
ment strategies, even if such strategies full rely on backtested analysis. Furthermore,
the framework allows for differential signal precision for the QI and the DI, thereby
allowing us to explore the effects of both superior and inferior information for the
quant. The latter feature of the model allows us to speak more generally to systematic
quantitative strategies, whereby quants may actually have superior information given
their ability to process large data to more accurately forecast future earnings.
As the simulation will highlight, the effects of quantitative investing on financial
market quality will be determined by whether a fully-automated quant (Economy 4)
trades more than a fully-discretionary quant (Economy 2). Since the quant’s strategy
is (loosely, i.e. Eq. (2.12)) a weighted average between the Economy 2 and the Econ-
omy 4 strategy, growth in automation (γ) will lead to more (less) aggressive trading
by the QI if βq4 > (<)βq2. The change in trading behavior due to greater automation
is internalized by the discretionary investor and ultimately determines the effects of
quantitative investing on financial market quality. Since the fully-automated quant is
by definition not maximizing profits, to the extent that this sub-optimality is accom-
panied by less aggressive trading, the DI has the opportunity to exploit the greater
resulting mis-pricing to his advantage by trading more aggressively without positive
implications to market quality. If, however, greater automation leads to greater trading
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intensity by the quant, the DI is mostly unable to exploit this to his advantage as he’s
concerned about excess information leakage. The net effect in the latter scenario is an
improvement in market quality. The simulation results, provided in Tables 2.1-2.3, are
summarized in Conclusions II.1 and II.2.
Conclusion II.1 (Effect of the introduction of a fully-discretionary quant). The intro-
duction of a fully-discretionary quantitative investor leads to improvements in market
quality via more informative prices, greater price volatility, and lower return volatil-
ity. The effects on market depth, trading volume, and profits for the speculator sector
depend on signal correlation and precision for the QI and DI. If the parameters are
such that the fully discretionary quant trades more than the fully automated quant
(βq2 > βq4), trading volume for the speculator sector increases, profits mostly decrease,
the DI trades less and makes less in profits, the QI makes positive profits, and market
depth mostly rises. Conversely, if βq2 ≤ βq4, trading volume for the speculator sector
mostly increases, profits always increase, the DI trades less and makes less in profits,
the QI makes positive profits, and market depth always decreases.
Conclusion II.2 (Effect of automation by the quantitative investor). The effect of
greater automation γ by the QI on financial market quality depends on whether the fully-
automated quant trades more than the fully-discretionary quant. If the fully-automated
quant trades more (βq4 > βq2), market quality broadly improves as market depth, price
informativeness, price volatility are mostly rising and return volatility is falling in γ.
Furthermore, the speculator sector as a whole trades more, profits are mostly lower,
the effects on the DI’s trading and profits can be either be increasing, decreasing, or U-
shaped in γ, while the QI always trades more and her profits are increasing, decreasing
or hump-shaped in γ. If the fully-automated quant trades less (βq4 < βq2), market qual-
ity deteriorates via lower market depth, less informative prices, lower price volatility,
and greater return volatility. The speculator sector as a whole trades less and makes
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greater profits as the DI trades more aggressively and makes greater profits, while the
QI trades less and makes lower profits.
To understand the intuition behind the main conclusions from the simulation, it is
helpful to first separately consider the effects of signal correlation and relative informa-
tion precision on market quality. Figures 2.2-2.3 demonstrate the effect of automation
on market quality for different correlation structures for the generalized model within
which the DI and QI have equal information precision (φd = φq) and other param-
eter values are held constant. The first notable pattern, highlighted in Fig. 2.2e, is
the growth in the QI’s trading intensity for lower correlation levels. This is a direct
outcome from the QI’s backtest, as described in Section 2.2.2.2, whereby the backtest
trades more aggressively with lower correlation. A lower correlation allows the quant
to trade more aggressively because she’s less concerned about excess information slip-
page. For sufficiently low correlation levels, greater automation leads to a greater
expected trading volume for the QI since the backtest has greater trading intensity
than the fully-discretionary strategy. Conversely, for sufficiently high levels of corre-
lation, greater automation leads to lower expected trading volume as more weight is
placed on the backtest, which has lower trading intensity than the fully-discretionary











Pictured in Fig. 2.2c, the discretionary investor’s reaction to the changes in signal
correlation is more nuanced. On the one hand, a sufficiently negative signal correlation
implies that he can trade more aggressively on his information since the QI is more
90
likely to trade in the opposite direction thereby decreasing information slippage. On
the other hand, the QI is also trading more aggressively, and is acting less strategically,
thereby limiting the extent to which the DI can be more aggressive in his trading. The
net effect of the two forces can lead to either an increase or a decrease in the trading
volume of the DI. However, if the signals are sufficiently positively correlated, the QI
will always trade less aggressively with greater automation, which opens the door for
the DI to be more aggressive in his trading.
As demonstrated in Fig. 2.2a, the net effect of the trading behavior of the DI and
the QI on the aggregate speculator trading volume is lower aggregate trading volume
in response to lower correlation levels. This is intuitive, as the negative correlation
leads to offsetting orders, causing a decrease in aggregate order flow. However, a more
intricate outcome, is that the increase in total trading volume in response to greater
γ is greatest for lower correlation levels. That is the change in the trading intensity of
the QI in response to greater automation for varying correlation levels dominates the












The trading patterns above always result in lower profits for the quant with greater
automation. This is to be expected as greater automation implies a lower adherence to
a profit-maximizing strategy, which, by definition, leads to lower profits. Furthermore,
a lower correlation level results in greater profits as price impact is lower. For the
discretionary investor, profits are rising with greater automation by the quant to the
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extent that he is able to trade more aggressively. However, the relationship with
correlation levels is nontrivial as highlighted above. The speculator sector as a whole
makes greater expected profits with more negatively correlated signals and aggregate
profits are rising in automation if the quant is less aggressive in her trading.
Greater aggregate trading volume generally results in more informative prices, and
price informativeness is falling in correlation. A lower correlation implies that the
aggregate order flow is more reflective of the fundamental value, while higher correlation











0. Therefore, price volatility exhibits the same pattern, while return volatility is the
reverse. Ultimately, market depth is increasing with correlation, however the rate of











The effect of differential signal quality, highlighted in Figures 2.4 and 2.5, is more
straightforward. Great relative signal precision for the quant leads to more trading
and more expected profits for the QI, less trading and less expected profits for the DI,
and more aggregate trading and aggregate profits for the speculator sector. Greater
automation generally dampens these effects, as the quant’s trading activity leads to
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Greater signal precision for the quant leads to more informative prices, greater price
volatility, and lower return volatility. Greater automation strengthens these effects as







Market depth is negatively impacted by the quant’s greater signal precision but the







Given the differential effects of signal precision and information correlation on trad-
ing activity and market quality, at first sight it may seem complex to fully describe the
effects of the parameter space (φd, φq, ρ) on market quality. One may conjecture that
for sufficiently low correlation together with sufficiently high information advantage
for the quant, market quality would generally benefit from greater automation and
vice versa. However, understanding the implications when the parameter effects are
offsetting, e.g. high correlation and high information advantage for the quant, appears
inherently challenging.
Fortunately, as highlighted by the simulation results in Tables 2.1-2.3, a sufficient
statistic defined for each triplet (φd, φq, ρ) nearly unambiguously determines the ef-
fect of the introduction of and greater automation by the quantitative investor on
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financial market quality. The sign of the wedge between the trading intensity of a
fully-discretionary and a fully-automated quant, i.e. sign(βq4 − βq2), captures the net
effect of the signal precision for each speculator and the signal correlation. As derived
in Appendix B.7, the relationship between the trading intensity of a fully-automated
and a fully-discretionary quant is jointly determined by (φd, φq, ρ), which allows us to
fully characterize the parameter space and the effects of any triplet on the sign of the
wedge.
We provide a classification of the parameter space via a contour plot illustrated
in Fig. 2.6. Specifically, for each pair of signal precision parameters (φd, φq), we plot
the maximum correlation level for all values below which the fully automated quant
trades more than the fully-discretionary quant. It is immediate from the theoretical
exercise in Appendix B.7 and apparent from the graph, that for a sufficiently high
information advantage for the quant, specifically if φq > 3φd, the automated QI will
always trade more aggressively than the discretionary QI regardless of how strong the
signal correlation is. For a lower information advantage and a sufficiently imprecise
signal for the DI, the quant can still absorb a positive correlation, however as the
DI’s signal increases in precision, we soon reach a point where despite an information
advantage, the automated quant does not have a greater trading intensity than a
discretionary one.
With an inferior information quality, the quant requires significantly lower corre-
lation levels to have greater trading intensity with full automation. Greater signal
precision for the discretionary investor brings down this break-even correlation even
further, and, beyond a certain point, the fully automated quant never trades more ag-
gressively than a fully discretionary quant. Ultimately, increases in the signal precision
for the discretionary investor always lower the breakeven correlation level required for a
more aggressive fully-automated quant. However, the effect of greater signal precision
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for the quantitative investor is twofold. For a sufficiently low signal precision for the
DI (to the left of the ρ = 0 contour), greater φq leads to a higher breakeven correlation
level. For a sufficiently high signal precision for the DI (to the right of the ρ = 0
contour), greater φq implies a lower breakeven correlation level.
We now connect the sign of the trading intensity wedge to the results of the sim-
ulation highlighted in Tables 2.1-2.3. A greater trading intensity results in a mostly
increasing market depth, increasing price informativeness and volatility, and decreasing
return volatility in the level of automation γ by the quant. These overall improvements
in market quality are driven by greater expected trading volume for the quant, mostly
lower volume for the DI, and greater volume for the speculator sector as a whole. The
effects on the quant’s profits are ambiguous, while the DI and the speculator sector as
a whole mostly see declining profits. Greater automation by the quantitative investor
has a positive impact on financial market quality for parameters, which imply greater
trading intensity for a fully-automated quant.
In cases where the fully-automated quant trades less than the fully-discretionary
quant, market quality generally deteriorates as the lower trading intensity opens the
door for the DI to benefit at the expense of the QI. The simulation highlights that
market depth, price informativeness, and price volatility unambiguously decrease, while
return volatility increases with greater automation by the quant. This is driven by
lower trading volume for the quant, greater trading volume for the DI, and lower
trading volume for the speculator sector as a whole. Concurrently, profits for the
quant unambiguously fall for the quant and increase for the discretionary investor and
the speculator sector. In all, market quality suffers from the greater automation by the
quant with a negative trading intensity wedge.
Given the differential effects of the trading intensity wedge on market quality, we
consider the importance of Figure 2.6. The effects of quantitative investing on market
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quality will ultimately depend on where we believe we are in the graph. If we believe
discretionary funds to have subpar information (e.g. ρ < 0.5), improvements in the
quality of the information obtained by the quants should lead to greater market quality
as market quality will increase for a greater set of potential correlation levels. However,
if we believe that discretionary investors have strong information (e.g. ρ > 0.6), a
more precise signal for the quant makes it less likely that automation improves market
quality. More generally, if we believe that information quality is increasing for the
speculator sector as a whole, i.e. for both the QI and the DI, the implications to market
quality are not trivial since both the starting point and the relative improvement will
dictate the effect on market quality.
2.4 Conclusion
Quantitative investment strategies are playing an increasingly important role in
the financial markets. What was previously available primarily via hedge funds to a
select clientele is now widely accessible for household investments via mutual funds
and smart-beta ETFs. The effects of the growth in quantitative investing on the
quality of the financial market is not immediate. Quantitative trading is inherently
disciplined by backtesting. Precisely due to the reliance on backtesting, quantitative
investing may not fully incorporate the strategic trading behavior of other market
participants. We develop a model of strategic speculation that captures the potential
myopia of quantitative funds via their reliance on a backtested trading strategy – i.e.
one assuming by definition that other market participants are unaware of the quant’s
existence.
The introduction of the quantitative investor to our model broadly benefits mar-
ket quality. However, greater automation by the quant (i.e. a greater reliance on the
backtest) may have disparate effects on market quality. If greater adherence to back-
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testing results in greater trading intensity for the quant, market quality improves as
the strategic market participants are unable to take advantage of the quant’s myopia.
Conversely, if greater automation leads to less trading by the quant, the fully-strategic
speculators may take advantage of the quant’s myopia, leading to worse market quality.
Importantly, many of these effects depend on potentially observable fund characteris-
tics, such as the relative precision and correlation of the information of discretionary
and quant investors.
Our theoretical analysis yields numerous empirical implications. Given the im-
portance of relative signal precision and signal correlation for the discretionary and
quantitative investors in determining the effects of quantitative investing on market
quality, it is essential to categorize quant and discretionary funds by signal quality.
For example, smart-beta ETFs are generally deemed to be less informed than propri-
etary quant traders, and the correlation of their trading strategies may change over
time with potentially material implications for the quality of the affected markets.
Thus, our analysis provides a framework for empirically investigating the market
quality implications of the growth in quantitative investing with strategic interaction
among investors. Applying the model to the data will shed light on the empirical effects
of quantitative investing on the trading behavior of the financial markets.
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2.5 Tables and Figures








All 43.9 44.6 0.0 11.5 27.1 24.6 46.8 25.5 48.9 45.2 100.0
βq4 > βq2 75.1 5.5 0.0 19.5 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.0 12.7 6.4 58.2
βq4 ≤ βq2 0.5 99.1 0.0 0.5 64.8 58.8 99.4 60.9 99.5 99.2 41.8
(a) Market depth








All 57.1 42.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 42.9 100.0 42.9 42.9 100.0
βq4 > βq2 98.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 2.0 100.0 2.0 2.0 58.2
βq4 ≤ βq2 0.1 99.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 99.9 99.9 41.8
(b) Price informativeness








All 57.1 42.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 42.9 100.0 42.9 42.9 100.0
βq4 > βq2 98.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 2.0 100.0 2.0 2.0 58.2
βq4 ≤ βq2 0.1 99.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 99.9 99.9 41.8
(c) Price volatility








All 42.9 57.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 57.1 0.0 57.1 57.1 100.0
βq4 > βq2 2.0 98.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.0 0.0 98.0 98.0 58.2
βq4 ≤ βq2 99.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 41.8
(d) Return volatility
Table 2.1: Simulation Results for Market Quality Measures
We use 100,000 parameter draws: ρ ∼ U(−1, 1), φd ∼ U(0, 1), φq ∼ U(0, 1), η ∼ U(0, 2), P0 =
0, σ2v = 1. For Economy 3, we evaluate market quality for 99 values of γ from 1% to 99% at
1% increments. Numbers represent the percent of simulations such that the condition in the
header is satisfied (Col. 1-7) or the average fraction of γ’s across all simulations such that
the condition satisfied (Col. 8-10). “E” stands for Economy. First four columns document
the shape of the market quality measure in Economy 3 for increasing γ.
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All 57.7 42.1 0.0 0.2 84.3 94.6 42.1 93.2 42.2 42.1 100.0
βq4 > βq2 99.2 0.4 0.0 0.4 73.1 90.9 0.6 88.4 0.7 0.5 58.2
βq4 ≤ βq2 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 99.9 99.9 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 41.8
(a) Trading volume: speculator sector








All 58.8 25.1 0.0 16.0 0.0 1.7 31.4 1.1 34.4 26.9 100.0
βq4 > βq2 29.4 43.1 0.0 27.5 0.0 2.9 53.9 1.9 59.1 46.1 58.2
βq4 ≤ βq2 99.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 41.8
(b) Trading volume: discretionary investor








All 57.1 42.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 42.9 100.0 42.9 42.9 100.0
βq4 > βq2 98.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 2.0 100.0 2.0 2.0 58.2
βq4 ≤ βq2 0.1 99.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 99.9 99.9 41.8
(c) Trading volume: quantitative investor
Table 2.2: Simulation Results for the Speculator Sector Trading Intensity
We use 100,000 parameter draws: ρ ∼ U(−1, 1), φd ∼ U(0, 1), φq ∼ U(0, 1), η ∼ U(0, 2), P0 =
0, σ2v = 1. For Economy 3, we evaluate trading volume for 99 values of γ from 1% to 99% at
1% increments. Numbers represent the percent of simulations such that the condition in the
header is satisfied (Col. 1-7) or the average fraction of γ’s across all simulations such that
the condition is satisfied (Col. 8-10). “E” stands for Economy. First four columns document
the shape of the market quality measure in Economy 3 for increasing γ.
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All 44.6 43.9 11.5 0.0 72.9 75.4 53.2 74.5 51.1 54.8 100.0
βq4 > βq2 5.5 75.1 19.5 0.0 100.0 100.0 91.0 100.0 87.3 93.6 58.2
βq4 ≤ βq2 99.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 35.2 41.2 0.6 39.1 0.5 0.8 41.8
(a) Expected profits: speculator sector








All 57.0 33.0 0.0 10.0 2.8 7.6 37.9 6.3 39.5 34.3 100.0
βq4 > βq2 26.2 56.6 0.0 17.2 4.7 12.9 65.1 10.7 67.8 58.9 58.2
βq4 ≤ βq2 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 41.8
(b) Expected profits: discretionary investor








All 13.1 62.4 24.5 0.0 100.0 98.3 80.9 98.9 76.1 85.2 100.0
βq4 > βq2 22.4 35.4 42.2 0.0 100.0 97.1 67.3 98.1 59.1 74.7 58.2
βq4 ≤ βq2 0.1 99.9 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 99.9 99.9 41.8
(c) Expected profits: quantitative investor
Table 2.3: Simulation Results for the Speculator Sector Profits
We use 100,000 parameter draws: ρ ∼ U(−1, 1), φd ∼ U(0, 1), φq ∼ U(0, 1), η ∼ U(0, 2), P0 =
0, σ2v = 1. For Economy 3, we evaluate expected profits for 99 values of γ from 1% to 99% at
1% increments. Numbers represent the percent of simulations such that the condition in the
header is satisfied (Col. 1-7) or the average fraction of γ’s across all simulations such that
the condition is satisfied (Col. 8-10). “E” stands for Economy. First four columns document
the shape of the market quality measure in Economy 3 for increasing γ.
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(a) Expected trading volume for speculator sector (b) Expected trading profits for speculator sector
(c) Market depth in Economy j: 1/λj (d) Price informativeness in Economy j: Var(v|Pj)−1
(e) Price volatility in Economy j: Var(Pj) (f) Return volatility in Economy j: Var(v − Pj)
Figure 2.1: Effect of Quantitative Investing on Market Quality by Quant’s Information
Quality.
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(a) Expected trading volume for speculator sector (b) Expected trading profits for speculator sector
(c) Expected trading volume for DI (d) Expected trading profits for DI
(e) Expected trading volume for QI (f) Expected trading profits for QI
Figure 2.2: Effect of Signal Correlation on Speculator Sector Trading Volume and
Profits.
Figures are constructed for the generalized model and assume equal information quality for
both the discretionary investor and the quantitative investor: φd = φq = 0.5.
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(a) Market depth (b) Price informativeness
(c) Price volatility (d) Return volatility
Figure 2.3: Effect of Signal Correlation on Market Quality.
Figures are constructed for the generalized model and assume equal information quality for
both the discretionary investor and the quantitative investor: φd = φq = 0.5.
103
(a) Expected trading volume for speculator sector (b) Expected trading profits for speculator sector
(c) Expected trading volume for DI (d) Expected trading profits for DI
(e) Expected trading volume for QI (f) Expected trading profits for QI
Figure 2.4: Effect of Relative Signal Precision on the Speculator Sector.
Figures are constructed for the generalized model, assume uncorrelated signals for the discre-
tionary and the quantitative investor, and allow for potentially inferior or superior information
for the discretionary investor: φd = 0.5, ρ = 0.
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(a) Market depth (b) Price informativeness
(c) Price volatility (d) Return volatility
Figure 2.5: Effect of Relative Signal Precision on Market Quality
Figures are constructed for the generalized model, assume uncorrelated signals for the discre-
tionary and the quantitative investor, and allow for potentially inferior or superior information
for the discretionary investor: φd = 0.5, ρ = 0.
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Figure 2.6: Breakeven Correlation for the Quant’s Trading Wedge
The contour plot demonstrates the maximum signal correlation levels such that the fully
discretionary quant (Economy 2) trades less than the fully automated quant (Economy 4) for
varying levels of signal precision for the DI and QI. The white dotted line highlights equal
signal precision for the DI and QI, with the region above signifying an informational advantage





The dramatic proliferation of exchange traded funds (ETFs) over the past few
decades has greatly increased the interconnectedness of the financial markets. By
design, ETFs track a basket of underlying securities, yet may deviate from their net
asset value (NAV) as dictated by the exposure of the basket via the forces of supply
and demand in the secondary markets. The associated law of one price violations
are continuously exploited by various market players including authorized participants
(APs) who are incentivized to ensure that ETF prices do not diverge from their NAV
drastically and various arbitrageurs such as high frequency traders at hedge funds and
other sophisticated investors. The resulting buying and selling in the synthetic security
and its constituents, which attempts to ensure that the ETF tracks its underlying
securities, may be viewed as a form of noise trading as it is ultimately agnostic to
fundamental value. In the present work, I theoretically explore the effects of arbitrage
trading due to law of one price violations on market quality in both the underlying and
synthetic securities.
I first explore the implications of introducing arbitrage trading to a market that
will otherwise see different prices of assets with identical payoffs. The markets for
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the underlying and synthetic assets are assumed to be initially segmented via different
levels of noise trading, which in turn leads to price divergence. The introduction of an
arbitrageur who ensures that prices of assets with identical payoffs converge, leads to
an averaging of noise trading activity across the otherwise segmented markets. The ar-
bitrageur buys (sells) in the market with excess noise supply (demand), implying that
effective noise trading in each market is a weighted average (based on market depth) of
noise trading in both markets. This smoothing diminishes the level of available cam-
ouflage (i.e. Kyle (1985)) via a lower effective noise trading volatility for the informed
speculator and increases concerns of adverse selection for the market makers, result-
ing in a declining trading intensity for the informed speculator, lower market depth,
and unchanged price informativeness from a world with law of one price violations.
Further segmenting the markets by introducing asset-specific speculators attenuates
the negative effects above, as the arbitrageur links the markets, thereby inducing com-
petition among the informed speculators akin to Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992).
The increased competition leads to greater trading intensity by the speculators, greater
market depth set by the market makers, and more informative prices relative to a world
with a single speculator and arbitrageur.
The analysis above assumes the existence of a market for both the underlying and
the synthetic assets. The results are dramatically different if one were to study the
introduction of a synthetic security. The arbitrageur connects the synthetic and the
underlying markets and his activity results in an averaging of noise trading between the
two markets. To the extent that the synthetic asset attracts sufficient noise trading, the
trading intensity of the informed speculator will rise in the underlying market and the
market maker will be able to provide greater market depth while price informativeness
remains unchanged. The result is even more pronounced in the case of greater market
segmentation via asset-specific speculators.
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In the main analysis, I model arbitrage trading as an activity separate from market
making. However, much of the leading theoretical literature on ETFs (e.g. Bhat-
tacharya and O’Hara (2018)), models arbitrage activity via the price updating process
of the market makers at an intermediate stage. The market makers will take all in-
formation available from order flow across markets, and will set prices of assets with
identical payoffs equal conditional on the same information set. This assumption boils
down to having the market maker also perform the function of an authorized partic-
ipant, which need not always be the case institutionally. I directly compare the two
approaches to arbitrage activity, and document the following differential implications
to market quality.
A stand-alone arbitrageur is generally agnostic to fundamental payoffs as he cares
only about price convergence, and therefore trades based on the relative order flow in
both markets to ensure that prices equate. His presence allows the informed specula-
tors to be more aggressive in their trading. However, the market makers become more
concerned about adverse selection. Conversely, the price-updating market maker cares
about adverse selection, and is therefore able to more accurately impute the asset pay-
off via information contained in the order flow of segmented markets. This reduces his
fear of adverse selection, yet dampens the ability of the informed speculators to trade
aggressively. The net effect of the two offsetting forces are identically informative prices
for both the stand-alone arbitrageur and the price-updating market maker. However,
the implications to various measures of market quality such as informed trading inten-
sity and market depth are different, and are governed by the respective objective of
the arbitrageur and the market maker.
My model provides various testable empirical implications. An immediate outcome
is that the introduction of an ETF, which attracts significant noise trading volume,
should result in greater informed trading in the underlying assets and greater market
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depth, and should not distort price informativeness. Exploiting the introduction of
ETFs across various markets, one can rely on empirical measures of price informa-
tiveness (e.g. Bai et al. (2016)), probability of informed trading (e.g. Easley et al.
(1996), Duarte and Young (2009)), liquidity (e.g Amihud (2002), Holden and Jacob-
sen (2014)), and adverse selection (e.g. Hasbrouck (1988), Hasbrouck (1991), Glosten
and Harris (1988)) to identify whether empirically the implications of the model stand
up. Furthermore, the nuanced market quality effects of stand-alone arbitrageurs versus
market makers jointly acting as APs allow for a cross-sectional exploration of ETFs
based on their exposure to stand-alone authorized participants versus market makers
also performing AP functions. Greater exposure to the latter should result in more
liquid prices with lower informed trading intensity, while exposure to the former should
imply lower liquidity and greater informed trading intensity.
The present work contributes to the rapidly growing theoretical and empirical lit-
erature on ETFs. Surprisingly, research specifically tackling the question of strategic
speculation in the presence of arbitrage trading and its impact on market quality has
been limited. To my knowledge, the most closely related paper would be Shim (2020),
who argues that arbitrage trading distorts asset prices as it trades based on mechani-
cally assigned weights versus the true exposure of the underlying securities to factors.
My model is complementary to his work: I focus on the effects of strategic speculation
in the presence of arbitrage trading and abstract away from the inefficiencies associated
with the weighting schemes of multi-security ETFs. Bhattacharya and O’Hara (2018)
is another complementary paper analyzing the effects of ETFs on hard-to-access mar-
kets, whereby the no-arbitrage mechanism is embedded via market makers’ short-term
price adjustments. The distinguishing feature of the present framework is its explicit
focus on the implications of arbitrage trading on financial market quality.
On the empirical side, much work has attempted to discern whether ETFs improve
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or impede price discovery in the underlying securities with conflicting results. On the
one hand, Glosten et al. (2017) highlight that greater ETF ownership leads to more
accurate incorporation of accounting information suggesting that price efficiency may
be rising due to ETF ownership. On the other hand, in a study of Russell index
reconstitutions, Coles et al. (2018) find that weak-form price efficiency deteriorates
due to index funds and ETFs. Furthermore, Ben-David et al. (2018) find that greater
ETF ownership leads to greater return volatility also implying lower price efficiency.
Similarly, Israeli et al. (2017) report that ETF ownership results in decreasing price
efficiency. Several papers, including Easley et al. (2020) and Huang et al. (2021) point
out various advantages of ETFs via their ability to serve as hedging instruments and
their optimal “activeness.”
3.2 Model
I model a three-date financial market with two risky assets with identical payoffs.
Participants include up to two perfectly informed speculators, up to one arbitrageur,
noise traders, and up to two market makers. At time t = 0, informed speculators
observe the payoff of the risky assets. At time t = 1, speculators, noise traders, and
the arbitrageur (if present) submit their demands for the risky asset and market makers
set prices according to the aggregate order flow. At time t = 2, the risky asset payoffs
are realized. Agents have rational expectations in that the informed speculators, the
market makers, and the arbitrageur are aware of the model parameters and each others’





There will be four market environments, or economies, indexed by j ∈ {b, a, s,m},
which will differ based on the number of informed speculators, the number of market
makers, and the presence of an arbitrageur who will ensure that prices of assets with
identical payoffs converge. Each economy will have two risky assets traded in separate
markets with identical payoffs but potentially different prices due to differential noise
trading. Economy b will be the benchmark economy and will feature a single informed
speculator allocating to the two risky assets. Prices may diverge in Economy b due
to differential levels of noise trading in the two markets. Economy a will attempt
to isolate the effect of arbitrage trading while holding all else equal by introducing
an arbitrageur to Economy b who will ensure that the prices of the two risky assets
converge. Economy b is introduced primarily for theoretical purposes, to highlight the
effects of a stand-alone arbitrageur. Economy s will identify the effect of arbitrage
trading in the presence of segmented markets, whereby each risky asset will have its
own informed speculator. Economy s will speak to the effects of arbitrage activity
in markets in which one can plausibly assume separate speculators for the underlying
and synthetic assets. Finally, Economy m will substitute the arbitrageur for a single
market maker, who sets prices to be the same based on order flow in both underlying
markets. Economy m will address institutionally-relevant markets in which the market
maker in the underlying and synthetic securities jointly acts as an AP.
Risky assets
Each economy will feature two risky assets i ∈ {1, 2} traded in different markets
with identical payoffs v distributed according to v ∼ N(0, σ2v), realized in the second
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period. The identical payoffs are meant to resemble the relationship between an ETF
and the underlying securities, which, absent frictions, should yield identical payoffs.
The endogenously determined price Pij set by the market maker in the first period
is indexed by Economy j as it will depend on the presence of the arbitrageur and
the number and trading behavior of the informed speculators. I label asset 1 as the
“underlying” and asset 2 as the “synthetic” security without loss of generality.
Noise traders and segmented markets
To incorporate law of one price violations I assume segmented markets for the two
assets. Specifically, I require that each Asset i trades only in Market i, which has




the level of noise trading is orthogonal to the fundamental payoff (σvzi = 0).
1 Some
examples of noise demand include uninformed retail investors buying or selling shares
for liquidity needs, informed asset managers buying or selling securities purely for
hedging purposes, or corporations unexpectedly issuing or buying back stock. One can
think of reasons why noise trading may differ between the synthetic and underlying
securities. For example, ETF purchases and sales may be driven by household wealth
shocks, or hedge fund hedging needs, while sales and purchases in the underlying




/σ2v as a normalized measure of noise trading in Market i. The differential
levels of noise trading for the two markets will result in law of one price violations as
assets will be functions of asset-specific order flow implying that assets with identical
payoffs will have different prices.
1σxy refers to the covariance between x and y.
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Informed speculators
Each economy will feature up to two informed speculators who observe the payoff
v. Each Asset i in Economy j will have exactly one speculator investing in the asset to
maximize profits. As in Kyle (1985), in placing her order, the speculator will balance
her knowledge of the payoff with revealing her knowledge to the market maker via her
demand. For Economy j ∈ {b, a}, where a single strategic speculator invests in both
assets, her optimization is as follows:
[x1j, x2j] = arg max
x̃1j ,x̃2j
E[x̃1j(v − P1j) + x̃2j(v − P2j)|v]. (3.1)
For Economy j ∈ {s,m}, which includes asset-specific speculators, whereby Speculator
i is assigned to Asset i, Speculator i’s demand will be:
xij = arg max
x̃ij
E[x̃ij(v − Pij)|v]. (3.2)
Aribtrageur
The arbitrageur will be introduced in Economies a and s to eliminate law of one
price violations. I will assume that the arbitrageur buys εj shares in Market 1 of
Economy j and sells εj shares in Market 2 of Economy j. The quantity bought and
sold will be endogenously determined, and, ultimately, the arbitrageur makes exactly
zero in profits, which is consistent with a competitive arbitrage market. For Economy
j ∈ {a, s}, the arbitrageur will submit the following orders in Markets 1 and 2 to ensure
that prices converge:
P1j(x1j + z1 + εj) = P2j(x2j + z2 − εj) (3.3)
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My notion of arbitrageurs most closely resembles authorized participants (APs) in the
financial markets, who are responsible for ensuring that ETF prices do not deviate
drastically from the value of the underlying basket, and to accomplish this role are
granted the ability to issue and buy back ETF securities exactly at NAV.
Market makers
Each Market i in Economy j ∈ {b, a, s} will have two market makers, each dedicated
to Asset i such that he only observes order flow in his Market i, and is assumed to
have risk-neutral preferences and operate in a competitive environment. Economy m
will feature a single market maker who will observe order flow and set prices both in
Market 1 and Market 2. For Economy j ∈ {b, a, s}, given aggregate order flow ωij, the
market maker sets a price such that he breaks even in expectation:
Pij(ωij) = E[v|ωij], (3.4)
i.e. such that the equilibrium asset price is semi-strong from efficient. For Economy
m, the market maker will take advantage of all available information in both Market
1 and Market 2, to set the same price in both markets:
P1m(ω1m, ω2m) = P2m(ω1m, ω2m) ≡ Pm(ω1m, ω2m) = E[v|ω1m, ω2m]. (3.5)
An underlying assumption in this framework is that the market maker has sufficient
inventory (if selling) or liquidity (if buying) to satisfy the net demands of the traders.
The market maker attempts to discern between the informed and uninformed order
flow and to set prices accordingly.
The aggregate order flow will differ based on whether an arbitrageur is present or
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if there are two speculators. As such, order flow will be
ω1j = x1j + z1 + 1j∈{a,s}ε (3.6)
for the underlying asset, and
ω2j = x2j + z2 − 1j∈{a,s}ε (3.7)
for the synthetic asset. The arbitrageur’s buying and selling in Markets 1 and 2 re-
spectively will only take place in Economies a and s. For these Economies I assume
that the arbitrageur and the market makers operate independently, which is consistent
with some industry segmentation between market makers and authorized participants.
Implicit in this assumption is the arbitrageur’s ability to infer the pricing rule of the
market maker and the demand functions of the informed speculators. Economy m
relaxes this assumption, and allows the market maker to partake in both functions by
allowing him to update prices based on the order flow in each market.
3.2.2 Model Solution
I aim to identify the effect of arbitrage trading activity on various measures of
market quality such as trading intensity, liquidity, and price informativeness. As such,
I begin with the simplest possible benchmark (Economy b), within which law of one
price violations may occur and identify the relevant measures of market quality in this
setting. Next, I introduce the arbitrageur in Economy a, who ensures that the law of
one price holds and revisit the effects on market quality. In Economy s, I allow for
potential segmentation between the informed speculators, assigning a market-specific
informed speculator, and explore how the activity of the arbitrageur interacts with
this segmentation. Finally, Economy m replaces the arbitrageur by allowing a single
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market maker to set prices, thereby automatically setting prices equal to each other.
For each Economy j I assume that the demand function of the speculator in Asset
i is linear in her signal
xij = βijv, (3.8)
and the market maker’s pricing function is linear either in aggregate order flow for
Economy j ∈ {b, a, s}
Pij = λijωij, (3.9)
or a linear combination of the order flow from the two markets in Economy m
Pm = λ1mω1m + λ2mω2m. (3.10)
I then derive the coefficients that satisfy the speculators’, arbitrageur’s, and market
makers’ optimization functions given by Eq. (3.1)-(3.5). I refer to βij as the “trading
intensity” of the informed speculator in Asset i as it reflects how aggressively the
speculator reacts to an incremental unit of signal. I identify 1/λij as “market depth,”
my primary measure of liquidity: the inverse of the market maker’s price sensitivity to
an incremental share of order flow.
I solve the model for all Economies in Appendices C.1.1,C.1.2,C.1.3, and C.1.4, and
summarize the solutions in Proposition III.1 below.
Proposition III.1 (Existence and Lack of Uniqueness of Linear Equilibrium). There
exists a linear trading rule for the speculator(s), specified by Eq. (3.8), and a linear
pricing function for the market maker(s), specified by Eq. (3.9) or (3.10), with positive
coefficients, such that the speculator(s) maximize expected profits, specified by Eq. (3.1)
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or (3.2), the market maker(s) set prices to break even, specified by Eq. (3.4) and (3.5),
and P1j = P2j for j ∈ {a, s,m}, for all realizations of v, z1, and z2. Positive coefficients
are uniquely identified for Economies b and m, and symmetric equilibria with positive
coefficients are uniquely identified for Economies a and s, which have a continuum of
linear equilibria.
I now describe and summarize my findings for each Economy all of which are derived
in Appendices C.1.1-C.1.4.
Benchmark: Economy b This is a simple extension of Kyle (1985) to include a
second asset and partially segment the market for Asset 1 and Asset 2 via different
levels of noise trading and asset-specific market makers. The segmentation is partial
since there continues to be a single strategic speculator trading in both assets. The
trading intensity for the informed speculator and each market maker’s pricing slope for










Both market depth (1/λib) and trading intensity are increasing in the amount of normal-
ized noise trading as the speculator has greater camouflage to trade more aggressively,
while the market makers are less concerned about adverse selection. The two forces





Introducing arbitrageur: Economy a I now introduce the arbitrageur who will
buy ε shares in Market 1 and sell ε shares in Market 2 so that the prices in the two
118
markets are equal. The change in market depth and trading intensity from Economy b
will highlight the effect of arbitrage trading. As pointed out in Prop. III.1, there is a
continuum of equilibria in this setting. This is intuitive since the speculator is active in
both Markets 1 and 2, and prices will be equal in the two markets by design. Therefore,
she will be indifferent between investing in either market and what will matter is the
aggregate amount of informed trading and the aggregate market depth, both of which
are uniquely identified for upwards sloping supply curves:
β1a + β2a =
√








η1 + η2 (3.15)
A similar pattern to Economy b holds, whereby aggregate market depth and aggregate
trading intensity are increasing in the amount of noise trading. It is important to
note that arbitrage trading links noise trading in the two markets via the activity
of the arbitrageur, resulting in aggregate measures of noise trading (i.e. η1 + η2) as
the defining equilibrium parameters. The market with greater (lower) market-depth
adjusted noise trading will see the arb sell (buy) ε shares. Therefore, the effective level
of noise trading in each market will be a weighted average of noise trading in both
markets, thereby reducing its volatility in each.2 Ultimately this prevents the informed
speculator from trading as aggressively as in the benchmark economy as
β1a + β2a < β1b + β2b,




z and the realization of noise trading
is such that z1 > z2. Here the model is fully symmetric and the arb will sell ε = (z1− z2)/2 in Market
1 and buy ε = (z1 − z2)/2 in Market 2 resulting in equal effective noise trading of (z1 + z2)/2 in each
market. The “averaging” of noise trading leads to its lower volatility in each market of σ2z/2.
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The net effect of lower camouflage and greater adverse selection on price informative-





Overall, the introduction of arbitrage trading is fully internalized by all market par-
ticipants allowing for both lower trading intensity and less liquid markets, while main-
taining price informativeness.
Segmenting informed speculators: Economy s I now consider the realistic pos-
sibility that markets may not only be segmented for the market makers, but also for
the informed speculators. As such, I introduce a second speculator, with Specula-
tor 1 specializing in Asset 1 and Speculator 2 specializing in Asset 2, while keeping
all other parameters of the model constant. In this framework, both speculators and
market makers are segmented, with the only link between the two markets being the




























Segmenting the markets leads to greater aggregate trading intensity and greater market
depth versus both the benchmark case and Economy a. Despite segmented markets
each speculator no longer has a monopoly on her information as informed trading in one
market will be translated to the other market via the activity of the arbitrageur. For
example, more aggressive buying by one of the speculators will lead to more aggressive
buying by the arb in the other market, therefore affecting the trading behavior of
the other speculator. The introduction of competition among the speculators leads to





Single market maker: Economy m In the final step, I consider the implications
of shutting down the arbitrage trading channel, and, instead, allowing market makers
to observe order flow across the segmented markets (e.g. Bhattacharya and O’Hara
(2018)). Since order flow in each market will be an incremental source of information,
the market maker will condition on order flow across markets when setting prices in
each market, which will result in equal prices. The trading intensity of each speculator











as the market maker becomes less concerned about adverse selection given the incre-
mental information via order flow. Although the aggregate trading intensity is lower
than the fully segmented setting, the greater aggregate market depth coupled with a
more precise signal for the market maker, results in an equal level of price informative-






Table 3.1 summarizes my main findings for market quality across all economies. The
introduction of an arbitrageur to the benchmark economy has the effect of absorbing
noise trading in each of the markets, since the market with the higher prices will have
seen greater noise demand, while the market with the lower price will have seen lower
noise demand. The arbitrageur steps in to correct these discrepancies, which implies
that the effective level of noise trading in each market becomes a (market depth based)
weighted average of noise trading in both markets. The averaging of noise trading
leads to a decrease in camouflage, which is internalized by both the speculator and the
market makers, leading to both lower trading intensity and lower market depth, which,
ultimately, does not impact price informativeness relative to the benchmark.
It is important to note that the changes from Economy b to Economy a assume
that both the underlying and synthetic securities previously existed, and that the
level of noise trading has remained the same in both. However, if one is exploring
122
the introduction of a synthetic security, which will bring incremental noise traders
to the market, then the implications are drastically different. The arbitrageur will
“transfer” the noise trading from the synthetic security to the underlying, implying
that the strategic speculator will be able to trade more aggressively in the underlying
as long as 3η1 < η2, i.e. the synthetic market is sufficiently noisy. Furthermore, the
market maker in the underlying will be able to provide greater liquidity due to lower
adverse selection concerns. The informed speculator will also be able to participate in
the synthetic security, resulting in unambiguously greater aggregate informed trading
intensity and higher aggregate liquidity.
Segmenting the asset markets by assigning asset-specific speculators in Economy s
improves market quality relative to the case of a single speculator in Economy a as the
trading intensity of the informed speculators is higher in each asset and, in aggregate,
market depth rises unequivocally, and prices become more informative as a result. The
strategic speculator of Economy a no longer has a monopoly on all of the noise traders
in both the underlying and synthetic securities. Due to the connectedness of the two
markets via the arbitrageur, this economy is akin to a multi-speculator version of Kyle
(1985) (e.g. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)), whereby the two speculators compete
more aggressively than one.
With asset-specific speculators in Economy s, the threshold for improvements in
market quality with the introduction of a synthetic security are lower than with a
single speculator in Economy a. As long as η2 > η1, i.e. if the synthetic market brings
more noise traders than already exist in the underlying, the informed speculator will
be able to trade more aggressively on her information. The threshold for the market




Ultimately, regardless of parameter values, the introduction of a synthetic asset has










the effect of increasing competition for the incumbent speculator, resulting in more
informative prices.
Finally, the substitution of a dedicated arbitrageur with a single market maker who
observes order flow in both markets and accordingly uses all available information to set
prices, has a subtle effect on market quality. On one hand, the trading intensity of the
informed speculator simplifies to that of the benchmark economy, and improves relative
to Economy s in Asset i if ηi > η−i, that is if she belongs to the market with greater
trading intensity. Aggregate trading intensity always decreases relative to Economy s.
On the other hand, the market maker now observes incremental information about the
asset payoff via access to the order flow in both markets, which unequivocally leads to
greater market depth both relative to Economy s and the benchmark Economy b. The
lower concerns of the market maker about adverse selection exactly offset the decline in
camouflage available to the speculators due to the absence of arbitrage trading resulting
in price informativeness identical to Economy s.
The differential outcomes to the informed speculators’ trading intensity and the
liquidity levels are driven by the differential objectives of the market maker and the
arbitrageur. The arbitrageur only cares about having the prices converge, and, there-
fore, is agnostic to asset fundamentals. His trading is a form of noise trading, which
acts as a link between the noise trading levels in the segmented markets and allows the
speculators to trade more aggressively. The more aggressive trading causes aggregate
liquidity to decline as market makers become more concerned about adverse selection.
On the other hand, the single market maker is concerned about adverse selection in
the underlying markets, and therefore uses both order flows to more accurately impute
the fundamental value. This, in turn, has the effect of decreasing his concerns about
adverse selection, which allows him to provide greater liquidity, but also decreases the
aggregate trading intensity of the speculator sector. The opposite effects of changes to
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liquidity and trading intensity as one moves from Economy s to Economy m, exactly
offset such that price informativeness does not change.
3.4 Conclusion
I present a stylized model to highlight the implications of arbitrage trading in
ETFs and their underlying securities on financial market quality. On one hand, the
introduction of arbitrage trading to segmented markets with otherwise diverging prices,
results in a “smoothing” of noise trading across the markets, reducing the levels of
camouflage available to the informed speculator and required for the market maker
to combat adverse selection risks. On the other hand, the introduction of an ETF
with a threshold level of noise trading leads to unambiguous improvements in the
market quality of the underlying security as some of the incremental noise trading is
transferred to the underlying market. Furthermore, I highlight the differential effects
on market quality of stand-alone arbitrageurs and market makers jointly serving as
authorized participants, with the former leading to greater informed trading intensity
for the speculators and greater adverse selection for the market makers, and vice versa
for the latter.
The present framework provides for ample testable empirical implications. The
focus on a single-asset model in the underlying security, thereby abstracting away from
the complexities associated with multi-asset ETFs, makes the model most applicable to
commodity ETFs. For example, one can explore the effects of the introduction of the
United States Oil Fund (USO) ETF on market quality measures in the futures and spot
markets. Furthermore, given the differential impacts to market quality of stand-alone
arbitrageurs and market makers also serving as authorized participants, one can exploit
cross-sectional variation in ETFs’ exposure to either category of arbitrageurs to analyze
whether the market quality measures for the underlying securities are consistent with
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the model presented. The prominence and the pace of proliferation of ETFs underscore
the importance of understanding their effects on the financial markets.
126
3.5 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Market Quality by Economy
































































Asset-specific trading intensity and market depth for Economy a and market





Passive Investing: Derivations and Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma I.1
Case 1: γ̃i < 1 and λ̃i > 0 Recall that














Cov(Si(P̃i), ṽ) = σ
2
θ̃i
The sufficiency of Si(P̃i) implies that















































































= q1 + q2θ̃i + q3x̃i







Cov(Si(P̃i), ṽ) = 0
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The price equation greatly simplifies due to the lack of fundamentals in prices:











= q1 + q3x̃i
Case 3: γ̃i = 1 Assets do not clear because trader demand becomes zero and supply
is stochastic. Therefore no equilibrium exists.
A.2 Properties of Expected Returns
I first exploit market clearing conditions to derive closed form solutions for uncon-








= X̃i + x̃i
⇓
(1− γ̃i)λ̃iτ
θ̃i − E[ṽi|P̃i] + E[ṽi|P̃i]− P̃i
σ2ũi

















(E[ṽi|P̃i]− P̃i) = X̃i + x̃i
















By the law of iterated expectations the unconditional return for any asset i is given
by:











Given aggregate supplies and participation levels for the index and stock picking strate-
gies, the unconditional risk-premium for the index and stock picking strategies are as
follows.
Risk Premium: Index Asset (i = 1)










Risk Premia: Stock Picking Strategies (i > 1)
E[ṽi − P̃i] = 0 (A.7)
Return Variance: All Assets I utilize the law of total variance and equation (A.4)
to estimate the variance of the unconditional return:




















A.3 Proof of Proposition I.2
I am after changes in the ratio of unconditional expected utilities of participating
and non-participating traders with respect to γ̃i in an information equilibrium. The
ratios are defined by equation (1.24):



































































The cases above specify the three levels of information equilibrium as outlined in equa-
tion (1.22):
Fully-uninformed equilibrium: if c̃i ≥ τ2 log(1 + ñi) then λ̃i = 0
















then λ̃i = 1
(A.10)
I proceed to derive closed form solutions of the ratios of expected utilities to participa-
tion (the function gi(γ̃i, λ̃i)) for the three cases specified in equation (A.10) and evaluate
their derivatives with respect to γ̃i. Since the ratio is always positive, I can equiva-
lently evaluate the derivative for the function gi(γ̃i, λ̃i)

































































) exp( 2c̃iτ + 2k̃iτ ) (A.12)
A.3.1 Fully-Uninformed Equilibrium



























































< 0⇔ ∂gi(γ̃i, λ̃i)
∂γ̃i
< 0 (since gi(γ̃i, λ̃i) > 0)
(A.14)
A.3.2 Interior Equilibrium
In an interior equilibrium, from equations (1.16),(1.17),(1.18),(A.1),(A.2),(1.15)
conditional expectations are













































































1 + ñi − exp(2c̃i/τ)
ñi
(A.19)






























































































































































































































< 0⇔ ∂gi(γ̃i, λ̃i)
∂γ̃i
< 0 (since gi(γ̃i, λ̃i) > 0)
(A.21)
A.3.3 Fully-Informed Equilibrium



























































































































































































































< 0⇔ ∂gi(γ̃i, λ̃i)
∂γ̃i
< 0 (since gi(γ̃i, λ̃i) > 0)
(A.25)
For all three cases of information equilibria, I have demonstrated that the ratio of
unconditional expected utility to participating vs. not-participating in asset i, given
by equations (A.14), (A.33), and (A.25), is decreasing in γ̃i, equivalently increasing in
participation (1 − γ̃i). Since utilities are negative, this demonstrates strategic substi-
tutability in participation: the more traders participate in the trading of an asset, the
lower are the expected gains to participation. An immediate consequence are closed
form solutions for equilibrium participation levels, demonstrated in Appendix A.4.
A.4 Closed-Form Solutions for Passive Share
A.4.1 Fully-Uninformed Equilibrium


















































































































exp(2(ki + c̃i)/τ)− 1
(A.28)
A.4.4 Passive Share Closed-Form Solutions: Summary
The following summarizes the closed-form solutions for passive share (note that it’s
possible to have parameter values such that γ̃i falls below zero, therefore I take the
maximum):

















































































































A.5 Proof of Lemma I.4
I am after the changes to the unconditional expected utility of trader j participating
in stock-picking strategy i for a fixed γ̃i across the three information equilibria. I rely
on the derivations in Appendix A.3 in the following.
































































































































































A.6 Asset Pricing Implications of Changing Information and
Participation Costs
A.6.1 Unconditional Expected Returns
The unconditional expected return for the any stock picking strategy is given by
equation (A.7)
E[ṽi − P̃i] = 0 (A.34)
The unconditional expected return for the market index is given by equation (A.6)











I apply the three cases of information equilibria, as specified by the conditions of
equation (1.22) for i = 1 (γ̃i = 0):
If c̃i ≥ τ2 log(1 + ñi) then λ̃i = 0




















































It’s immediate that for the first and third cases, changes to information costs have no































































A.6.2 Unconditional Return Variances
The unconditional variance of returns is given by equation (A.8):





















I rely on equations (1.30),(A.20),and (A.23) to derive the unconditional variance for
both the index and stock picking strategies across three levels of equilibrium.
A.6.2.1 Unconditional Variance of Index Asset
Fully-Uninformed Equilibrium
































Interior Equilibrium By equations (A.6) and (A.38):


































































































A.6.3 Unconditional Variance of Stock Picking Strategies
Fully-Uninformed Equilibrium



















































































































































































































































































































































































































The derivative signs follow from the fact that all derivatives functions are positive,






A.7 Participation Levels with the Index Asset
I estimate the ratio of participating to not participating in asset i across three levels




































































By equation (A.5), the risk premium for each asset is given by:










By the law of total variance we have:



















which for assets with non-zero supply equals








































Fully-Uninformed Equilibrium: c̃i ≥ τ2 log(1 + ñi) and λ̃i = 0

























































































Armed with the above, we can write the ratio for the utility change due to partici-



























































































































By the chain rule both the square root term and the exponential term are decreasing































































































































































































By the chain rule both the square root term and the exponential term are decreasing




























































































































































































































































































By the chain rule and the fact that ∂m̃i
∂γ̃i
> 0 both the square root term and the
exponential term are decreasing in γ̃i implying that the ratio of expected utilities is
decreasing as well.
A.8 Effects of Changing Information and Participation Costs
on the Original Assets
The following portfolio weights, as given by the coefficients on the corresponding
synthetic asset payoffs, map the synthetic assets with payoffs ṽ1, . . . , ṽN back to the
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original assets with payoffs v1, . . . , vN




































The coefficients on the synthetic payoffs above correspond to the portfolio weights
placed on each of the synthetic assets in order to arrive at the original asset. For each
original asset i, I label the portfolio weights for the synthetic assets as wi1, wi2, . . . , wiN .
According to equation (A.55), the weight placed on the index portfolio for each original







where q defines the relationship between expected supply and payoff uncertainty, and
is assumed to be constant across assets. Therefore the original assets’ market betas are
increasing in their supply and in fundamental uncertainty and are decreasing in the
number of risky assets. All original assets i < N are negatively exposed to synthetic
assets 1 < j < i+1 and are positively exposed to synthetic asset j = i+1. Original asset
i = N is negatively exposed to all synthetic assets j > 1. For directional derivations
of the effects of information and participation costs on variances and covariances only
the signs on the portfolio weights matter, not the magnitudes.
Utilizing the notation above and the law of one price I can define various measures
of expected returns, variances and covariances:
1. The variance of the return of the original asset i will be equal to:
Var(vi − Pi) =
N∑
j=1
w2ijVar(ṽj − P̃j) (A.57)
2. The expected return of original asset i will be equal to:




= wi1E[ṽ1 − P̃1]
(A.58)
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3. The covariance of the return of original asset m with original asset n
Cov(vm − pm, vn − pn) =
N∑
j=1
wmjwnjVar(ṽj − P̃j) (A.59)
4. The covariance of the return of original asset i with the market
Cov(vi − pi, ṽ1 − p̃1) = wi1Var(ṽ1 − P̃1) (A.60)
From the definitions above, the mapping from the synthetic assets to the original assets
as given by equation (A.55), and the properties of expected returns and variances as
highlighted in Lemmas I.5 and I.6, the following return properties arise.
Lemma A.1 (Effects of Information and Participation Costs on Return Properties).
The effects of stock picking costs on the return properties of the original assets are as
follows:
1. Expected returns: not affected by changes to stock picking information costs.
2. Return variances: change in the variance of a synthetic asset as specified by
Lemma I.6, affects the variances of ALL original assets in the same direction.
3. Return covariances between original assets m and n, where m < n:
• If 1 < m < n ≤ N : changes in information costs for synthetic assets
1 < j < m + 1 will have the same effect directionally as the change in
variance as specified by Lemma I.6. Change in the information cost for
synthetic asset j = m + 1 will have the opposite effect directionally as the
change in variance specified by Lemma I.6. Change in information costs for
synthetic assets j > m+ 1 will have no effect on the covariance.
• If m = 1: change in the information cost for synthetic asset j = 2 will
have the opposite effect directionally as the change in variance specified by
Lemma I.6. Change in information costs for synthetic assets j > 2 will have
no effect on the covariance.
The effects of index information costs on the return properties of the original assets
are as follows:
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1. Expected returns: proportional to the change in the expected return for the index
asset as specified by Lemma I.5 for ALL original assets. Coefficient of propor-
tionality is given by the original asset’s weight in the market index as specified by
equation (A.56).
2. Return variances: change in the variance of the index asset as specified by Lemma
I.6, affects the variances of ALL original assets in the same direction.
3. Return covariances: change in the variance of the index asset as specified by
Lemma I.6, affects ALL of the pair-by-pair covariances of the original assets in
the same direction.
The effects of stock picking participation costs on the return properties of the original
assets are as follows:
1. Expected returns: not affected by changes to stock-picking participation costs.
2. Return variances: change in the variance of the synthetic asset as specified by
Lemma I.6, affects the variances of ALL original assets in the same direction.
3. Return covariances between original assets m and n, where m < n:
• If 1 < m < n ≤ N : changes in participation costs for synthetic assets
1 < j < m + 1 will have the same effect directionally as the change in
variance as specified by Lemma I.6. Change in the participation cost for
synthetic asset j = m + 1 will have the opposite effect directionally as the
change in variance specified by Lemma I.6. Change in participation costs
for synthetic assets j > m+ 1 will have no effect on the covariance.
• If m = 1: change in the participation cost for synthetic asset j = 2 will
have the opposite effect directionally as the change in variance specified by
Lemma I.6. Change in participation costs for synthetic assets j > 2 will
have no effect on the covariance.
A.9 Lemma A.2 with Proof
Lemma A.2 (Reducing Correlated Fundamentals to the Diagonal Case). Assume that
Σu = σ
2
u×IN and Σθ is positive definite. Using the eigen-decomposition of Σθ, the payoff
space can be re-spanned with portfolios of the underlying securities whose fundamental
and noise payoffs are orthogonal.
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Since Σθ is a covariance matrix and is thus symmetric, such a decomposition exists
where Λθ = diag(λ1, . . . , λN) contains the eigenvalues of the Σθ and Qθ = [q1, . . . ,qN]
contains the corresponding weights on the assets underlying the variance-covariance
matrix. The eigen-decomposition decomposes the N potentially correlated assets into
N orthogonal portfolios, which span the original asset space. Any portfolio wi of the
original assets can be replicated using portfolio wo of the orthogonal assets as follows:
wi = Qθwo ⇒ Q′θwi = wo (A.62)
since Q′θQθ = IN under the original decomposition. I can thus restate the original





















Renaming the original variables to have subscripts “o” for their orthogonal versions,
under the assumption that the noise matrix has the form Σu = σ
2
uIN and by the















where Λθ and Σu are diagonal with
vo = θo + uo (A.66)
The aggregate supply of the orthogonal portfolios, Xo is given by:
QθXo = X ⇒ Xo = Q′θX (A.67)
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Therefore, I can restate the problem with correlated fundamentals in terms of assets,
which have uncorrelated fundamentals and noise payoffs.
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APPENDIX B
Quants: Derivations and Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma II.1
We conjecture that the DI’s demand and MM’s price functions are governed by Eq.
(2.5) and (2.6). Given rational expectations, the DI’s problem simplifies to:





E[x̃(v − µ1 − λ1ω1)|sd]
= arg max
x̃
E[x̃(v − µ1 − λ1(x̃+ z))|sd]
= arg max
x̃



















≡ αd1 + βd1sd
(B.1)
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Similarly, the market-maker’s problem becomes
P1(ω1) = E[v|ω1]
= E[v|xd + z]

































≡ µ1 + λ1ω1
(B.2)



























































We will focus on economically meaningful equilibria, i.e. strategies that buy more with
a stronger signal (βd1 > 0) and price functions that charge more with greater demand














µ1 = P0(1− φd)− 2λ1αd1
Substituting into Eq. (B.2)





























































B.2 Derivation of Backtest: Eq. (2.9)
The QI feeds the DI’s trading strategy and the MM’s pricing rule from Economy 1
given by Eq. (2.7) and (2.8) into her optimization problem:

























































































































































B.3 Proof of Lemma II.2
B.3.1 Economy 2. Fully-strategic Quant, γ = 0
This is the case of two strategic speculators i ∈ {d, q}. The problem is fully sym-
metric for both strategic speculators, therefore we solve it from the QI’s perspective
and reverse notation for the DI. In what follows, note that:
E[v|sq] = (1− φq)P0 + φqsq












≡ νd(sd − P0)
The QI chooses demand xq to maximize the following expectation:
xq2 = arg max
x̃q
E[x̃q(v − P2)|sq] (B.6)
For both speculators we conjecture a demand function linear in the signal:
xi2(si) = αi2 + βi2si (B.7)
Noise traders supply z shares and market-makers set prices according to the aggregate
order flow:
ω2 = xd2 + xq2 + z (B.8)
The market makers in the economy are competitive and risk-neutral resulting and are
assumed to have a pricing rule linear in the aggregate order flow:
P2(ω2) = E[v|ω2]
= µ2 + λ2ω2
(B.9)
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We first consider the QI’s problem:





E[x̃q2(v − µ2 − λ2ω2)|sq]
= arg max
x̃q2
E[x̃q2(v − µ2 − λ2(xd2 + x̃q2 + z))|sq]
= arg max
x̃q2
E[x̃q2(v − µ2 − λ2xd2 − λ2z)− λ2x̃2q2|sq]
= arg max
x̃q2
{x̃q2(E[v|sq]− µ2 − λ2E[xd2|sq])− λx̃2q2}
=
E[v|sq]− µ2 − λ2E[xd2|sq]
2λ2
=
E[v|sq]− µ2 − λ2αd2 − λ2βd2E[sd|sq]
2λ2
=
E[v|sq]− µ2 − λ2αd2 − λ2βd2E[v + ed|sq]
2λ2
=





(1− φq)P0 + φqsq
)







































≡ αq2 + βq2sq
(B.10)
Similarly, for the DI:























≡ αd2 + βd2sd
(B.11)
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Finally, the competitive market maker sets prices according to:
P2(ω2) = E[v|ω2]
= E[v|xd2 + xq2 + z]










































≡ µ2 + λ2ω2
(B.12)
We have six equations and six unknowns:
µ2 = P0 −
(βd2 + βq2)σ
2
v(αd2 + αq2 + (βd2 + βq2)P0)




























































































We first utilize the equations B.16 and B.18 to solve for 1/λ2 and set the results equal
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2φd − φdφq − νdφq




Substituting βd2 from equation B.21 into equation B.14 and into equation B.19 and
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2k + φd + νd
√
φqk2 + (2φq − νdφq − φdφq)k + νdφq − φd + φdφq
ηφdφq
(B.22)
We have solved for βq2, βd2, and λ2. We now proceed to solve for αq2,αd2, and µ2.
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Subtracting equations B.15 and B.17:


































P0(φq − φd) + βq2P0(νd + φd − 1− kνq − kφq + k)
= βq2P0
(
(2k + φd + νd)(φq − φd)
φd
+ νd + φd − 1− kνq − kφq + k
)
⇒ αd2 = αq2 + βq2P0
(
(2k + φd + νd)(φq − φd)
φd
+ νd + φd − 1− kνq − kφq + k
)
(B.23)





































From Eq. (B.13) and (B.14), we have:
µ2 = P0 − λ2(αd2 + αq2 + (βd2 + βq2)P0) (B.25)





















We have now solved for µ2 with previously calculated λ2,βq2,βd2, and can add Eq.
(B.23) and (B.24) and divide by 2 to solve for αd2:
αd2 = βq2P0
(
(2k + φd + νd)(φq − φd)
φd


















Finally, using Eq. (B.23), we obtain:
αq2 = αd2 − βq2P0
(
(2k + φd + νd)(φq − φd)
φd
+ νd + φd − 1− kνq − kφq + k
)
(B.28)
B.3.1.1 Economy 2: Solution Summary




φqk2 + (2φq − νdφq − φdφq)k + νdφq − φd + φdφq
(B.29)
βd2 = kβq2 (B.30)
λ2 =
φd




2φd − φdφq − νdφq
































αq2 = αd2 − βq2P0
(
(2k + φd + νd)(φq − φd)
φd




B.3.2 Economy 4: Fully-automated Quant, γ = 1
In this case the QI is fully-automated and applies the trading rule dictated by





































≡ αb + βbsq
(B.35)
The DI pursues a strategy similar to Economy 2, specified by Eq. (B.11), but with
different inputs for the QI’s trading rule and the MM’s pricing function:























≡ αd4 + βd4sd
(B.36)
Similarly, the MM’s pricing rule is comparable to Economy 2, as given by Eq. (B.37),
with different inputs for the DI’s and QI’s strategies:
P4(ω4) = E[v|ω4]
= E[v|xd4 + xq4 + z]
= E[v|αd4 + βd4(v + ed) + αb + βb(v + eq) + z]





























≡ µ4 + λ4ω4
(B.37)
We have four equations and four unknowns:
µ4 = P0 −
(βd4 + βb)σ
2
v(αd4 + αb + (βd4 + βb)P0)

























































































































































































































































































From Eq. (B.58) and (B.59), we have:
µ4 = P0 − λ4(αd4 + αb + (βd4 + βb)P0) (B.45)
Substituting Eq. (B.60) into the above











+ αb + (βd4 + βb)P0
)
(B.46)
= 2P0 − (1− λ4βb)(1− φd)P0 − λ4αb − λ4βbνdP0 − 2λ4(βd4 + βb)P0 (B.47)












B.3.2.1 Economy 4: Solution Summary





























































































































We can now solve for













B.3.3 Economy 3: Partially-automated Quant, 0 < γ < 1
The DI’s optimal demands are formulaically identical to Economy 2:























≡ αd3 + βd3sd
(B.55)
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The QI now solves the following objective function for this optimal demand xq3 where




















































































≡ αq3 + βq3
(B.56)





























≡ µ3 + λ3ω3
(B.57)
We have six equations and six unknowns:
µ3 = P0 −
(βd3 + βq3)σ
2
v(αd3 + αq3 + (βd3 + βq3)P0)





















































































2γβb + (1− γ)φq − (1− γ)λ3(φq + νq)βd3
2(γ + (1− γ)λ3)
(B.63)

















2γβb + (1− γ)φq − (1− γ)λ3(φq + νq)βd3




2(1− γ)βq3 + (1− γ)(φq + νq)βd3










2(1− γ)βq3 + (1− γ)(φq + νq)βd3






























































































⇒ (aβ2q3 + bβq3)2 + eβq3(cβq3 + d)(aβ2q3 + bβq3) + fβ2q3(cβq3 + d)2 − g(cβq3 + d)2 = 0
⇒(a2+ace+c2f)β4q3+(2ab+bce+ade+2cdf)β3q3+(b2+bde+d2f−c2g)β2q3−2cdgβq3−d2g=0
(B.65)
This is quartic, which has a closed-form solution for βq3 resulting in a maximum of
four roots. For each root, we can then utilize Eq. (C.20) to solve for βd3 and, in-turn,
use Eq. B.59 to solve for λ. We have solved for βd3, βq3, and λ3.
We proceed to solve for αd3, αq3, and µ3. This is a simple three variable linear


























2γαb + (1− γ)
(
(1− λ3βd3)(1− φq)P0 − µ3
)
− (1− γ)λ3αd3 + (1− γ)λ3βd3νqP0
2(γ + (1− γ)λ3)
=
2γαb + (1− γ)(1− λ3βd3)(1− φq)P0 + (1− γ)λ3βd3νqP0
2(γ + (1− γ)λ3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡k
− 1− γ




2(γ + (1− γ)λ3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
αd3
= k − lµ3 −mαd3
(B.67)
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µ3 = P0 − λ3(αd3 + αq3 + (βd3 + βq3)P0)
= P0 − λ3(βd3 + βq3)P0︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡q
−λ3αd3 − λ3αq3
= q − λ3αd3 − λ3αq3
(B.68)
Solving the system of equations, we first obtain:
αq3 =
(k − lq)(1− jλ3) + lλ3(h− jq)−m(h− jq)





We use the solution above to solve for:
αd3 =




µ3 = q − λ3αd3 − λ3αq3. (B.71)
B.3.3.1 Economy 3: Solution Summary
































− (1− γ)(φq + νq)
e = 2− φd − νd






















Next we use the solutions above to obtain
αq3 =
(k − lq)(1− jλ3) + lλ3(h− jq)−m(h− jq)












2γαb + (1− γ)(1− λ3βd3)(1− φq)P0 + (1− γ)λ3βd3νqP0
2(γ + (1− γ)λ3)
l =
1− γ
2(γ + (1− γ)λ3)
m =
(1− γ)λ3
2(γ + (1− γ)λ3)
q = P0 − λ3(βd3 + βq3)P0
and use the solution to find
αd3 =




µ3 = q − λ3αd3 − λ3αq3.
B.4 Derivations for Measures of Market Quality
B.4.1 Market Depth




P1(ω1) = µ1 + λ1ω1
= µ1 + λ1(xd1 + z)
= µ1 + λ1(αd1 + βd1(v + ed) + z)
= µ1 + λ1(αd1 + βd1v + βd1ed + z)
= µ1 + λ1αd1 + λ1βd1v + λ1βd1ed + λ1z
(B.72)
Therefore,
Var(v|P1) = Var(v)− Cov(v, P1)Var(P1)−1Cov(P1, v)
= σ2v −
Cov(v, µ1 + λ1αd1 + λ1βd1v + λ1βd1ed + λ1z)
2
















































Economies 2-4 For j ∈ {2, 3, 4}
Pj(ωj) = µj + λjωj
= µj + λj(xdj + xqj + z)
= µj + λj(αdj + βdjsd + αqj + βqjsq + z)
= µj + λj(αdj + βdj(v + ed) + αqj + βqj(v + eq) + z)




Var(v|Pj) = Var(v)− Cov(v, Pj)Var(Pj)−1Cov(Pj, v)
= σ2v −
Cov(v, µj + λjαdj + λjαqj + λj(βdj + βqj)v + λjβdjed + λjβqjeq + λjz)
2

















































































































































µj + λjαdj + λjαqj + λj(βdj + βqj)v + λjβdjed + λjβqjeq + λjz
)]
= P0 − µj − λjαdj − λjαqj − λj(βdj + βqj)P0
Return Volatility From equation B.73:
Var(v − P ) = Var(v − µj − λjαdj − λjαqj − λj(βdj + βqj)v − λjβdjed − λjβqjeq − λjz)
= Var
(
(1− λj(βdj + βqj))v − λjβdjed − λjβqjeq − λjz
)





























Expected Trading Volume: Aggregate We are after E[|xdj + xqj|], which is the
expected value of the absolute value of a normal random variable. Otherwise known
as the “folded normal distribution,” given a normally distributed random variable



















where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. We proceed to derive
the distribution of x1 + x2.
















xdj + xqj ∼ N
(
αdj + αqj + (βdj + βqj)P0︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡µxdj+xqj








eq + 2βdjβqjσedeq︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡σ2xdj+xqj
)
Substituting into equation B.74


















Expected Trading Volume: by Trader We are after E[|xij|], which is the expected
value of the absolute value of a normal random variable. We utilize equation B.74 to
derive the expectation of this random variable. The distribution of xij is:


































Expected Profits: By Trader and Aggregate Expected profits of trader i in
Economy j (πij) are equal to:
E[πij ] = E[xij(v − P )]
= E[(αij + βijsi)(v − µj − λjωj)]
= E[(αij + βijsi)(v − µj − λj(xdj + xqj + z))]
= E[(αij + βij(v + ei))(v − µj − λj(αdj + βdjsd + αqj + βqjsq + z))]
= E[(αij + βijv + βijei)(v − µj − λj(αdj + βdj(v + ed) + αqj + βqj(v + eq) + z))]
= E[(αij + βijv + βijei)
(v − µj − λjαdj − λjβdjv − λjβdjed − λjαdj − λjβqjv − λjβqjeq − λjz)]
= E[(αij + βijv + βijei)
((1− λjβdj − λjβqj)v − µj − λj(αdj + αqj)− λjβdjed − λjβqjeq − λjz)]
= αij(1− λjβdj − λjβqj)P0 − αijµj − λjαij(αdj + αqj) + βij(1− λjβdj − λjβqj)E[v2]
− βijµjP0 − βijλj(αdj + αqj)P0 − λjβ2ijE[e2i ]− λjβdjβqjE[edeq]
We have the following moments given to us by model parameters:
σ2v = E[v2]− E[v]2 = E[v2]− P 20 ⇒ E[v2] = σ2v + P 20
σ2ed = E[e
2
d]− E[ed]2 = E[e2d]
σ2eq = E[e
2
q]− E[eq]2 = E[e2q]
σedeq = E[edeq]− E[ed]E[eq] = E[edeq]
Therefore
E[πij] = αij(1− λjβdj − λjβqj)P0 − αijµj − λjαij(αdj + αqj)
+ βij(1− λjβdj − λjβqj)(σ2v + P 20 )
− βijµjP0 − βijλj(αdj + αqj)P0 − λjβ2ijσ2ei − λjβdjβqjσedeq
Finally,
E[πdj + πqj] = E[πdj] + E[πqj]
= (αdj + αqj)(1− λjβdj − λjβqj)P0 − (αdj + αqj)µj − λj(αdj + αqj)2
+ (βdj + βqj)(1− λjβdj − λjβqj)(σ2v + P 20 )













Cov(αdj + βdjsd, αqj + βqjsq)√
Var(αdj + βdjsd)Var(αqj + βqjsq)
=
Cov(αdj + βdjv + βdjed, αqj + βqjv + βqjeq)√


























B.6 Comparative Statics for the Benchmark Case: Proposi-
tion II.1
The simplified version assumes the following model parameters: P0 = 0, φd = 1, ρ =
νq = νd = 0, σ
2







































φ2q − 3φq + 4
(4− φq)2
- Economy 4 (with only the selected βd4 is market depth positive):











−3φ2q + 4φq + 16











−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
B.6.1 Market Depth
We first show that market depth increases with the introduction of the quantitative

























































where the latter inequality holds for φq ∈ (0, 1]




















−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
m




−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
m ( note that − 3φ2q + 4φq + 16 > 0 for φq ∈ (0, 1])
f(φq) ≡ −3φ2q + 13φq − 12 < 0
where the latter inequality holds for φq ∈ (0, 1] since the roots of f(φq) are φ∗q ≈ 1.33
and φ∗∗q = 3.
Finally, we demonstrate that the gap in market depth between Economy 2 and
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f(φq) ≡ 6φ4q − 85φ3q + 400φ2q − 720φq + 384 ∨ 0
We first note that f(0) = 384, f(1) = −15. We now demonstrate that f(φq) is mono-
tone for φq ∈ (0, 1] , implying a single root for φq ∈ (0, 1]. Note the following derivatives
of f(φq):
f ′(φq) = 24φ
3
q − 255φ2q + 800φq − 720
f ′′(φq) = 72φ
2
q − 510φq + 800
The two roots of f ′′(φq) = 0 are ≈ 2.3,≈ 4.7, which implies that f ′′(φq) > 0 for
φq ∈ (0, 1]. This in turn means that f ′(φq) is increasing for φq ∈ (0, 1], which coupled
with f ′(0) = −720, f ′(1) = −151 demonstrates that f ′′(φq) < 0 for φq ∈ (0, 1]. The
latter implies that f(φq) is decreasing for φq ∈ (0, 1], which proves that there exists
φ∗q ∈ (0, 1] such that f(φq) > 0 for φq ∈ (0, φ∗q) and f(φq) < 0 for φq ∈ (φ∗q, 1].
Therefore, the percent decrease in market depth due to automation is hump-shaped
in the precision of the QI’s signal. The peak of the relative decline in market depth is












































































































































−φ2q + 2φq + 8 + φq
√
−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
−2φ2q + 2φq + 8
m note that − 2φ2q + 2φq + 8 > 0 for φq ∈ (0, 1]
− φ3q + 8φq + 16 > (2− φq)
√
−3φ4q + 4φ3q + 16φ2q
m
f(φq) ≡ 4φ6q − 16φ5q − 4φ4q + 16φ3q + 256φq + 256 > 0
The latter inequality holds for the following reasons. First, note that f(0) = 256 and
f(1) = 512. Since f(φq) is continuous, if f(φq) is either monotone or hump-shaped for
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φq ∈ (0, 1] then f(φq) > 0 in this interval. We now take derivatives of f(φq) and work
backwards to demonstrate that f(φq) is monotone over the interval.
f ′(φq) = 24φ
5
q − 80φ4q − 16φ3q + 48φ2q + 256
f ′′(φq) = 120φ
4
q − 320φ3q − 46φ2q + 96φq
f ′′′(φq) = 480φ
3
q − 960φ2q − 92φq + 96
f ′′′′(φq) = 1440φ
2
q − 1920φq − 92
First note that the zeros of f ′′′′(φq) are ≈ −.05 and ≈ 1.38 implying that f ′′′′(φq) < 0
for φq ∈ (0, 1]. Since f ′′′(0) = 96 and f ′′′(1) = −476 and f ′′′(φq) is decreasing for
φq ∈ (0, 1], there exists φ∗q ∈ (0, 1] such that f ′′′(φq) > 0 for φq ∈ (0, φ∗q) and f ′′′(φq) < 0
for φq ∈ (φ∗q, 1]. This implies that f ′′(φq) is hump-shaped in the interval φq ∈ (0, 1],
which coupled with f ′′(0) = 0 and f ′′(1) = −150 suggests that there exists φ∗∗q ∈ (0, 1]
such that f ′′(φq) > 0 for φq ∈ (0, φ∗∗q ) and f ′′(φq) < 0 for φq ∈ (φ∗∗q , 1]. Therefore f ′(φq)
is also hump-shaped in the interval φq ∈ (0, 1]. Since f ′(0) = 256 and f ′(1) = 232 and
f ′(φq) is hump-shaped in the interval φq ∈ (0, 1], f ′(φq) > 0 in the interval. Coupled
with f(1) > f(0) > 0, f(φq) > 0 for φq ∈ (0, 1].































−φ2q + 2φq + 8 + φq
√
−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
−2φ2q + 2φq + 8
> 1
m√
−3φ2q + 4φq + 16 > −φq
The latter inequality always holds for φq ∈ (0, 1].
B.6.3 Return Volatility
Var(v − Pj) = σ2v
(














We first demonstrate the return volatility increases with automation by the quant.
Var(v − P2) < Var(v − P4)
m
(1− λ2(βd2 + βq2))2 + λ22β2q2
1− φq
φq





























































































φ2q − 6φq + 8















−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
m
φq − 4 <
√
−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
The latter inequality always holds for φq ∈ (0, 1] since the left-hand-side is negative
and the right-hand-side is positive within the interval.
We now demonstrate that return volatility decreases with the introduction of the
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quantitative investor, both with and without automation.
Var(v − P2) < Var(v − P1)
m
φ2q − 6φq + 8





φq(φq − 4) < 0
The latter inequality always holds for φq ∈ (0, 1] since the left-hand-side is always
negative in the interval.
















−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
< 0
The latter inequality always holds for φq ∈ (0, 1] since the left-hand-side is always
negative in the interval.
B.6.4 Price Volatility
We will rely on derivations in the return volatility analysis by noting that
Var(v − Pj) = σ2v + Var(Pj)− 2Cov(v, Pj)
Var(Pj) = Var(v − Pj)− σ2v + 2λj(βdj + βqj)
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We first demonstrate that price volatility increases with automation by the quant.
Var(P2) > Var(P4)
m
φ2q − 6φq + 8


























−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
m
φq(φq − 3) < 0
The latter inequality always holds for φq ∈ (0, 1] since the left-hand-side is always
negative in the interval.
We now demonstrate that price volatility increases with the introduction of the
quantitative investor, both with and without automation.
Var(P2) > Var(P1)
m
φ2q − 6φq + 8









φq(4− φq) > 0
The latter inequality always holds for φq ∈ (0, 1] since the left-hand-side is always
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−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
> 0
The latter inequality always holds for φq ∈ (0, 1] since the left-hand-side is always
positive in the interval.
B.6.5 Trading Intensity and Expected Trading Volume
Quantitative investor The QI does not trade in Economy 1. She trades more














φ2q − 3φq < 0
m
φq(φq − 3) < 0,
where the latter inequality holds for φq ∈ (0, 1].
A higher trading intensity implies a greater expected trading volume and vice versa,
immediate from Eq. (B.74), with µxqj = 0 and σxqj = βqjσsq . Therefore the QI trades
less as she turns on her strategy.
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0 > φ2q − φq − 4
The latter inequality holds for φq ∈ (0, 1] since the right-hand-side is an upwards
parabola with roots at ≈ −1.56 and ≈ 2.56.
Next, we show that the strategic speculator trades less once the QI is introduced


































−3φ2q + 4φq + 16 <(φq + 4)2
m
−4φq(φq + 1) < 0
where the latter inequalities hold because φq ∈ (0, 1].






















φ2q − 3φq + 4
m√
−3φ2q + 4φq + 16− φq >
8− 4φq√
φ2q − 3φq + 4
m
−2φ2q + 4φq + 16−
√
−12φ4q + 16φ3q + 64φ2q >
16φ2q − 64φq + 64
φ2q − 3φq + 4
m








f(φq) ≡ φ4q − 8φ3q + 26φ2q − 44φq + 33 > 0
We demonstrate that the latter inequality holds for φq ∈ [0, 1] by proof by contradiction.
First, f(0) = 33, f(1) = 8. Therefore, for the inequality to not hold it must be the
case that f(φq) has a local minimum in φq ∈ (0, 1). However, this, in turn, implies that
f ′(φq) has a a value of zero in the interval φq ∈ (0, 1), i.e.:
f ′(φq) = 4φ
3
q − 24φ2q + 52φq − 44 = 0
However, this does not hold since, f ′(0) = −44,f ′(1) = −12, which in-turn implies that
f ′′(φq) must have a local minimum for φq ∈ (0, 1). Since
f ′′(φq) = 12φ
2
q − 48φq + 52 > 0,
f ′(φq) cannot have a zero in φq ∈ (0, 1), which implies that f(φq) is always greater
than zero.
A higher trading intensity implies a greater expected trading volume and vice versa,
immediate from Eq. (B.74), with µxdj = 0 and σxdj = βdjσv. Therefore, the DI trades
more in expectation with automation by the QI.
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Speculator sector First, we show that the speculator sector as a whole trades more
with the addition of the QI:















































φ2q − 3φq + 4
> 1
m
0 > φq(φq − 3)
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−3φ2q + 4φq + 16 + φq) <
√
(2− φq)2




φ2q − 3φq + 4
m
−φ2q + 2φq + 8 + φq
√
−3φ2q + 4φq + 16 <
32
φ2q − 3φq + 4
m
(φ3q − 3φ2q + 4φq)
√
−3φ2q + 4φq + 16 < (φ2q − 3φq + 4)(φ2q − 2φq − 8) + 32
m
f(φq) ≡ −φ5q + 8φ4q − 22φ3q + 8φ2q + 71φq − 96 < 0
We prove the latter inequality for φq ∈ (0, 1] via proof by contradiction. Let’s first
consider the first three derivatives of f(φq) and work backwards:
f ′(φq) = −5φ4q + 32φ3q − 66φ2q + 16φq + 71
f ′′(φq) = −20φ3q + 96φ2q − 132φq + 16
f ′′′(φq) = −60φ2q + 192φq − 132
Note that the two roots of f ′′′(φq) = 0 are φ
∗
q = 1 and φ
∗∗
q = 2.2. Since f
′′′(φq)
is a downwards parabola, f ′′′(φq) < 0 for φq ∈ (0, 1). This implies that f ′′(φq) is
decreasing for all φq ∈ (0, 1). Note that f ′′(0) = 16 and f ′′(1) = −40. Hence, there
exists an φ0q ∈ (0, 1) such that f ′(φq) is increasing from φq ∈ (0, φ0q) and decreasing
from φq ∈ (φ0q, 1), while reaching a local maxima at φ0q. Together with the fact that
f ′(0) = 71 and f ′(1) = 48, f ′(φq) > 0 for φq ∈ (0, 1). Finally, since f(0) = −96 and
f(1) = −32 and the function is monotone and increasing across the interval, f ′(φq) < 0
for all φq ∈ (0, 1). QED.
The speculator sector as a whole trades less with automation by the quant, which
follows from Eq. (B.74), with µxdj+xqj = 0 and σxdj+xqj =
√





since both aggregate trading intensity βdj + βqj and the QI’s trading intensity βqj
decrease as the QI turns on the strategy (i.e. from Economy 2 to Economy 4).
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B.6.6 Speculator Profits
E[πij] = βij(1− λj(βdj + βqj))− λjβ2ij
1− φi
φi
In what follows, note that:




φ2q − 3φq + 4








−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
)
1− λ2(βd2 + βq2) =
2− φq
4− φq






























−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
(B.75)
Quantitative investor
E[πq2] = βq2(1− λ2(βd2 + βq2))− λ2β2q2
1− φq
φq
E[πq4] = βq4(1− λ4(βd4 + βq4))− λ4β2q4
1− φq
φq
The quant’s profits decrease with automation by design, since she switches from a
profit-maximizing strategy.
Discretionary investor
E[πd1] = βd1(1− λ1βd1)
E[πd2] = βd2(1− λ2(βd2 + βq2))
E[πd4] = βd4(1− λ4(βd4 + βq4))
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First, we show that the profits of the DI increase with the automation by the QI:
E[πd2] < E[πd4]
m
βd2(1− λ2(βd2 + βq2)) < βd4(1− λ4(βd4 + βq4))
We have already demonstrated that βd2 < βd4. It is sufficient to show that 0 <
1− λ2(βd2 + βq2) < 1− λ4(βd4 + βq4).




















−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
m
(4− φq)2 < −3φ2q + 4φq + 16
m
φq(φq − 3) < 0
where the latter inequality holds for φq ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore E[πd2] < E[πd4].
Next, we show that the profits of the DI decrease with the introduction of the QI,
both with and without automation. It is sufficient to show that profits in Economy 4




βd4(1− λ4(βd4 + βq4)) < βd1(1− λ1βd1)
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We have already demonstrated that βd4 < βd1. It remains to be shown that

















−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
where the latter inequality holds for φq ∈ (0, 1].
Speculator sector
E[πd1 + πq1] = βd1(1− λ1βd1)
E[πd2 + πq2] = (βd2 + βq2)(1− λ2(βd2 + βq2))− λ2β2q2
1− φq
φq
E[πd4 + πq4] = (βd4 + βq4)(1− λ4(βd4 + βq4))− λ4β2q4
1− φq
φq
First, we show that profits for the entire speculator sector increase with automation
by the quantitative investor. From Eq. (B.75):
E[πd2] + E[πq2] < E[πd4] + E[πq4]
m










































−3φ2q + 4φq + 16
m
−3φ2q + 13φq − 12 < 0
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The latter inequality holds for φq ∈ (0, 1] because the two roots of the quadratic are
4/3 and 3 and the parabola is concave.
We now demonstrate that the profits for the speculator sector as a whole decrease
with the introduction of the quant, either with or without automation. It is sufficient
to show that profits are lower for Economy 4, since they are greater than Economy 2,
as just demonstrated.
E[πd4] + E[πq4] < E[πd1] + E[πq1]
m















where the latter inequality holds for φq ∈ (0, 1].
B.7 Breakeven Correlation
We are after the conditions under which the fully automated quant (Economy 4)
trades more aggressively than the fully discretionary quant (Economy 2). From Eq.

















































φq(2φd − φdφq − ρw)2 + φd(2φq − φdφq − ρw)2
m
φq(2φd − φdφq − ρw)2 + φd(2φq − φdφq − ρw)2 > 4φ2dφq
m
f(ρ) ≡ w2(φd + φq)ρ2 + 2wφdφq(φd + φq − 4)ρ+ φdφ2q(φdφq − 8φd + φ2d + 4) > 0
















Since f(ρ) is an upward parabola and ρ ∈ [−1, 1], the inequality above holds for the
following conditions:
1. ∀ρ ∈ [−1, 1] if φq > 3φd or ρ∗− > 1 or ρ∗+ < −1
2. ∀ρ ∈ [ρ∗+, 1] if ρ∗− ≤ −1 and ρ∗+ ∈ (0, 1)
3. ∀ρ ∈ [−1, ρ∗−] if ρ∗+ ≥ 1 and ρ∗− ∈ (0, 1)
4. ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ∗−] ∪ [ρ∗+, 1] if ρ∗− ∈ (0, 1) and ρ∗+ ∈ (0, 1)
5. Never holds if ρ∗− < −1 and ρ∗+ > 1
Given the range of φd ∈ (0, 1) and φq ∈ (0, 1), a numerical analysis demonstrates that
only conditions 1, 3, and 5 are possible.
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APPENDIX C
Arbitrage as Camouflage: Derivations and Proofs
C.1 Model Solution
C.1.1 Economy b: No Arbitrageur
I first solve the model with law of one price violations. I assume that the functional
forms for the price and supply functions are as follows (no intercept terms are necessary





For the strategic speculator:
[x1b, x2b] = arg max
x̃1,x̃2
E[x̃1(v − P1(ω1)) + x̃2(v − P2(ω2))|v]
= arg max
x̃1,x̃2
E[x̃1(v − λ1bω1) + x̃2(v − λ2bω2)|v]
= arg max
x̃1,x̃2















x̃1v − λ1bx̃21 + x̃2v − λ2bx̃22
)
= 0











x̃1v − λ1bx̃21 + x̃2v − λ2bx̃22
)
= 0











x̃1v − λ1x̃21 + x̃2v − λ2x̃22
)




x̃1v − λ1x̃21 + x̃2v − λ2x̃22
)










= 4λ1λ2 > 0
(C.4)
Therefore, to satisfy the second order conditions, I will require λ1b > 0 and λ2b > 0.
For market maker 1:
P1b(ω1b) = E[v|ω1b]
= E[v|x1 + z1]














For market maker 2:
P2b(ω2b) = E[v|ω2b]
= E[v|x2 + z2]










































































Price informativeness for each Asset i would be measured as:





















C.1.2 Economy a: With Arbitrageur
I now solve the model without law of one price violations. Once again, I assume
that the strategic speculator’s trading signal and the market makers’ pricing rule is









































For the strategic speculator:
[x1a, x2a] = arg max
x̃1a,x̃2a
E[x̃1a(v − P1a(ω1a)) + x̃2a(v − P2a(ω2a))|v]
= arg max
x̃1a,x̃2a
E[x̃1a(v − λ1aω1a) + x̃2a(v − λ2aω2a)|v]
= arg max
x̃1a,x̃2a






























































































v − x̃2a =




































v − x̃1a =





































Since the latter condition is not satisfied, I will demonstrate that I have found a non-
unique local maximum by focusing on symmetric equilibria for which λ1a = λ2a = λa.
In this case:




2 + (x̃1a + x̃2a)v,
where, if I assume that λa > 0, then any cross-section of g(x̃1a, x̃2a), such that x̃1a +
x̃2a = c, will be a downward parabola. Therefore, g(x̃1a, x̃2a) is a downwards pointing
parabolic cylinder, implying that infinitely many solutions exist to the optimization.
As long as




the speculator is maximizing her profits.
For market maker 1:
P1a(ω1a) = E[v|ω1a]
= E[v|x1a + z1 + εa]








































































For market maker 2:
P2a(ω2a) = E[v|ω2a]
= E[v|x2a + z2 − εa]







































































I have four equations and four unknowns:
β1a =

































First, note that Eq. (C.16) and (C.17) are equivalent, yielding:




Next, note that Eq. (C.18) and (C.19) are equivalent, yielding:























β1a + β2a = ±
√
η1 + η2
⇓ (assuming symmetric equilibria)




I can derive the inverse of price informativeness for Market 1 as:





















I can derive the inverse of price informativeness for Market 2 as:






















C.1.3 Economy s: With Fully Segmented Markets and Arbitrageur














































































































































































For market maker 1:
P1s(ω1s) = E[v|ω1s]
= E[v|x1s + z1 + εs]







































































For market maker 2:
P2s(ω2s) = E[v|ω2s]
= E[v|x2s + z2 − εs]








































































I have four equations and four unknowns:
β1s =

































First, taking equations C.32 and C.33, solving for λ1 +λ2 and setting the results equal,
gets us:
2β1s + β2s = β1s + 2β2s
⇓
β1s = β2s ≡ βs
(C.36)




Note that Eq. (C.34) and (C.35) are equivalent. Let’s use the first one and substitute
Eq. (C.37):


























Using Eq. (C.37), there are infinitely many solutions. Assume a symmetric equilibrium















I can derive the inverse of price informativeness as:



























which will be identical for Asset 2, since their prices are the same by construction.
C.1.4 Economy m: With Segmented Speculators and Single Market Maker
In this case, there is no arbitrageur, and, instead, the market maker uses order
flow in both markets to set prices, which will be the same since they reflect the full
information set of the market maker. I will have the following demand and price
functions
x1m = β1mv (C.41)
x2m = β2mv (C.42)
Pm = λ1mω1m + λ2mω2m. (C.43)
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For Speculator 1:
x1m = arg max
x̃1m
E[x̃1m(v − Pm(ω1m, ω2m))|v]
= arg max
x̃1m
E[x̃1m(v − λ1mω1m − λ2mω2m)|v]
= arg max
x̃1m
E[x̃1m(v − λ1m(x̃1m + z1)− λ2m(x̃2m + z2))|v]
= arg max
x̃1m




x̃1m(v − λ2mβ2mv)− λ1mx̃21m
}
(C.44)
First order condition for Speculator 1:








Similarly, for Speculator 2:
x2m = arg max
x̃2m
E[x̃2m(v − Pm(ω1m, ω2m))|v]
= arg max
x̃2m
E[x̃2m(v − λ1mω1m − λ2mω2m)|v]
= arg max
x̃2m
E[x̃2m(v − λ1m(x̃1m + z1)− λ2m(x̃2m + z2))|v]
= arg max
x̃2m




x̃2m(v − λ1mβ1mv)− λ2mx̃22m
}
(C.46)
First order condition for Speculator 2:









The market maker breaks even in expectation:
Pm = E[v|ω1m, ω2m]


















































≡ λ1mω1m + λ2mω2m
(C.48)



















































































































I derive the inverse of price informativeness as:
Var(v|Pm) = Var(v|λ1m(x1m + z1) + λ2m(x2m + z2))
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